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Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
Beiträge: 1574
Wohnort: Stadt

Beitrag Afghanistan Antworten mit Zitat
Noch einmal Afghanistan:

Zitat:
Below, her village — Bagh, in the Maamand Valley in eastern Afghanistan — has been gutted by the Islamic State militants who overran it three months ago. Most of the houses have been looted, burned or simply taken over by the fighters, and the 80 or so families that lived there have been forced to seek refuge near Jalalabad city.

Malaika, vigorous in her late 50s, is one of three women who decided to stay behind to try to keep their homes.

“The poor woman is guarding the windows and the planks of the two rooms that remain,” her husband, Mullah Jan, said last month. Mr. Jan was held by the militants for two months until he paid them $500 ransom. “We had 10 goats and one cow. They took all of it.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/world/asia/afghan-isis-branch-makes-inroads-in-battle-against-taliban.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&smtyp=cur&_r=0


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
13. Oktober 2015, 10:06 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Ölbusiness Antworten mit Zitat
Wie der IS Öl und Diesel an seine Feinde verkauft:

Zitat:
Despite all these efforts, dozens of interviews with Syrian traders and oil engineers as well as western intelligence officials and oil experts reveal a sprawling operation almost akin to a state oil company that has grown in size and expertise despite international attempts to destroy it.

Minutely managed, Isis’ oil company actively recruits skilled workers, from engineers to trainers and managers.

Estimates by local traders and engineers put crude production in Isis-held territory at about 34,000-40,000 bpd. The oil is sold at the wellhead for between $20 and $45 a barrel, earning the militants an average of $1.5m a day.

“It’s a situation that makes you laugh and cry,” said one Syrian rebel commander in Aleppo, who buys diesel from Isis areas even as his forces fight the group on the front lines. “But we have no other choice, and we are a poor man’s revolution. Is anyone else offering to give us fuel?”

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/b8234932-719b-11e5-ad6d-f4ed76f0900a.html





_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
14. Oktober 2015, 13:34 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Russland und USA Antworten mit Zitat
Russland dürfte tatsächlich eine grossere Bedrohung für den IS darstellen als die USA:

Zitat:
On the other hand Russia has clear geopolitical interests behind defending the Syrian state against terrorism. Syria has been an ally of Russia for decades, and it hosts Russia’s only Mediterranean naval base. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that Russia is entering Syria to prevent ‘another Libyan scenario,’ or in other words – to prevent it from turning into a failed state as the US had done to Libya.

Furthermore Russian interests in fighting terrorism are tied directly to Russia’s own national security. Russia has had problems in the past with terrorism within their own borders and in particular, Chechnya. Chechen fighters who have joined ISIS in Syria, have now threatened to take the fight to Moscow. Jabhat Al Nusra, Syria’s Al Qaeda faction, have also called for terror attacks in Russia. In an interview with 60 minutes, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin stated that it is better to fight terrorists in Syria than wait until they return to Russia.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/why-russia-is-serious-about-fighting-terrorism-and-the-us-isnt-america-protects-al-qaeda-and-isis/5483347


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Übersetzung Guardian-Artikel Antworten mit Zitat
Deutsche Übersetzung eines weiter oben geposteten Artikels aus dem Guardian:

Zitat:
Mehr als ein Jahrhundert lang war Dabiq nichts weiter als ein unscheinbares Dorf im Norden Syriens – ein Fleck auf einer weiten Ebene zwischen der Grenze zur Türkei und dem Irak. Nichts deutete darauf hin, dass dieser Ort einmal das Schicksal von Nationen prägen würde. Einem verwitterten Schild am Dorfeingang zufolge lebten hier einst 4.000 Menschen, von denen die meisten aber wegen fehlender Arbeit fortgegangen waren. Ab 2011 dann auch, um sich dem Aufstand gegen Baschar al-Assad anzuschließen. Während der ersten drei Kriegsjahre lockte die Ankunft eines fremden Autos aber höchstens ein paar gelangweilte Kinder auf die leeren Straßen. Ansonsten bewegte sich in Dabiq nichts.

Die wenigen Männer, die geblieben waren, fanden gelegentlich Arbeit auf einer Baustelle: etwa ein einfaches Haus für einen, der ins Dorf zurückkehrte, nachdem er zehn Jahre lang im Libanon gearbeitet hatte. Oder einen Zaun für den Schrein, der die einzige Sehenswürdigkeit des Orts darstellte – das Grab von Suleiman ibn Abd al-Malik. Der Umayyaden-Kalif wurde hier 717 begraben. Der syrische Bürgerkrieg aber, so schien es, fand anderswo statt.

https://www.freitag.de/autoren/the-guardian/extrem-geplant


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
10. November 2015, 03:59 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Der Krieg, den der IS will Antworten mit Zitat
Über die Strategie des IS:

Zitat:
Today, France has one of the largest Muslim minorities in Europe. French Muslims are also predominantly a social underclass, a legacy of France’s colonial past and indifference to its aftermath. For example, although just 7 to 8 percent of France’s population is Muslim, as much as 70 percent of the prison population is Muslim, a situation that has left a very large number of young French Muslims vulnerable to absorbing radical ideas in prison and out. Within this social landscape, ISIS finds success. France has contributed more foreign fighters to ISIS than any other Western country.

One attacker at the Bataclan concert hall, where the highest number of people were killed, was twenty-nine-year-old Ismaël Omar Mostefaï, a French citizen of Algerian and Portuguese origin from the Paris area. He had a criminal record and had traveled to Syria for a few months between 2013 and 2014—a profile similar to the two Kouachi brothers, also French nationals of Algerian origin living in Paris proper, who had trained with al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen before carrying out the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in January.

http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2015/nov/16/paris-attacks-isis-strategy-chaos/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag IS von innen Antworten mit Zitat
Ein sehr ausführlicher Artikel in vier Teilen:

Zitat:
For all its means of self-enrichment, ISIS hasn’t forgotten about the little guy. It has constructed a social safety net for those it rules in its Islamic welfare state, a linchpin of which is Baghdadi’s own Affordable Care Act.

ISIS members are entitled to free medical treatment and pharmaceuticals, and anyone living in the caliphate can apply for free health care, provided need can be established. “You can go to the doctor or hospital for no money,” Abu Khaled said. “If you can’t go to the doctor or hospital in Islamic State territory, if you have to go abroad, they pay you. No matter what the amount. If you have cancer and you need chemotherapy in Turkey, they will pay for everything, including your hotel. Even if it’s tens of thousands of dollars.”

And doctors in al-Bab hardly complain about losses because medicine is one of the most profitable careers one can have in al-Dawla. Physicians are paid between $4,000 and $5,000 a month to keep them from running off to Turkey.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/11/15/confessions-of-an-isis-spy.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
19. November 2015, 16:00 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Muoit



Anmeldedatum: 31.10.2006
Beiträge: 1498

Beitrag Antworten mit Zitat
Das hier ist etwas versteckt auf der Kosmoprolet-Seite:

Zitat:
Der folgende Text, verfasst unter dem Eindruck der iranischen Revolution, dürfte eine der ersten Abhandlungen über den modernen Islamismus aus linksradikaler Sicht darstellen. Er skizziert dessen Entstehung aus den besonderen Bedingungen der muslimischen Welt heraus, insbesondere aus dem Charakter ihrer Bourgeoisie, und im Bewusstsein, dass die Kritik der Religion die Voraussetzung aller Kritik ist. Damit unterscheidet er sich von der folgenreichen Dummheit derjenigen Linken, die zwischen der Kritik des Islam und dem rassistischen Ressentiment gegen »die Araber« nicht unterscheiden können oder wollen. Gleichzeitig vermeidet er die genauso folgenreiche Dummheit anderer Linker, angesichts der Misere der arabisch-muslimischen Welt einen Lobgesang auf »den Westen« anzustimmen. Für Lakhdar bildet vielmehr die nicht zuletzt von westlichen Staaten abgesicherte Welthungerordnung einen wesentlichen Grund für den Aufstieg der Islamisten. Sie bieten eine irrationale Antwort auf irrationale Verhältnisse.
Lakhdar ging 1981 davon aus, die Islamisten im Iran würden sich nicht lange an der Macht halten können. Diese leider widerlegte Prognose war kein zufälliger Irrtum, sondern folgte aus seiner Grundannahme, der Islamismus sei mit den Erfordernissen des Kapitalismus unvereinbar. Anders gesagt, so gelungen Lakhdars Polemik gegen die noch unterhalb bürgerlicher Verhältnisse agierende islamische »Bourgeoisie« ist (ein in diesem Zusammenhang etwas fragwürdiger Begriff), so sehr zieht sich durch den Text die stillschweigende Ineinssetzung des Kapitalismus schlechthin mit der besonderen, eben »bürgerlichen« Ausprägung, die er auf seinem europäischen Geburtskontinent angenommen hat. Doch offenbar kann eine kapitalistische Warengesellschaft auch unter der Herrschaft der Mullahs existieren.

http://kosmoprolet.org/lafif-lakhdar-warum-der-rueckfall-den-islamischen-archaismus

_________________
Power to the Pöbel!
19. November 2015, 17:36 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Frauen aus Raqqa erzählen Antworten mit Zitat
Deutsche Übersetzung eines Artikels der NYT:

Zitat:
Aws, 25, und Dua, 20, leben heute in einer kleinen Stadt im Süden der Türkei. nachdem sie aus Raqqa und vor den djihadistischen Machthabern geflohen sind. Sie haben hier Asma, 22, eine weitere Deserteurin der Khansaa-Brigade getroffen und Unterschlupf in der großen Gemeinschaft syrischer Flüchtlinge gefunden.

Raqqa ist weithin bekannt als Hauptstadt des vom IS ausgerufenen Kalifats und als Ziel zahlreicher Luftangriffe von immer mehr Ländern, die die jüngsten Terroranschläge des IS vergelten wollen. Aber die Stadt, in der die drei Frauen aufgewachsen sind, war früher ziemlich anders. Unter falschen Namen erzählen sie während zweier Besuche in diesem Herbst mehrere Stunden lang von ihren Erfahrungen unter der IS-Herrschaft und wie die Djihadisten das Leben in Raqqa völlig verändert haben.

https://www.facebook.com/arminwolf.journalist/posts/1125250680820133?_fb_noscript=1


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
27. November 2015, 12:37 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Libyen Antworten mit Zitat
Zum Aufstieg des IS in Libyen:

Zitat:
When the Libyan arm of the Islamic State first raised the group’s black flag over the coastal city of Surt almost one year ago, it was just a bunch of local militants trying to look tough.

Today Surt is an actively managed colony of the central Islamic State, crowded with foreign fighters from around the region, according to residents, local militia leaders and hostages recently released from the city’s main prison.

“The entire Islamic State government there is from abroad — they are the ones who are calling the shots,” said Nuri al-Mangoush, the head of a trucking company based here in Misurata, about 65 miles west of the Islamic State’s territory around Surt. Many of its employees live in Surt, and five were jailed there recently.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/29/world/middleeast/isis-grip-on-libyan-city-gives-it-a-fallback-option.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
29. November 2015, 19:23 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Steuern Antworten mit Zitat
Diesbezüglich funktioniert der IS tatsächlich wie ein Staat:

Zitat:
Across wide expanses of Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State, with the goal of building a credible government, has set up a predatory and violent bureaucracy that wrings every last American dollar, Iraqi dinar and Syrian pound it can from those who live under its control or pass through its territory.

Interviews with more than a dozen people living inside or recently escaped from the Islamic State-controlled territory, and Western and Middle Eastern officials who track the militants’ finances, describe the group as exacting tolls and traffic tickets; rent for government buildings; utility bills for water and electricity; taxes on income, crops and cattle; and fines for smoking or wearing the wrong clothes.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/30/world/middleeast/predatory-islamic-state-wrings-money-from-those-it-rules.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
30. November 2015, 14:37 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Libyen Antworten mit Zitat
Der IS breitet sich in Libyen aus, schon bald westliche Angriffe?

Zitat:
But pinpoint strikes have failed to slow the group’s expansion, and the possible loss of Ajdabiya will be a disaster for Libya, cutting off oil ports and the gas fields that generate electricity, a move that the London-based oil expert John Hamilton says would mean “game over” for the economy.

Officials from the American military’s African Command, Africom, based in Stuttgart, have been visiting the region and, should the political decision be made, western forces are already deployed in strength around Libya’s borders. Along with drones and spy planes, the US has bombers and Marine helicopter-borne units stationed in Spain and Italy. More US drones operate from two bases in Niger, guiding a 3,000-strong force of French paratroopers, Operation Barkhane, on the southern Libyan border against jihadi convoys passing out of the country.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/06/warplanes-libya-next-battlefront-isis-nato


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
06. Dezember 2015, 15:49 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Libyen Antworten mit Zitat
...und trainiert Piloten:

Zitat:
ISIS is training pilots at an airbase in Libya using small planes, some possibly left over from the Qaddafi regime, and at least one flight simulator in an effort experts fear could lead to aerial attacks targeting Europe, according to regional analysts.

The terrorist group, which is bulking up its footprint in the chaotic north African nation even as airstrikes by Russia, the U.S. and other western allies pound its headquarters in Syria, is functioning unfettered in the Mediterranean city of Sirte. Given that Sirte is just a short flight from mainland Europe – Italy is closest of all - the development could mean ISIS is closing in on a bid to take its terrorism to a frightening new level with a multitude of high-profile potential targets within range.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/12/04/isis-takes-flight-terror-group-training-pilots-at-airbase-in-libya/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
06. Dezember 2015, 17:12 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Interviews mit Deserteuren Antworten mit Zitat
Ein sehr informativer Artikel:

Zitat:
This Research Note is based on our first sampling of defectors who made it across the border. Our interlocutors were all Syrians–twelve men and one woman, ranging in age from fourteen to forty-five. They were all Arabs. Three originated from Tell Abyad, four Raqqa, two from Aleppo, and one each from Tishrin, al-Hasakah, el-Aziziye, and Deir ez-Zor. The men had all undergone Shariah indoctrination and military training with IS and had sworn an oath of allegiance (bay’ah) to IS before becoming fighters for the Islamic State. They spent between six and eighteen months as IS fighters and had defected within one year before the interview. Three had been in leadership positions as commanders, one of them as Chief of Security at a base in Raqqa and one of them was the Emir of a town under the control of ISIS before his defection. The rest were ordinary fighters, a prison guard, and the minor, a fourteen year-old child had been groomed to become a suicide bomber.

All of our subjects are now living in the Sanliurfa region of Turkey and all are in hiding, fearing the long arm of IS. They were all married except for the minor, and all of them except for the youngest adult (who had only married the week before the interview) had one or more young children. Our female informant was a mother and was married to a defected IS fighter. She was considered by IS as a member by virtue of her marriage to a fighter. Three of the males were college-educated, one was a law student in his last year, another an Arabic language teacher and the third an Arabic literature teacher. Three were high school graduates. The other adults we interviewed had not finished high school and one even had dropped out of primary school. They were farmers and small business owners. The minor had his middle school education interrupted by the conflict in Syria.

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/475/html


Auch Tristan Leoni, der mit Dauvé den Blog DDT21 animiert, hat einen Artikel zum Kalifat geschrieben. Teil 1:

Zitat:
Avec l’actuelle restructuration du Proche-Orient, nous assistons à la constitution de nouvelles entités, les plus connues étant l’État islamique (EI) et le Rojava (Kurdistan occidental). Celui-ci, parangon de démocratie et de féminisme, serait un rempart contre la barbarie du premier. Car l’État islamique est un monstre, les images le prouvent. Tout le prouve. Il faudrait d’ailleurs le nommer Daech1 car il ne mériterait pas le « noble » qualificatif d’État et n’aurait « rien à voir » avec l’islam. L’explication devrait suffire. Elle n’est pourtant pas suffisante pour comprendre pourquoi et comment, depuis des mois, huit à dix millions de personnes vivent dans un territoire en guerre contre le reste de la planète. Les jours du Califat sont sans doute comptés, mais la question, elle, demeurera : Pourquoi ça marche ?

http://ddt21.noblogs.org/?page_id=667


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
20. Dezember 2015, 17:34 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



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Beitrag Kalifat und Barbarei Antworten mit Zitat
Teil 2:

Zitat:
Mais ce n’est pas tout. Il va falloir rajouter une couche, celle d’un « espoir désespérant ». Celle de l’adhésion, au delà du pragmatisme, d’une partie de cette population au discours et au projet du Califat. Car l’EI peut compter sur la participation active de dizaines de milliers de militants, soldats ou fonctionnaires, mais aussi sur le soutien passif d’un certain nombre d’habitants d’Irak et de Syrie (et sur la passivité prudente ou indifférente de beaucoup d’autres).

Et puis il y a ces dizaines de milliers de jeunes, notamment beaucoup de prolétaires, qui traversent la planète pour vivre au Califat ou y mourir, tandis que tant d’autres en rêvent.

http://ddt21.noblogs.org/?page_id=728


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
30. Dezember 2015, 22:41 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Jihadi Che Antworten mit Zitat
Interessanter Artikel:

Zitat:
Though al-Qaeda and the Islamic State share the same ultimate goal — establishing a global caliphate ruled by an austere version of sharia (Islamic law) — each group maintains a distinct approach to revolutionary warfare. Al-Qaeda has come to favor covert expansion, unacknowledged affiliates, and a relatively quiet organizational strategy designed to carefully build a larger base of support before engaging in open warfare with its foes. By contrast, the Islamic State believes that the time for a broader military confrontation has already arrived, and has loudly disseminated its propaganda to rally as many soldiers as possible to its cause. The group combines shocking violence with an effective propaganda apparatus in an effort to quickly build its base of support.

The Maoist and focoist schools of revolutionary thought provide a useful framework for understanding these groups’ differing strategies. Al-Qaeda exhibits a revolutionary strategy that is both implicitly and explicitly based on the works of Mao Tse-tung, while the Islamic State’s approach is more consonant with the focoist writings of Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Régis Debray.

http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/the-islamic-state-vs-al-qaeda-the-war-within-the-jihadist-movement/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
18. Januar 2016, 22:28 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Jemen Antworten mit Zitat
AQAP und der IS sind alles andere als unglücklich über den Krieg im Jemen:

Zitat:
Yemen is in the midst of a bloody and chaotic civil war that benefits both al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State. As the war continues, AQAP will attempt to acquire and govern more territory while the Islamic State will seek to further radicalize local populations by grafting an Iraqi-style sectarian war onto the existing conflict. Both groups vie for recruits and territory, and their competition could also spark attacks outside of Yemen as AQAP and the Islamic State attempt to demonstrate that they, and not their rival, are at the forefront of the jihadi movement.

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-and-the-islamic-state-benefit-as-yemen-war-drags-on


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Doc Sportello



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Beitrag ....... Antworten mit Zitat
The Islamic State’s obsession with al Qaeda and the Taliban:

Zitat:
The Islamic State and al Qaeda both denounced Saudi Arabia’s mass execution of more than 40 men in early January. Many of the men sentenced to death took part in al Qaeda’s attempt to destabilize the Saudi kingdom from 2003 to 2006. But the authors of Dabiq argue al Qaeda’s response to the Saudi executions was lacking.

Zawahiri “came out and criticized the apostate Saudi regime but made no mention of the evil scholars backing them,” Dabiq’s authors argue. Instead, Zawahiri “merely advised the ‘scholars’ of the Arabian Peninsula to speak out against the government.”

The “caliphate” urges its supporters to outdo al Qaeda and attack the Saudi clerical establishment. It “was already obligatory to spill the blood of these palace scholars,” Dabiq’s authors write, “for they had apostatized years ago, defending and supporting” those who wage “war against Islam.” After the mass execution, “the reason to kill them now is even greater.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/01/dabiq-magazine-shows-islamic-state-obsession-qaeda-taliban.php


Zitat:
We agreed to have a meting with the 21-year-old Furkat in the subway of one of European capitals. I did not know his phone number or his surname, only the fact that he had been in the "Islamic State" (IS), and that he writes in Russian with a lot of mistakes.

I assumed that he came from some Caucasian republic, and I imagined an adult male with a huge beard.

The guy proved to be a native of Central Asia, with a barely noticeable facial hair. None of his external parameters did not fit my idea of an IS militant.

Furkat got to Syria from Moscow. He left his education, when being in the second year of a higher school, got converted to Islam, began practicing namaz (prayer) and searching for answers to the questions about his role, place and mission, and found a way out only in taking up arms and "going to fight against the tyrant and dictator Bashar al-Assad."

His way to Syria was not fast, as for a few months Furkat tried to find an opportunity to go to the front; he even spoke openly addressing Imams at mosques and parishioners asking to help him to achieve his aim.

It is quite easy to imagine the reaction of the people, whom Furkat had addressed. They did not even try to dissuade him. They believed that he was a professional provocateur, therefore, they just pushed him away.

http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/travel_to_the_islamic_state.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Spital in Mosul Antworten mit Zitat
Eigentlich ist die Gesundheitsversorgung im IS gratis, die Realität sieht jedoch etwas anders aus:

Zitat:
The extremist group known as the Islamic State has been in control of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul for over a year now and health care there has become more and more problematic, a report from the provincial council-in-exile said several months ago.

Doctors, nurses and patients inside Mosul this week confirmed the report’s findings, saying that while some of things mentioned in the report have changed, others have stayed the same.

“In Mosul, hospitals have not closed – but they have certainly reduced their services,” says Khalid al-Musali*, a doctor working in Mosul. “There are no vaccines for children and many essential medicines are no longer available. There is also a shortfall in basic services. For example, there’s no electricity in hospital corridors for 20 hours a day and patient’s rooms are lit by battery. Only the corridors in the emergency department and the intensive care unit are lit continuously.”

http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/society/5206/Medical-Treatment-in-Mosul-Reserved-For-Extremists-And-Their-Families.htm


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag IS vs. AQ Antworten mit Zitat
Der Autor ist zwar ein liberaler Forscher mit einer beträchtlichen Sympathie für die von Qatar unterstützte Ahrar al-Sham, trotzdem ist der Text lesenswert und liefert viele Informationen:

Zitat:
International jihad has undergone a wholesale internal revolution in recent years. The dramatic emergence of the Islamic State (IS) and its proclamation of a Caliphate means that the world no longer faces one Sunni jihadi threat, but two, as IS and al-Qaida compete on the global stage. What is the relationship between the groups and how do their models differ? Is IS’s rapid organizational expansion sustainable? Can al-Qaida adapt and respond?

In a new Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, Charles Lister explores al-Qaida and IS’s respective evolutions and strategies. He argues that al-Qaida and its affiliates are now playing a long game by seeking to build alliances and develop deep roots within unstable and repressed societies. IS, on the other hand, looks to destabilize local dynamics so it can quickly seize control over territory.

Lister finds that the competition between IS and al-Qaida for jihadi supremacy will continue, and will likely include more terrorist attacks on the West. Accordingly, he calls for the continued targeting of al-Qaida leaders, the disruption of jihadi financial activities, and greater domestic intelligence and counter-radicalization efforts. Lister concludes, however, that state instability across the Muslim world must be addressed or jihadis will continue to thrive.

http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2016/01/27-islamic-state-challenges-alqaida-lister#.VqjT3cUzkdM.twitter


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag In einem IS-Knast Antworten mit Zitat
Gespräche mit ehemaligen IS-Häflingen:

Zitat:
The jihadis had scrawled a warning above the stairs that descended to their underground prison: Forbidden to enter.

At the bottom, a dusty chair sat in darkness behind a heavy desk. An ISIS guard once kept watch there, but now the prison was empty. The only sound was dripping water, and the only relics of the terror inflicted on the captives were the messages on the walls. One had met new arrivals at the desk: Death comes to you. God is great.

http://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/life-and-death-inside-an-isis-prison?utm_term=.ojeA2OVbPy#.tfZ0y2AQqJ


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Rezension Antworten mit Zitat
Rezension eines Buches von Charles Lister, der sehr klar die Position eines Teils der westlichen Bourgeoisie verkörpert: Unsere Verbündete auf der Arabischen Halbinsel haben viel Kohle, also sollten wir sie auch gegen Russland unterstützen:

Zitat:
Is Lister’s book just another to add to the pile? It focuses on the Syrian jihad and, unlike most of the other books, it assesses and outlines the growth and actions of all the jihadist and Islamist groups in Syria - not just ISIS.

The 20 or so non-ISIS jihadist groups are hugely significant too, not least Jabhat al-Nusra, which may well prove to be a much thornier long-term challenge than its more extreme jihadist counterpart. Lister draws on his experience of face-to-face meetings with representatives of more than 100 Syrian armed groups and a two-year-long dialogue process run by the Brookings Institute where he is based.

Lister estimates the number of jihadists (as opposed to Islamists) in Syria to be in excess of 50,000. So far, more than 25,000 jihadists have journeyed to Syria to fight, far more than the numbers of mujahideen who went to Afghanistan in the 1980s

http://www.middleeasteye.net/in-depth/reviews/book-review-syrian-jihad-charles-r-lister-1860395104


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag IS eine "Revolution"? Antworten mit Zitat
Zwar viel Anthropologendogmatik, aber trotzdem lesenswert:

Zitat:
But there is also a subliminal joy felt across the region for those who reject the Islamic State’s murderous violence yet yearn for the revival of a Muslim Caliphate and the end to a nation-state order that the Great Powers invented and imposed. It is an order that has failed, and that the US, Russia and their respective allies are trying willy-nilly to resurrect, and it is an order that many in the region believe to be the root of their misery. What the ISIS revolution is not, is a simple desire to return to the ancient past. The idea that ISIS seeks a return to medieval times makes no more sense than the idea that the US Tea Party wants to return to 1776. ‘We are not sending people back to the time of the carrier pigeon,’ Abu Mousa, ISIS’s press officer in Raqqa, has said. ‘On the contrary, we will benefit from development. But in a way that doesn’t contradict the religion.’

https://aeon.co/essays/why-isis-has-the-potential-to-be-a-world-altering-revolution


Der Test ist auch auf Französisch übersetzt worden.

_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Zarqawi und Iran Antworten mit Zitat
Wenn man nach Jemen oder Syrien schaut, ist das wohl schon sehr veraltet, aber sehr aufschlussreich:

Zitat:
When Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was organizing his jihadist organization in Afghanistan called Jund al-Sham it included cells and routes through Iran. In 1999, Zarqawi travelled to Afghanistan for the second time after he was amnestied from prison in Jordan. When he arrived in the country he stayed in an area under the control of the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Zarqawi then met with Osama bin Laden in Kandahar. The two did not get along as they had different views on jihad, but prominent Al Qaeda leader Saif al-Adel thought that the group should maintain contacts with Zarqawi That led Al Qaeda to provide Zarqawi with $200,000 to help him set up his own camp in Herat along the Afghanistan-Iranian border in 2000. There he went about creating his own network that stretched to Europe and Iran. The Iranian city of Mashhad for example, became an important way station for men and material to enter Zarqawi’s camp. His top operative in Iran was a man named Abu Ali who ran and coordinated a cell in Germany. Afghanistan had become a failed state controlled by various factions and warlords after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. Zarqawi had missed out on the war against the communists in the country, but like many other jihadists felt it provided a perfect setting to start his own organization. This was probably where Tehran first became aware of his activities as it supported both Hekmatyar and Al Qaeda. It also did nothing about him establishing his supply lines through Iran.

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2016/02/irans-ties-with-al-qaeda-in-iraqs-abu.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Libyen u.a. Antworten mit Zitat
Schon bald westliche Truppen in Libyen?

Zitat:
FIVE years after Western air power helped remove Muammar Qaddafi, the chances of another intervention in Libya are steadily increasing. Islamic State may be retreating in Iraq and under pressure in Syria, but in Libya it is a growing menace. At a meeting in Rome on February 2nd of the international coalition against Islamic State (IS), Libya was high on the agenda. That followed talks in Paris on January 22nd in which General Joe Dunford, the chairman of America’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreed with his French opposite number that they were “looking to take decisive military action” against IS in Libya. It has since been confirmed that American and British special forces are already on the ground there in small numbers, making contact with local militias.

http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21690057-libyas-civil-war-has-given-caliphate-fresh-opportunities-western-military


Derweil fragen sich liberale Forscher, ob der IS die Kunst des Regierens beherrscht:

Zitat:
More than a year after Mosul fell to ISIS in June 2014, sources report that civilians there are becoming increasingly critical of ISIS rule. Iraqis have recently described life in Mosul as a “nightmare,” “intolerable,” and “a big prison.” Others say that they have “no future” and are living in “a society where it’s normal for children to watch their elders being murdered.”

These anecdotes do not prove conclusively that public opinion has shifted, but they suggest that local support for ISIS rule in Mosul may have eroded since last June, when some civilians cautiously welcomed improvements in security and essential services that followed ISIS’s takeover of the city. External observers may find it hard to believe that any civilian living in fear of death by decapitation or stoning could regard such a system as legitimate. Yet, Syrians and Iraqis whom I have interviewed say that attitudes toward ISIS governance are often more favorable than outsiders commonly assume, particularly in the early stages of ISIS rule.

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/11/20-experts-weigh-in-isis-governance-revkin-mccants


Teil 2:

Zitat:
With clear shortcomings in oral testimony, I prefer to focus instead on internal ISIS documents to understand the evolution in governance—as well as problems facing ISIS that we don’t see in the endless streams of propaganda. To be sure, this method also has limitations: though I have managed to compile hundreds of documents so far, they likely constitute only a small fraction of the whole cache. Only if the ISIS project collapses with loss of major strongholds like Raqqa and Mosul—and hopefully the capture of tens of thousands of documents—will we get a fuller picture.

Even so, the documents unearthed so far yield a number of important insights. The ISIS bureaucracy is ostensibly comprehensive and impressive, but it is clear that as time progresses, the state project is facing challenges due to pressure from its enemies.

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/02/03-experts-weigh-in-isis-governance-altamimi-mccants


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Frankreich, Afrika, Libyen Antworten mit Zitat
Die Nr. 8 von Dâr al-Islam, gewissermassen die französische Version von Dabiq, enthält ein Riesendossier, um die Anschläge in Paris im November zu rechtfertigen. Vermutlich v.a. weil die bei ihrem Zielpublikum in den Banlieues nicht besonders gut angekommen sind:

Zitat:
On February 6, 2016 The Islamic State published the 8th issue of its French magazine Dar al-Islam. This issue was almost entirely dedicated to the attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015.

https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2016/02/07/dar-al-islam-issue-8-attentats-sur-la-voie-prophetique/


Auch in Afrika breitet sich der Jihadismus aus:

Zitat:
Sub-Saharan Africa was long seen as relatively immune to the call of Islamist militancy because of its unorthodox religious practices—rooted in Sufism, a more mystical mode of Islam that focuses on individual spirituality—and its traditional cultures, which are far removed from strict Middle Eastern ways. Today the area has become the fastest-growing front of global jihad—and perhaps its deadliest.

Driving this change is a crucial transformation of the way that Islam is being practiced by the 250 million Muslims living south of the Sahara—a population that is projected to grow by 60% over the next three decades. “The Islam that is spreading through society in Africa today is the new active Islam, not the dormant, Sufi, private-life only [version]. It’s going into policy, into economy, into culture, into education. It’s going into public life,” said Hassan al-Turabi, the leading ideologue of political Islam in Africa, who hosted Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders as Sudan’s de facto ruler in the 1990s.

http://www.wsj.com/article_email/jihad-comes-to-africa-1454693025-lMyQjAxMTI2MTAxNzcwNjc2Wj


Eine ausführliche Reportage über den IS in Libyen:

Zitat:
But even before Qaddafi’s downfall, two trends had appeared that would ultimately turn Libya into the chaotic and violent failed state it is today. First, cracks widened within the already uneasy alliance of radical Islamists and former regimists who banded together to overthrow Qaddafi. The polarization between Islamists and their rivals reached crisis point following the 2013 overthrow of the Islamist leader Mohamed Morsi in neighboring Egypt, long a North Star in Libya’s political trajectory.

Second, the rebel militias who overthrew Qaddafi did not disband. They argued that the remnants of Qaddafi’s security forces were either incompetent or untrustworthy, and would need to be supplemented or replaced. The “thuwar,” or revolutionaries, formed out of the uprising against Qaddafi or its immediate aftermath, took over much of the country. When political grievances swelled, they turned their guns on each other.

http://www.buzzfeed.com/borzoudaragahi/isis-is-running-rampant-in-libya?utm_term=.yq0JmlylO#.vgq126O6r


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Afghanistan Antworten mit Zitat
Eine Serie zum IS in Afghanistan:

Zitat:
They also appear to be stricter in regards to enforcing their interpretation of Sharia in Afghanistan. Unlike the Taliban, IS-K has burned opium fields as well as banned cigarettes. They also set up their own school systems in areas they control. These schools largely serve the purpose of brainwashing students and preparing them to fight for the group. IS-K propaganda is generally high quality, especially when compared to the Afghan Taliban’s propaganda. Wilayat Khorasan even operates a radio station in Eastern Nangarhar (Shakib, 2015). Khorasan’s sleeker propaganda is one major factor in driving their spread in Afghanistan.

http://theosintblog.com/2015/12/17/isis-in-afghanistans-nangarhar-province/


Teil 2 von 4:

Zitat:
Despite the heavy losses ISIS has been facing in Syria and Iraq (with the Iraqi Government recapturing nearly all of Ramadi from ISIS in December and January), ISIS growth has not ceased in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Estimates by the UK based Royal United Services Institute put IS-K numbers at 7,000-8,500 in Afghanistan and 2,000-3,000 in Pakistan. In this write-up we will be analyzing and mapping IS-K’s leadership structure.

http://theosintblog.com/2016/02/08/isis-in-afghanistan-pt-2-wilayat-khorasans-leadership-structure/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Philippinen Antworten mit Zitat
Bericht über eine neue "Filiale" in den Philippinen:

Zitat:
The identity of the specific group the fighters shown in the video belong to is uncertain. The jihadist groups Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and a group calling itself Ansar al Khilafah in the Philippines have all either pledged allegiance or expressed support for the Islamic State in the past. Traditionally, ASG has had ties to al Qaeda. In June 2014, a master ASG bomb maker, who was thought to have been killed in a drone strike in North Waziristan, Pakistan, turned up in the Philippines. The operative, Abdul Basit Usman, was wanted by the US for his involvement in multiple bombings in the Philippines and also had ties to Jemaah Islamiyah, an al Qaeda-linked group in Southeast Asia. Usman was reportedly killed earlier this year in a shootout with the Filipino military, however, he was also reported dead months later after a shootout with another jihadist outfit.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/12/islamic-state-supporters-show-training-camp-in-the-philippines.php


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Regierungsstrukturen Antworten mit Zitat
Teil 3 über die Regierungsstrukturen des IS:

Zitat:
In October 2006—when the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was declared—the leader of al-Qaida in the Land of Two Rivers (better known as AQI), Abu Ayyub al-Masri (Abu Hamza al-Muhajir) pledged allegiance to the new self-declared leader of the faithful, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi. In a January 2007 book, ISI’s Shaykh ‘Uthman ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Tamimi explains the rationale for declaring the state. In it, he also outlines the state’s responsibilities for areas it controls: prosecuting criminals and sinners, implementation of the hudud (fixed punishments in the Qur’an and Hadith), mediating and resolving conflicts, providing security, distributing food and relief, and selling oil and gas.

Although it called itself a state, the Islamic State of Iraq controlled only small amounts of territory, for limited periods of time—in no small part because of the American military occupation, but also due to insurgent and tribal competition for power. It attempted to show a veneer of legitimacy by establishing a cabinet of ministries in April 2007 and September 2009. Because of ISI’s limitations, it was nearly impossible to resolve conflicts, provide security, distribute food and relief, or sell oil and gas. Instead, it fell back on mostly only instituting hisba (moral policing) activities and targeting enemies as murtadin (apostates) and therefore legitimate to target and kill. Ten years ago, therefore, ISI did not live up to its own standards of governance excellence.

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/02/09-experts-weigh-in-isis-governance-zelin-mccants#.VruB5D6jgrA.twitter


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Pakistan & Kriegsstrategie Antworten mit Zitat
Der IS in Pakistan:

Zitat:
Daesh, otherwise referred to as Islamic State or ISIL, has been expanding its presence around the world beyond its stronghold in Syria and Iraq. In the coming weeks, Strife will be focussing a number of articles more closely on emerging areas of concern in Asia, speaking with practitioners on the ground and academics who interrogate the potential threat posed by Daesh. The first piece is from Strife Senior Editor Zoha Waseem who contributes this two-part analysis on Daesh from Pakistan. You can view part II here.

https://strifeblog.org/2016/02/06/daesh-in-pakistan-an-evolving-militant-landscape-part-i%E2%88%97/


Albert A. Stahel zur Kriegsstrategie des IS:

Zitat:
Let us delve a bit deeper into the aspect of guerrilla warfare. In April 2015, you published an article highlighting that Saddam Hussein had been inspired by the concept of guerrilla warfare coined by the Brazilian Carlos Marighella. How did it impact Saddam Hussein’s strategy in the 2003 Iraq War and has it transcended to the Islamic State?

In an interview given just before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein mentioned that he was fascinated by the writings of Carlos Marighella. One of Marighella’s main ideas is for the creation of small, militia-like forces that are capable of operating behind enemy lines. This is exactly what Saddam Hussein intended when he created the Fedayeen – the only forces that actively resisted the intervention of the Americans and their Coalition of the Willing. What is interesting is that the Fedayeen not only survived the occupation, but have now also become an integral part of the new armies under the Islamic State.

https://strifeblog.org/2016/02/12/isis-and-its-conduct-of-war-interview-with-professor-dr-albert-a-stahel/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Organhandel Antworten mit Zitat
Bericht über den Organhandel des IS:

Zitat:
ISIL harvesting organs of prisoners and transplanting them into its fighters or for trade

Fatwa is an order issued by the religious clergy who are considered the elite that is capable of derive the necessary justifications from the religious texts and the reality people live, and it is tantamount to the divine order because they, the clergy, are the heir of the prophet, as they are described in the doctrinal texts, therefore, they are authorized to issue “divine orders” (aka Fatwa) which is an indisputable and unchallenged order, and its execution is mandatory the moment it is issued, and violating it would lead to accuse the violator with infidelity because he/she is clearly violating a divine order. And this is what ISIL is basing its orders and decisions upon.

https://mosuleye.wordpress.com/2016/02/18/mosul-eye-special-report-isil-organ-trade-2016contribution-of-mosulyoon/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Königreich vs. Kalifat Antworten mit Zitat
Sehr lesenswerter Text:

Zitat:
Throughout 2015, several authors offered rather unfavorable comparisons of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic State, some drawing a direct line from one to the other. They pointed out the similar educational curricula used by the two and the shared practice of beheading, among other things. Kamel Daoud, in a November 2015 New York Times op-ed, argued that “Saudi Arabia is a Daesh that has made it,” referring to the group by the Arabic acronym for its former name—a “dressed up” form of the same thing. But for the most part these comparisons are wide of the mark, as Saudi Arabia seeks partnership with the West and does not aspire to global conquest.

The comparison worth noting is the one in the minds of the Islamic State’s jihadi thinkers, the idea that Saudi Arabia is a failed version of the Islamic State. As they see it, Saudi Arabia started out, way back in the mid-eighteenth century, as something much like the Islamic State but gradually lost its way, abandoning its expansionist tendencies and sacrificing the aggressive spirit of early Wahhabism at the altar of modernity. This worldview is the starting point for understanding the contest between the kingdom and the caliphate, two very different versions of Islamic states competing over a shared religious heritage and territory.

http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/18/kingdom-and-caliphate-duel-of-islamic-states/iu4w


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Vorläufer des IS? Antworten mit Zitat
Zum "Islamischen Emirat von Kunar":

Zitat:
The Islamic Emirate of Kunar was a Salafi Islamic state founded by Jamil al-Rahman and his political party in Afghanistan in 1990. This proto-state was an early and short-lived experiment that captured the attention of Salafi leaders and activists throughout the Muslim world. Following his assassination in 1991, al-Rahman was variously eulogized and reviled by Salafi leaders. Although not well known in the United States, this emirate was a modern ideological and political predecessor to today’s self-anointed Islamic State. In fact, some of the mujahideen involved with al-Rahman’s political organization later influenced the founders of the Islamic State and in at least one case are prominently involved with the group’s expansion into Afghanistan. This report analyzes previously unstudied primary sources in Persian and Pashto to illuminate how the Islamic Emirate of Kunar came into being. While this analysis is of historical value, it is also helpful for contextualizing current events in the region.

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-first-islamic-state-a-look-back-at-the-islamic-emirate-of-kunar


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Revolte in Faludscha?

Zitat:
Sunni tribesmen have attacked Islamic State militants in the Iraqi city of Fallujah, the Iraqi military and local officials said Friday, overrunning and burning one of their headquarters as resentment against the group grows.

After the unrest in two neighborhoods, Issa al-Issawi, the mayor in exile of the city 45 miles west of Baghdad, warned that there would be “mass slaughter” unless the tribesmen received assistance.

The flare-up was the first notable sign of armed opposition to the Islamic State inside the city since the group took control of Fallujah more than two years ago. Ill will against the group has been mounting in recent months amid what the United Nations has described as a growing humanitarian crisis inside the city.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/sunni-tribesmen-clash-with-islamic-state-in-fallujah-as-resentment-boils/2016/02/19/2a21ce95-e7c0-4a3c-89e8-f02005d9400b_story.html?tid=pm_world_pop_b


IS, Baath-Partei und Kriegsstrategie:

Zitat:
The Islamic State has seized large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria, handily defeating state armies and rebel groups. The conventional wisdom is that its large contingent of former Ba’athist army officers is the key to its military success. Although overlap exists between the Islamic State’s techniques and Ba’athist military doctrine and tactical methods, there are also many differences. A hybrid of experiences including lessons learned from the Iraqi insurgency and tactics imported by Chechen jihadis has influenced the Islamic State’s military posture and tactics. Three case studies comparing the Islamic State’s battles to Ba’athist campaigns sheds light on the organization’s military doctrine.

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-military-doctrine-of-the-islamic-state-and-the-limits-of-baathist-influence


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Afghanistan Antworten mit Zitat
Teil 3:

Zitat:
ISIS produces content in a variety of languages ranging from Mandarin Chinese to French. While the majority of ISIS propaganda is produced in Arabic, there has been an increase in Urdu, Pashto and Dari propaganda through late 2015 and early 2016. IS-K’s effectiveness at propaganda will partially dictate whether they can peel away fighters from the Afghan Taliban. Thus we will be analyzing the various types of propaganda used by IS-K, as well as discuss some of the strategy and rhetoric IS-K uses in its propaganda. To do this we must first define what IS-K considers to be its territory of “Khorasan.”

http://theosintblog.com/2016/02/20/isis-in-afghanistan-pt-3-analyzing-wilayat-khoarasans-propaganda/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Libyen Antworten mit Zitat
Zum IS in Libyen und seinen Netzwerken:

Zitat:
Indeed, intelligence officials said there was emerging evidence that the Islamic State had turned to its affiliate in Nigeria — the Islamic militant organization called Boko Haram, which was formerly aligned with Al Qaeda — to poach young commanders and fighters from Al Qaeda’s affiliate in northwest Africa and from its Shabab franchise in Somalia.

Previous attempts by senior Islamic State leaders to reach out directly to those Qaeda groups received the silent treatment, the officials said. But the new approach, while still in its early stages, seems to be gaining traction.

The Senegalese authorities recently reported that 30 men had gone to Libya to fight with the Islamic State there, trends that officials in Niger, Nigeria and Mali have also noticed.

As the Islamic State pushes closer to some of the poorer countries of the Sahel region, like Niger and Mauritania, the authorities here believe there will be no shortage of unemployed young men who are eager to join the fight.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/world/africa/us-scrambles-to-contain-growing-isis-threat-in-libya.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Stockende Expansion Antworten mit Zitat
Zum mässigen Erfolg einiger "Filialen":

Zitat:
Judging from the Islamic State’s propaganda, it would appear the group is rapidly overtaking the Muslim world. The Islamic State has declared wilayats (provinces) in ten countries spanning from Nigeria to the Caucasus region. It has executed high-profile attacks in several otherwise stable countries, including Tunisia, Turkey, Kuwait, France, and the United States. The group has championed its victories and downplayed its defeats at every turn, portraying itself as a military behemoth destined to restore the caliphate to its former glory. In short, the Islamic State would like the world — and especially prospective recruits — to believe it is “remaining and expanding” (baqiya wa tatamaddad), a slogan that defines the group’s propaganda.

Yet in reality, between state security forces and rival jihadist groups, the Islamic State has encountered one serious obstacle after another as it has tried to expand its presence beyond Syria and Iraq. Several of its nascent affiliates met decisive defeat. In some places, the Islamic State has been its own worst enemy, as personality clashes and disagreements over strategy created deep cleavages.

http://warontherocks.com/2016/02/neither-remaining-nor-expanding-the-islamic-states-global-expansion-struggles/


Und ein Kommentar zum Artikel:

Zitat:
Gartenstein-Ross argues that the losses for the Islamic State affiliates undermine a core message the group tries to convey to future recruits: that it's constantly expanding and growing stronger. "The group's failures as it tries to expand beyond Syria and Iraq could cast doubt on its entire global caliphate project," he writes.

Not all experts entirely agree. Cole Bunzel, a doctoral candidate who researches jihadi ideology and the Islamic State at Princeton University, told me that while it's true that some affiliates are little more than paper organizations, the Islamic State has been more successful than al Qaeda in rapidly establishing branches in other countries.

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-02-23/where-islamic-state-stumbles-in-its-war-with-al-qaeda


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Holcim in Syrien Antworten mit Zitat
Schau an, schau an, die Schweizer Baumafia ist nun auch in Syrien am Start:

Zitat:
Zaman Al Wasl opens an investigation about Lafarge Cement Syria company and publishes it in parts, in this part concentrating on the relationship between the company and the Islamic State and the mediators between both of them.

Lafarge is a French industrial company specialising in three major products: cement, construction aggregates, and concrete.

On July 10, 2015, Lafarge merged with Holcim, a Swiss cement company. On July 15, the new company was officially launched around the globe under the name of Lafarge-Holcim, creating a new leader in the Building Materials sector. It has 2500 factory around the world in 90 countries worth a profit of $32 billion a year, the number of worker reaches to 115 thousand workers.

Lafarge Cement Syria was established in Jalbiyeh town, between Ras Alain and Ayn al-Arab "Kobani", 160 km away from Aleppo, production started in 2010 at volume between 2.5 and 3 million tonnes.

https://en.zamanalwsl.net/mobile/readNews.php?id=14166#.VszoMte0fbQ.twitter


Die Betreuung von gewissen Kunden, wie Ahmad, vom IS, scheint etwas mühsam zu sein:



_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag IS vs. AQ Antworten mit Zitat
Zur Zukunft von IS und AQ:

Zitat:
As we continue onwards in the so-called Long War, it’s a good time to reflect on where we are in the fight against al-Qaida and its bête noire, the Islamic State. Both organizations have benefited from the chaos unleashed by the Arab Spring uprisings but they have taken different paths. Will those paths converge again or will the two organizations continue to remain at odds? Who has the best strategy at the moment? And what political changes might happen in the coming year that will reconfigure their rivalry for leadership of the global jihad?

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/02/24-experts-weigh-in-alqaida-isis-lister-mccants


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Bangladesch Antworten mit Zitat
Aufschlussreich, sowohl zum Thema, als auch zum Charakter der liberalen "Anti-Terror-Forschung":

Zitat:
Bangladesh has attracted international media attention for heightened militant activities in 2015, particularly after a series of killings of bloggers by a local militant group allegedly associated with Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and after murders of foreign nationals, responsibility of which was claimed by the Islamic State (IS). Islamist militant groups in Bangladesh which emerged in the 1990s have undergone several transformations. Originally grown out of the volunteers who joined the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, these groups have since then taken different shapes. Since the 1990s, five ‘generations’ of militant groups appeared on the scene. In some measures, the militant groups have come full circle: they began as a result of a global agenda fighting an ‘atheist’ Communist system (war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan) to now being part of establishing a global ‘khilafat’ (by joining the IS in Syria and Iraq) via pursuing a circumscribed local agenda for a period in the early 2000s. Despite such transformations, very little is known about the Bangladeshi militants. This article attempts to address this lacuna by examining the socio-demographic profile of Bangladeshi militants arrested between July 2014 and June 2015. The findings reveal a significant diversity among the militants. Contrary to public perceptions in Bangladesh, significant numbers of militants are well-educated and come from a middle class background.

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/485/html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Das absolute AQ-anti-IS-Pamphlet Antworten mit Zitat
IS: Ihr seid die Juden des Jihad:

Zitat:
This evil-tongued jurist officially called Shaykh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi and Shaykh Abu Qatadah Al-Filistini donkeys and sissy pimps, and he called Shaykh Ayman Zawahiri foolish and senile, and called the leaders of Al-Qaedah the Jews of Jihad.


AQ: Ihr seid die eigentlichen Schiiten:

Zitat:
So ISIS keeps their chain-Takfir on Shaykh Usama bin Laden and many other scholars and Mujahid leaders hidden, and
keeping such convictions hidden is the same Takiyyah the Shia Rawafid use. Contrary to Ahl Sunnah wal Jamaah who
openly declare their convictions. Another similarity they share with the Rawafid is that they slanders the companions of
Shaykh Usama bin Laden, much like the Rawafid slander the companions of the Prophet (saws), because they know that
they cannot attack the Prophet (saws) directly, as this is unacceptable by everyone.


Zwischen den Zeilen findet man Mao, Marighella, Guevara und vieles mehr, sehr aufschlussreich. "The crumbling tower of lies"

_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Vorratsmangel bei Boko Haram Antworten mit Zitat
Da sie so ziemlich alle Leute aus ihrem Gebiet umbringen oder vertreiben, wird langsam das Essen knapp:

Zitat:
In Cameroon, soldiers drove Boko Haram fighters from the border town of Kerawa in October, but it has since been assaulted at least six times, with militants beheading a young man in one attack. Early last month, a suicide bomber entered Kerawa and blew himself up behind a house, killing a tailor. According to a State Department report on the episode, the bomber had been looking for a large group of people to kill, but after all the attacks in the town, the streets were empty.

The mass displacement caused by Boko Haram — and by the sometimes indiscriminate military campaign to defeat it — has left 1.4 million people in the region without adequate food supplies, the United Nations says. In Borno State in northeastern Nigeria, where the situation is the most acute, humanitarian workers say that 50,000 people are one step away from famine. Along the Chadian border, farmers typically trade their pepper crops for imported cereals and grains. But the pepper fields have been abandoned and there is little left to trade.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/05/world/africa/boko-haram-food-crisis.html?ref=world&_r=0


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Im Niedergang? Antworten mit Zitat
Zur aktuellen Situation:

Zitat:
Hassan Hassan, a fellow at the Chatham House security think-tank and the co-author of ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, told Middle East Eye there were no signs that internal dissent would bring the group's downfall.

Executions by IS of its own members had been “business as usual” ever since its capture of Mosul, Iraq’s second city, in 2014.

“These reports provide an opportunity to escalate the fight against IS, but I wouldn’t say it is a big deal,” said Hassan.

While many people are unhappy under IS rule and face a worsening economic situation, Hassan said there was little appetite for a rebellion because of the mortal danger involved and fears that whatever came after IS would be no better.

http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/islamic-state-losing-strength-or-gaining-weaknesses-185128916


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Die Kunst des Regierens Antworten mit Zitat
Teil 4:

Zitat:
Ascertaining the extent to which ISIS excels at governing requires, among other things, an understanding of its imperatives and capabilities. The most fundamental act of governance for any state is protecting its territory. With many of the world’s most powerful militaries now dedicating significant resources towards the Islamic State’s destruction, the group has its work cut out for it in this regard. Defending its current territorial holdings in Syria and Iraq (and expanding if and where possible) is the single most critical imperative for ISIS.

This is not to say that other aspects of governance, including those detailed by Mara Revkin, Aymenn al-Tamimi, and Aaron Zelin, are not priorities for ISIS. The polity erected by the transnational jihadist movement cannot hope to survive—much less expand—without the provision of essential services such as sanitation, utilities, healthcare, and education to its citizenry. However, ISIS can only focus so much on these functions when the areas it controls are under attack on multiple fronts. In the last few months, it has lost ground in certain areas—largely in Iraq—but its core turf in Syria remains intact.

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/02/17-experts-weigh-in-isis-governance-bokhari-mccants


Teil 5:

Zitat:
The Islamic State group (ISIS), despite clear pretentions to statehood in the form of the “caliphate” it declared in June 2014, does not preside over a particularly successful “state.” It faces numerous challenges from both within and without, challenges that accelerated in 2015 with increasingly systematic airstrikes on ISIS fighters and facilities by numerous external actors.

However, the governing institutions over which the Islamic State presides currently represent the best approximation of institutionalized governance for the millions of people in Iraq and Syria under its rule. Though international actors unanimously refuse to acknowledge the Islamic State as a legitimate state in the international system, it nevertheless provides many of the functions of a state for those living within its territory. The fulfillment of these state functions is critical to the lives and livelihoods of those governed in territory controlled by the Islamic State. An effective policy to challenge the Islamic State must take the group’s governance agenda into account by constructing appealing alternatives to Islamic State governance rather than simply seeking to undermine it.

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2016/03/07-experts-weigh-in-isis-governance-mecham-mccants


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag IS vs. KSA Antworten mit Zitat
Zum ideologischen Gefecht zwischen dem "Islamischen Staat" und der "Islamischen Koalition":

Zitat:
Saudi Arabia’s announcement of the formation of an ‘Islamic Alliance’ to combat terrorism in mid-December 2015 incurred the concern of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the ‘caliph’ of the Islamic State. His propagandists were unprepared to address the ideological ramifications of such a paradigm shift in Saudi behavior. The anti-Saudi ideological formulations and narratives that the jihadists had developed over a number of years did not factor-in the possibility that Saudi state would undertake aggressive military operations beyond its borders, operations directed primarily against themselves. Saudi thinking may be premised on the idea that the Islamic State—seeking local support in Iraq and Syria by claiming to act in defense of Sunnis against tyranny and sectarianism—would crumble easily and quickly if faced with an ‘Islamic Alliance’ that aims to liberate Sunnis from both the Islamic State and Iranian hegemony alike. The announcement has raised popular expectations of an impending ‘new order’ in the Middle East among those heartened by what they consider ‘long-overdue’ Saudi activism. However, the new Saudi initiative is a dangerous gamble that may backfire on rhetorical and ideological grounds if the campaign fails or takes too long.

http://www.hudson.org/research/12291-saudi-arabia-s-islamic-alliance-major-challenge-for-al-baghdadi-s-islamic-state-or-potential-opportunity


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Der "Islamische Dollar" Antworten mit Zitat
Die wichtigste Währung im Kalifat? Der Golddinar des IS? Nein, der US-Dollar:

Zitat:
There is one American who is particularly welcome on the streets of the extremist-run, northern Iraqi city of Mosul. And his name is Benjamin Franklin - the face of this particular founding father is on the US$100 bill. Because strangely enough for a group that declared itself an independent Islamic state in the middle of Iraq, US dollars play a vital role in the “state’s” funding and monetary policy, a policy they’ve invented that means they get to make more money from things like currency exchange.

What the extremists call Bayt Al Mal, or the House of Money in English, acts as a kind of ministry of finance for the territory that the Islamic State, or IS, group controls.

http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/economy/5215/How-Extremists-Rig-Mosul%E2%80%99s-Money-Markets-In-Their-Favour.htm


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Europäische Selbstmordbrigade? Antworten mit Zitat
Das werden bestimmt tolle Zeiten:

Zitat:
The Islamic State group has trained at least 400 fighters to target Europe in deadly waves of attacks, deploying interlocking terror cells like the ones that struck Brussels and Paris with orders to choose the time, place and method for maximum carnage, The Associated Press has learned.

The network of agile and semiautonomous cells shows the reach of the extremist group in Europe even as it loses ground in Syria and Iraq. The officials, including European and Iraqi intelligence officials and a French lawmaker who follows the jihadi networks, described camps in Syria, Iraq and possibly the former Soviet bloc where attackers are trained to attack the West. Before being killed in a police raid, the ringleader of the Nov. 13 Paris attacks claimed to have entered Europe in a multinational group of 90 fighters, who scattered "more or less everywhere."

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/1c1661cef71c4a1a93f3a1863d27a284/trains-400-fighters-attack-europe-wave-bloodshed


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Europäische Brigade? Antworten mit Zitat
Weiterer ausführlicher Bericht:

Zitat:
“This didn’t all of a sudden pop up in the last six months,” said Michael T. Flynn, a retired Army lieutenant general who ran the Defense Intelligence Agency from 2012 to 2014. “They have been contemplating external attacks ever since the group moved into Syria in 2012.”

Mr. Hame was arrested in Paris last August, before he could strike, one of at least 21 trained operatives who succeeded in slipping back into Europe. Their interrogation records offer a window into the origins and evolution of an Islamic State branch responsible for killing hundreds of people in Paris, Brussels and beyond.

European officials now know that Dad, Mr. Hame’s handler, was none other than Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the Belgian operative who selected and trained fighters for plots in Europe and who returned himself to oversee the Paris attack, the deadliest terrorist strike on European soil in over a decade.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/world/europe/isis-attacks-paris-brussels.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&smtyp=cur&_r=0


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Antworten mit Zitat
Islamist gang of murderers for a new Bretton-Woods! ISIS cites good old David Graeber in Dabiq 6 to sustantiate their critique of banks.

Zitat:
Gold and warfare have always lived hand in hand, as financial author David Graeber writes. «Over the course of the wars of expansion during the time of the Umayyad Empire, enormous quantities of gold and silver were looted from palaces, temples, and monasteries and stamped into coinage, allowing the Caliphate to produce gold dinars and silver dirhams of remarkable purity.»
Of course, many central banks around the world rubbish the idea of a return to gold or a gold standard in the 21st Century, citing that it would be a huge step backwards. But it’s the job of mega bankers to rubbish gold, because if the world were to return to a monetary system based on precious metals, the control they and governments have over the country and financial health of the public would cease to exist. They’d be out of a job. You cannot manipulate the value of gold. It is what the market demands it be. But with paper money you can fiddle around as much as you like. And it’s all designed to bleed as much money as possible out of the average consumer’s pocket. (Dabiq 6, page 62)


_________________
Power to the Pöbel!
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Beitrag Geschichte eines Deserteurs Antworten mit Zitat
Sehr ausführlicher Bericht eines Deserteurs über das Leben im IS:

Zitat:
One morning in mid-January 2015, a small, furtive-looking man in a black hooded parka stood alone on the Turkish side of the Akçakale border crossing with Syria. The weather was sunny and cold, and there was almost no one in sight. The man glanced around uneasily, and finally approached a street sweeper in a blue jumpsuit. “I want to cross to the other side,” he said. “What can I do?” The street sweeper demanded 75 Turkish lira and pointed to a small hole in the fence, not far from the main gate. The man paid him but hesitated. He had come a long way, and was now barely 10 metres from his destination: the dusty brown hills of northern Syria, where the Islamic State began. “What about the guards?” he said. “No problem,” the street sweeper replied. “Just go.” The man walked towards the hole in the gate. He bent down and squeezed through. On the other side, he began to run. One of the Turkish guards saw him and shouted. He did not stop.

http://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/12/reluctant-jihadi-recruit-lost-faith-in-isis


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Deserteure Antworten mit Zitat
Der IS hat mit Desertionen zu kämpfen:

Zitat:
And so in January 2016, he pretended to be going to the frontlines in Iraq but instead deserted his unit and fled to Turkey. In doing so, he joined a growing number of Syrian ISIS fighters who have lost faith in an organization whose tactics they regard as un-Islamic and inhumane. Although data on the trend is scarce, hundreds of ISIS fighters reportedly defected from Raqqa and Aleppo in the month of March alone. A high percentage of them are Syrian. Some join moderate rebel groups, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and others abandon the conflict altogether by crossing the border into Turkey or Jordan.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-05-01/quitting-isis


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag IS in Frankreich Antworten mit Zitat
Ein Journalist von Canal plus hat eine Gruppe von IS-Anhängern in Frankreich infiltriert:

Zitat:
Pendant six mois, des journalistes sont parvenus à infiltrer un réseau de terroristes français se réclamant de Daech. Ils ont ainsi filmé, en caméra cachée, les activités quotidiennes de ce groupe d’apprentis djihadistes composé d’une dizaine de membres. Parmi eux, figure Ossama, 20 ans. Après avoir tenté en vain d’intégrer l’armée française, le jeune homme a sombré dans la délinquance, le satanisme et l’alcoolisme avant de découvrir l’islamisme radical sur Internet. Il est parvenu à mettre en place une petite cellule appelée « soldats d’Allah ». Les djihadistes communiquent entre eux grâce au réseau social Telegram. Un détenu français dialogue avec eux depuis sa prison. Un autre homme qui se trouve à Raqqa, en Syrie, envoie des photos, ou encore des schémas pour préparer des explosifs.

https://mesreplay.fr/video/special-investigation-soldats-dallah/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Roy vs. Kepel Antworten mit Zitat
Zur Kontroverse zwischen Olivier Roy und Gilles Kepel:

Zitat:
A feature article in Libération allowed Roy and Kepel to defend their positions. Roy said that he does not ignore religion and that he agreed with Kepel about the extent of Salafism in France’s poor suburbs. However, he said that this cannot explain the radicalization of people, such as Salah Abdeslam, the key suspect whom France will put on trial after he is extradited from Belgium. Roy refuses the notion that Salafism helps incubate violent extremism — or that the perpetrators of the Brussels and Paris atrocities can even be classified as Salafis. Kepel, for his part, admitted that some similarities exist between different forms of extremism but reiterated his belief in the link between jihadi terrorism and Salafism. He also criticized radicalization as a concept for lumping together disparate groups and ideologies including leftists, neo-fascists and Islamic extremists.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/10/who-becomes-a-terrorist-and-why/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Tristan Leoni zum IS Antworten mit Zitat
Erster Teil des ursprünglich auf DDT21 erschienenen Textes auf Deutsch:

Zitat:
Die Geburt eines Staates ist weder gängig, noch rührend. Und der Frühgeborene, der Proto-Staat ist, obwohl sehr zerbrechlich, schon schädlich.
Mit der gegenwärtigen Restrukturierung des Nahen Ostens erleben wir die Konstitution von neuen Einheiten, die bekanntesten davon sind der Islamische Staat (IS) und Rojava (Westkurdistan). Letztere sei als Musterbeispiel der Demokratie und des Feminismus ein Schutzwall gegen die Barbarei ersterer. Denn der Islamische Staat ist ein Monster, die Bilder beweisen es. Alles beweist es. Man müsste ihn übrigens Daesch nennen, denn er habe die „noble“ Bezeichnung Staat nicht verdient und habe „nichts“ mit dem Islam „zu tun“. Die Erklärung sollte reichen. Sie genügt jedoch nicht, um zu verstehen, wieso und wie 8 bis 10 Millionen Leute seit Monaten in einem Territorium leben, das mit dem Rest des Planeten im Krieg steht. Die Tage des Kalifats sind wahrscheinlich gezählt, doch die Frage bleibt: Wieso funktioniert es?

http://kommunisierung.net/Kalifat-und-Barbarei-erster-Teil


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Saudis und Jihad Antworten mit Zitat
Saudiarabien und Jihadisten aus dem Kosovo:

Zitat:
Saudi Arabia has frustrated American policy makers for years. Ostensibly a critical ally, sheltered from its enemies by American arms and aid, the kingdom has spent untold millions promoting Wahhabism, the radical form of Sunni Islam that inspired the 9/11 hijackers and that now inflames the Islamic State.

The latest chapter in this long, sorrowful history involves tiny Kosovo. With a population of only 1.8 million people, Kosovo has sent more of its young people per capita than any other country to fight and die in Iraq and Syria. Since 2012, some 314 Kosovars have joined the Islamic State, including two suicide bombers, 44 women and 28 children. Even Belgium, widely seen as a hotbed of extremism after the attacks on Paris and Brussels, lags behind it in the recruitment rankings.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/opinion/the-world-reaps-what-the-saudis-sow.html?_r=1


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Freiwillige für den Selbstmord Antworten mit Zitat
Bericht eines 15-jährigen Kamikaze-Kandidaten aus Mosul:

Zitat:
A teenager receiving treatment for a serious infection in a Mosul hospital recently spoke to visitors about how he became ill. It turned out that for the past three months he had been living in a basement with many other young men, training to become a suicide bomber or a fighter for the extremist group known as the Islamic State, who currently control the city. NIQASH met the boy and was able to hold several conversations with him in private, during which he outlined why he, like many other young Mosul men, had joined the extremist group - and why he was still thinking about committing suicide in the name of the group.

http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/5272/A-Would-Be-Teenage-Suicide-Bomber-in-Mosul-Tells-His-Story.htm


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Krise? Antworten mit Zitat
Einige Rückschläge an der Front in letzter Zeit:

Zitat:
For the first time in the two years since the leader of Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, proclaimed the existence of an “Islamic caliphate” straddling Syria and Iraq, the jihadi group is at real risk of losing much of the territory it holds.

Four Isis strongholds – two in Syria and two in Iraq – are now under concerted attack, and in all cases the militants defending them are struggling to contain well-organised and resourced assaults planned over many months.

The attacks are heavily backed by the US, which since April has stepped up its campaign to “destroy and degrade” the terrorist organisation in its self-declared heartland of eastern Syria and western Iraq. A two-year project that had been derided by allies and proxies alike as being too limited and cautious now has military momentum.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/02/isis-islamic-state-risk-losing-territory-caliphate-syria-iraq


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Zweiter Teil Antworten mit Zitat
Zweiter Teil von Tristan Leoni zum Kalifat:

Zitat:
Nach mehreren Jahren eines unerbittlichen Bürgerkrieges ist das Eintreffen der Truppen des IS nicht nur gleichbedeutend mit der Ersetzung eines Terrorregimes durch ein anderes, sondern auch [siehe den ersten Teil] mit der Rückkehr eines Rechtsstaates, einer relativen Ruhe, einer Verbesserung der Versorgung, der Reparatur von Infrastrukturen, der Wiedereinführung von öffentlichen Diensten, dem schnellen Aufbau einer Verwaltung – freilich im besten oder im schlimmsten der Fälle, doch die Einwohner können die Ordnung dem Chaos vorziehen. Die Tatsache, dass der IS mit seinen Herrschafts-, Verwaltungs-, logistischen und finanziellen Fähigkeiten spielt, erklärt, dass er in verschiedenen Städten als Befreier empfangen werden konnte, er für einige „als absolut respektables Regime“ erscheinen kann oder Stämme ihm die Treue schwören.

http://kommunisierung.net/Kalifat-und-Barbarei-zweiter-Teil


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Homosexualität Antworten mit Zitat
Text zur Repression gegen Homosexuelle im Kalifat:

Zitat:
The tragic events at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando shed light on a lesser-known facet of the Islamic State (IS): the group's virulently hostile views toward homosexuality, in particular its targeting of gay men. Thus far, no evidence has surfaced suggesting that IS directed the perpetrator, Omar Mateen, to conduct the operation, and jihadis usually have multiple motivations for taking action, including in this case possible mental health issues. Yet IS has published a vast corpus of justifications for killing homosexuals, and it has publicly targeted numerous allegedly gay men in Iraq and Syria in the past year-and-a-half alone.

To be sure, gay men were being targeted by the Iraqi and Syrian regimes prior to the announcement of the so-called IS "Caliphate," and the region's legal and religious climate is often inhospitable to that community. Moreover, other jihadi groups have executed homosexuals, including the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and its branches Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). What stands out with IS, though, is the level of textual justification it has produced for such executions and the theatrical manner in which it conducts them, potentially inciting greater anti-LGBT violence.

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-states-views-on-homosexuality


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Zerrissene Familien Antworten mit Zitat
Die Frontlinie mit dem IS durchzieht Familien:

Zitat:
More than a dozen recent interviews, with Sunnis from areas where the Islamic State has had a presence, revealed the extent to which the terror organization has divided families.

In many cases, they described a familiar pattern of radicalization for their relatives — beginning not with any special interest in religion, but rather the 2003 invasion and the Sunni insurgency that followed. Many spent time in American-operated prisons in Iraq, where they studied the Quran and plotted jihad. In 2013, when Mr. Maliki’s policies sparked nationwide Sunni protests, there was a ready constituency of aggrieved and radicalized Sunnis the Islamic State could exploit.

Alaa al-Jibouri, a Sunni from Salahuddin Province who has joined a government-allied militia, said that his uncle, a member of the Islamic State, was not religious before he spent time in an American prison in Iraq.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/19/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-sunnis-sectarian-falluja.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=0


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Belgien Antworten mit Zitat
Zu islamistischen Netzwerken in Belgien:

Zitat:
Belgium has been grappling with the nexus of foreign fighter recruitment and terrorism for more than a generation. In the 1990s Belgium was a transit country for recruits of Islamist terrorist groups like GIA and the GICM. The al-Qa`ida hit team that assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud, the head of the Northern Alliance, two days before 9/11 were residents of the Brussels district of Molenbeek. Malika el-Aroud, the Belgian-Moroccan widow of one of the suicide bombers, was sentenced in May 2010 together with her new husband, Moez Garsallaoui, for recruiting young Belgian and French extremists to join al-Qa`ida. Her website, Minbar SOS, was one of the most visited forums by Francophone jihadis across the Western world. One individual that el-Aroud championed was Muriel Degauque, a Catholic convert from Charleroi who became the first-ever Western, female suicide bomber in Iraq after she and her husband, Issam Goris, traveled from Belgium to Iraq. Another key figure in Belgian extremist circles in the 1990s and 2000s was el-Aroud’s mentor Bassam al-Ayachi, a French cleric of Syrian descent whose Centre Islamique Belge in Brussels was linked to several terrorism cases. His son was one of the first Belgians to die in Syria, and some of the so-called Zerkani network were influenced by his teachings.

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/belgian-radical-networks-and-the-road-to-the-brussels-attacks


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Geschichte des Jihad Antworten mit Zitat
Der Versuch einer historischen Einordnung des IS:

Zitat:
Under al-Baghdadi, there seems to operate a relatively flat network of commanders who enjoy considerable autonomy and maintain an unexpected level of cohesiveness, presumably by way of intense interaction via modern communication tools. If Al Qaeda evoked the “franchise” metaphor, ISIL is more akin to UBER: digitally empowered entrepreneurship within a low-maintenance framework. Accordingly, it has shown an unusual ability to absorb pre-existing networks, such as residual state bureaucracies, Baath Party remnants, and rogue tribes.

Consequently, it has proven to be remarkably non-ideological, regardless of its stately grand-standing, Islamist pretenses, and uncompromising brutality. It has not theorized the notion of an “Islamic state” beyond vague, inconsistent, and impractical references to a mythicized early Islamic era. Symptomatically, its original name (the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham) happily combines in a single sentence a contemporary denomination (Iraq) and a historical one (Sham, a reference to ancient Syria). It clearly seeks consolidation in “soft-belly” areas, rather than any expansion based on a territorial vision that would pit it against “hard” enemies. It has made at best lackadaisical efforts to codify and justify its recourse to violence, staged to maximize modern-life “buzz” effects at the expense of any ethical underpinning. Its narrative boils down to simple categories – shorn of the elaborate theological trappings – to which the jihadist movement until recently paid considerable attention.

http://www.turkishpolicy.com/article/801/the-reinvention-of-jihadism-in-the-middle-east


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Rückkehr in die Türkei Antworten mit Zitat
Türkische IS-Rekruten kehren langsam aber sicher zurück:

Zitat:
In Hacibayram, 70 of the estimated 150 young men who had joined IS have returned home, along with seven of the 10 families that had moved to the “caliphate,” a local official in close contact with residents told Al-Monitor. Observers, however, warn that the decline in recruitment does not mean that IS has lost its popular appeal.

The robe-clad men in Hacibayram refused to answer questions, wary of speaking to the media after police raids in the neighborhood last year. The detainees were eventually released due to lack of evidence, but they remain reticent to speak out of security concerns. According to local residents, however, in private conversations former IS members grumble about the group’s tough internal rules, the harsh living conditions in Syria and the decline in the economic benefits they had been promised.

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/07/turkey-syria-isis-hacibayram-militants-return-home.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Falludscha und allg. Situation Antworten mit Zitat
In Falludscha sind alle Sunniten geflohen, schiitische Milizen kontrollieren die Stadt:

Zitat:
“This is a victory for the one who we worship, Ali,” read one of the spray-painted banners. “Falluja is now in the hands of the Badr Brigades,” said another. All around, Shia banners are juxtaposed against national flags, which are also now flying in large numbers across a city that knew nothing but the black standard of Isis for the past two-and-a-half years.

As the reign of the terror group withers, the claim on Falluja’s future seems very much in the balance. There are no local people left to influence things. Nothing moves here except the military units left behind to safeguard it. Every resident who remained under Isis rule has now fled.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/09/falluja-isis-shia-iraq?CMP=share_btn_tw


Warum der IS wohl nicht in naher Zukunft verschwinden wird:

Zitat:
The Islamic State has long been prepared for changing conditions. When I met a man using the name Abu Adnan in November 2014 in the town of Urfa, Turkey, near the border with Syria, he told me that he was part of the Islamic State’s intelligence apparatus and was in charge of setting up sleeper cells and spy networks in Turkey.

“Our enemies are clever and determined,” he told me. “What we can do is to make sure the body of the state is strong, so that it can heal no matter how far they weaken it. So even if they destroy us in one area, you can be sure we’re still there. We don’t have to be exposed and visible.” Men like Abu Adnan have been responsible for planning suicide operations in Turkey and beyond.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10/opinion/is-the-islamic-state-unstoppable.html?_r=0


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Passt zwar nicht wirklich hier rein, egal: Einer der ersten modernen islamischen Staatstheoretiker war ein konvertierter Jude:

Zitat:
Perhaps that’s not surprising, given Asad’s roots. He was born at the turn of the 20th century in Austria-Hungary—in what is now Ukraine—as Leopold (Aryeh) Weiss. His grandparents were Orthodox Jews; his paternal grandfather was a rabbi. Weiss’ parents were secularized and assimilated to European culture. His father was a successful lawyer in Vienna. As a child Weiss had a basic Jewish education and a working knowledge of Hebrew. Educated at German universities and imbued with liberal values, he lived in the bohemian quarters of the Weimar Republic at the height of its cultural awakening and became a journalist, covering the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. A visit to relatives in Jerusalem and a subsequent long sojourn in Arabia caused him to “fall in love with the Arabs.” Increasingly disillusioned with the West, and rejecting the Marxism adopted by many of his European contemporaries as “purely materialist,” Weiss converted to Islam in 1926. He expressed his new identity with the name Muhammad Asad: Asad, meaning “lion,” was the equivalent of both his Hebrew name Aryeh and his Latin-derived name Leopold.

http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-arts-and-culture/books/206221/jew-helped-invent-islamic-state


Human Rights Watch zur Herrschaft vom IS:

Zitat:
The Islamic State ruled Iraq’s Makhmur district for 21 months with summary executions, torture, and collective punishment of villagers. The extremist armed group, also known as ISIS, prevented civilians from fleeing and placed them at unnecessary risk of attack.
Iraqis who fled from ISIS in Nineveh find shelter at a camp for displaced persons in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Expand

“Out of the headlines, ISIS routinely destroys lives and families in the Iraqi towns and villages it occupies,” said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director. “Simply trying to escape ISIS’s cruel rule can be a death sentence.”

In May 2016, Human Rights Watch interviewed 20 residents from villages in Makhmur district, in northwest Iraq, who had fled to a displaced persons camp in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). ISIS forces captured Qayyara, Khabata, and Makuk, among other towns and villages in mid-2014.


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Das Ende? Antworten mit Zitat
Die chronisch optimistischen Liberalen sind sich sicher: Der IS ist im Niedergang:

Zitat:
Much of the editorial echoes the downbeat sentiments expressed by the Islamic State’s official spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani, in his recent audio statement of May 21 of this year. While in that statement ‘Adnani was sure to project a measure of confidence, remarking that the Islamic State is “becoming stronger with each passing day,” some of his comments betrayed the starker reality of a caliphate under siege. This was clear in the following queries: “Do you think, America, that victory will come by killing one or more leaders?” “Do you reckon, America, that defeat is the loss of a city or the loss of territory?” Responding to his own questions, ‘Adnani declared that killing the Islamic State’s leaders would not defeat the greater “adversary”—the group itself—and that taking its land would not eliminate its “will” to fight. Even if the Islamic State were to lose all its territories, he said, it could still go back to the way it was “at the beginning,” when it was “in the desert without cities and without territory.” The allusion here is to the experience of the Islamic State of Iraq, which between 2006 and 2012 held no significant territory despite its claim to statehood. For this reason it was derided as a “paper state.” ‘Adnani is thus suggesting that even if defeated the Islamic State could take refuge in the desert, rebuild, and return anew.

http://www.jihadica.com/the-islamic-state-of-decline/


Und ein Kommentar zum übersetzten Leitartikel:

Zitat:
Even as it launches waves of terrorist attacks around the globe, the Islamic State is quietly preparing its followers for the eventual collapse of the caliphate it proclaimed with great fanfare two years ago.

In public messages and in recent actions in Syria, the group’s leaders are acknowledging the terrorist organization’s declining fortunes on the battlefield while bracing for the possibility that its remaining strongholds could fall.

At the same time, the group is vowing to press on with its recent campaign of violence, even if the terrorists themselves are driven underground. U.S. counterterrorism experts believe the mass­casualty attacks in Istanbul and Baghdad in the past month were largely a response to military reversals in Iraq and Syria.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-isis-quietly-preparing-for-the-loss-of-the-caliphate/2016/07/12/9a1a8a02-454b-11e6-8856-f26de2537a9d_story.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Jihadismus und Marxismus Antworten mit Zitat
Für Liberale ist Jihadismus und Marxismus natürlich mehr oder weniger das gleiche:

Zitat:
In an earlier column, I briefly addressed the similarities between the utopian ideology of the Islamic State and that of the global communist movement. I have also compared the counterinsurgency efforts used against the two movements in the past. But as I was writing about the structure of the Islamic State last week, I encountered more and more parallels to the global Marxist movement. This got me thinking even more intently about the similar ways that the two — despite their differences — have applied, encouraged and supported the use of violence. In light of these parallels, the lessons derived from the decades-long struggle against communism throughout the world may provide important guidance for the continuing fight against jihadism.

https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/what-cold-war-can-teach-us-about-jihadism


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Attentat gegen Hazaras in Kabul Antworten mit Zitat
Zwar kämpft kaum ein Hazara freiwillig in Syrien (was die Idioten von Reuters nicht zu wissen scheinen, sie glauben auch, Assad sei Schiite...), doch das ist dem IS wohl ohnehin egal:

Zitat:
A Daesh commander who uses the name Abu Omar Khorasani said the bombing of the rally by thousands of Hazaras protesting about the route of a new power line was in retaliation for the support offered by some members of the community to the regime in Syria.

Many Hazaras have gone through Shi'ite-governed Iran to fight for the government of President Bashar al-Assad, a fellow Shi'ite, against Islamic State.

"Unless they stop going to Syria and stop being slaves of Iran, we will definitely continue such attacks," the militant commander told Reuters by telephone from an undisclosed location.

"We can and we will strike them again."

http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1060Z0


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ISKP Antworten mit Zitat
Über den "Islamischen Staat Khorasan Provinz":

Zitat:
The Islamic State’s local franchise in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), has claimed responsibility for the suicide attack on the TUTAP protests in Kabul on 23 July 2016. The attack killed more than 80 people and injured over 230 others in Deh Mazang Square in western Kabul. The target of the attack [on 23 July], a peaceful, civilian protest of Shia Hazaras unrelated to the war and of no military importance, would seem to suggest that this was indeed an IS attack. AAN’s Borhan Osman looks at the emergence and subsequent development of ISKP and its relationship to the Taleban and the Afghan government. Judging by the group’s turbulent past, which saw it cornered in Nangarhar (in contrast to its ambitions of a nationwide expansion), it seems ISKP is now possibly more bent on striking in places like Kabul for the sake of gaining attention and boosting its fighters’ morale.

https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag AQ vs. IS Antworten mit Zitat
Zur Rivalität zwischen AQ und IS:

Zitat:
Fractures between jihadist groups like al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State have ushered in periods of both destructive competition and escalating competition. Destructive competition, when terror groups attack each other, arises predominately from internal splits when terrorist factions occupy the same terrain. It can be amplified by younger extremists seeking a more violent direction than older members, the presence of foreign fighter contingents with divergent interests, and the existence of terrorist ‘Pretorian Guards’ lacking a stake in a post-conflict settlement. On the other hand, escalating competition, when terror groups attempt to outpace each other through expansive competition, occurs when competing terror organizations separate geographically and the perpetration of successful attacks leads to gains in notoriety and subsequent increases in resources. In the near term, international counterterrorism coalitions facing escalating competition from an assortment of al-Qa`ida and Islamic State affiliates might look to broker an end to the Syrian conflict and target shared sources of strength between competing groups as methods for returning competition to a destructive context.

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/deciphering-competition-between-al-qaida-and-the-islamic-state


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Al Qaem Antworten mit Zitat
Das wahre HQ vom IS im Irak sei Al Qaem:

Zitat:
“Everybody believes that the Islamic State group’s main base is in Mosul. But they are wrong,” Ibrahim al-Jafari, one of the tribal fighters in nearby Haditha, who, together with other tribal fighters and the Iraqi army, has repelled many attempts by the nearby extremists to take over that city too; Haditha is about 150 kilometres from Al Qaem. “The group’s main force is now located in Al Qaem on the Syrian border.”

“The extremist group is sick and weak,” al-Jafari told NIQASH. “But it is preparing a large army in Al Qaem and as long as this area is under the Islamic State’s control, they will be a threat to all in Anbar province.”

The Islamic State, or IS, group has been in control of the Al Qaem area since August 2014, when the extremists declared they were establishing their own country. The new Islamic State, they announced, would stretch from the Syrian border town, Albu Kamal, to Iraq’s Al Qaem. But since then, Al Qaem has hardly been in the headlines. The only way anyone gets information about the relatively isolated border town is via propaganda material coming from the IS group itself, in which one can see the city’s streets, its inhabitants and information on the individuals that the IS group has punished or killed.

http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/5319/the-iraqi-city-of-al-qaem-may-be-the-new-extremist-capital.htm


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Netzwerk Antworten mit Zitat
Zu den Ablegern des IS:

Zitat:
Since it announced its caliphate in the summer of 2014, the Islamic State has taken on 17 affiliates or “governorates” that operate in 12 countries outside of Syria and Iraq. Many of the governorates were preexisting jihadist groups or factions that joined the Islamic State because they identified with its antagonism toward local jihadist competitors and its unyielding animosity toward non-Muslim nations. Yet this hostility subsequently limits the group’s ability to build governments or take territory beyond the confines of Syria and Iraq. In most countries where the Islamic State has planted its flag, its aggression prompted powerful local jihadist rivals[a] or international foes to check its advances. The Islamic State could soften its antagonism to one or the other for the sake of convenience, but this would compromise its recruiting ability and tarnish its reputation as the uncompromising champion of the global jihadist ideal.

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-polarizing-effect-of-islamic-state-aggression-on-the-global-jihadist-movement


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Kosovo Antworten mit Zitat
Jihadismus im Kosovo:

Zitat:
The government estimates that more than 300 Kosovars have traveled to the Middle East to wage jihad, or Islamic holy war. That makes this predominately Muslim country of under 2 million people, which unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, Europe's biggest contributor per capita of IS foot soldiers.

Kacanik in particular has gained a reputation as the jihadist capital of the Balkans. In the past three years, at least 24 men from its population of 30,000 have left to fight for extremist groups like IS or Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq.

http://www.rferl.org/fullinfographics/infographics/inside-kosovos-islamic-cauldron/27825148.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Leaks Antworten mit Zitat
Geleakte Dokumente:

Zitat:
The original raw archive of Islamic State administrative documents I began back in January 2015 now contains well over 300 specimens to view in the original and in translation. Owing to technical issues, no further specimens can be added to the original post and so the archive must be continued here. To avoid confusion, there will be continuity with the original classification system. Thus, the last specimen in the first post was Specimen 12J, and so the first specimen added here will be Specimen 12K.

http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents-1


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Interview mit Deserteur Antworten mit Zitat
Ein deutscher Deserteur des IS hat einer Journalistin ein Interview gegeben:

Zitat:
“He was speaking openly about the situation, saying that they have loads of people living in European countries and waiting for commands to attack the European people,” Mr. Sarfo recounted on Monday, in an interview with The New York Times conducted in English inside the maximum-security prison near Bremen. “And that was before the Brussels attacks, before the Paris attacks.”

The masked man explained that, although the group was well set up in some European countries, it needed more attackers in Germany and Britain, in particular. “They said, ‘Would you mind to go back to Germany, because that’s what we need at the moment,’” Mr. Sarfo recalled. “And they always said they wanted to have something that is occurring in the same time: They want to have loads of attacks at the same time in England and Germany and France.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/world/middleeast/isis-german-recruit-interview.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Kurden im IS Antworten mit Zitat
Den ganzen Artikel, damit Ihr Euch kein Konto machen müsst:

Zitat:
The Kurds of ISIS
Why Some Join the Terrorist Group
By Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens and Ranj Alaaldin

“Jihadism has existed here for decades, and ISIS will be defeated just like the rest of them,” a confident senior Kurdish intelligence official told us. The Kurds are particularly self-assured when it comes to the threat that the Islamic State poses to the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan, which the group menaced before the Kurdish peshmerga forces (and Western airpower) began beating it back in August 2014.

We spent two weeks in Iraqi Kurdistan in order to gain a better understanding of ISIS and the war against it. Our research involved interviewing Kurdish security officials, peshmerga commanders, intelligence officers, and Kurdish prisoners who had joined ISIS. We learned more about the conditions that take someone away from his or her home, family, and friends to the so-called caliphate.

During a peshmerga-guided trip to Taza, a settlement just outside Kirkuk that represents one of the front lines against ISIS in Iraq, Kurdish commanders appeared genuinely relaxed. The head of the base there told us that, since the start of the U.S.-led air campaign in 2014, ISIS has been unable to mount any serious assaults in the area. “All we see now are a few mortar shells,” he said, “just to remind us that they are there.” In some cases, ISIS has resorted to using shells laden with chlorine and mustard gas. A week prior to our visit, Taza was the site of one such attack, which led to hundreds of casualties. Despite the concern it caused, this attack was more a demonstration of the group’s increasing desperation than anything else.

ISIS, however, is not just a terrorist insurgency threatening the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan. It is also a domestic problem, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) internal security services have been hard at work preventing ISIS attacks within its territory, arresting Kurdish and Arab members (and even Western foreign fighters, we were told) and dismantling the group’s remarkable recruitment and logistics network.

ISLAMISTS AND KURDS

Jihadist groups have historically found it difficult to gain wide appeal within Kurdish culture, which is defined by centuries of secular nationalist struggle against Arab regimes. But they do have a historical presence in the region. Kurdish jihadist groups emerged as splinters of earlier, more moderate Kurdish Islamist movements. Among the first of these was the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK). It was established in 1987 by a number of Islamist Iraqi dissidents fighting Saddam Hussein’s Baathist dictatorship, some of whom had trained and fought in Afghanistan during the Russian invasion.

The IMK and other Kurdish Islamists traditionally sought refuge in the east of what would become Iraqi Kurdistan and had a strong base in Halabja, a more religiously conservative province there. This location also ensured that the group was in close proximity to its patrons in the Iranian regime, which at the time was engaged in its eight-year war with Iraq.

The Halabja province is best known as the site of Saddam’s 1988 chemical weapons strike, an atrocity that took the lives of around 5,000 Kurds. Unsurprisingly, the bombing had a significant radicalizing effect on the population, which the IMK exploited by declaring jihad on the Iraqi government in response. Throughout the early 1990s, the IMK continued to receive training and financial and logistical assistance from Saddam’s enemies. The Iranians were joined by Syrian Baathists in their efforts to destabilize both Saddam’s dictatorship and the Kurdish region’s newly elected secular nationalist government, which was run by the two giants of Iraqi Kurdish politics and society, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

The stories of Kurdistan’s ISIS members should serve as a reminder of the complexities of the region’s problems. There is no holy grail, and one should be wary of those who promise it. The Islamists in the IMK were only too happy to oblige, organizing a number of attacks in the region against both PUK and KDP targets. Although intermittent fighting broke out between secular Kurds and the IMK, the KDP and PUK were soon distracted by their own civil war, which took almost all of their attention between 1994 and 1998. At the end of the war, the IMK joined the secular KRG, angering its more hardcore elements and leading to the creation of the country’s first Salafi-jihadist groups.

The biggest of these was Jund al-Islam, which in the late 1990s began establishing militant and ideological training camps in the Halabja region in the hope of preparing the ground for a Salafi-jihadi revolution in Iraq. By 2001, it had been renamed Ansar al-Islam and began receiving assistance from al Qaeda. It was also during this time that the group attracted the attentions of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the eventual founder of al Qaeda in Iraq. He saw northern Iraq as an effective safe haven for the consolidation of his own movement, Jund al-Sham, which he had established in Afghanistan following the 2001 invasion. After the subsequent 2003 invasion of Iraq, and with Zarqawi’s assistance, it became one of a number of jihadist organizations waging jihad against Western and Kurdish forces. Its single worst atrocity in Iraqi Kurdistan came in 2004, when a suicide car bomb killed 109 people, including Kurdistan’s then deputy prime minister, Sami Abdul Rahman.

It is here where the roots of ISIS lie. For the Kurdish authorities, the group is little more than the latest incarnation of a movement that has proven on numerous occasions its capacity to revitalize and reorganize itself in the region.What this long-term Kurdish experience with jihadists also means is that its security services and military are very well versed in fighting, and defeating, such groups. This may partly explain the confidence of all the officials with whom we spoke.

ISIS has lost over 40 percent of its territory in Iraq, and around 20 percent in Syria. In the months since the attacks in Paris in November, it withdrew from more than seven major towns and cities. U.S. military officials in Kurdistan told us that its overall network and leadership is being decimated by the international coalition that has a significant presence in the skies as well as on the ground, where they work with local forces such as the Kurdish peshmerga.

Since May 2015, ISIS has been unable to launch a successful operation in Iraqi Kurdistan. Yet there is no room for complacency, since the ISIS network that extends throughout the region relies upon and takes advantage of the historical jihadist roots in the area. According to officials, there are currently 400–450 Kurdish ISIS members either in the KRG or among ISIS ranks that can keep the group going.

This network survives in large part because ISIS, which operates in that grey area between a mafia and an insurgent group, is still able to prey upon and exploit the weak. “Let me give you an example,” explained a senior internal security agent. “ISIS goes to a lorry driver in Syria or Iraq whose livelihood depends on going back and forth from ISIS-controlled areas to Kurdistan. Faced with a choice of either becoming a messenger or delivery boy for ISIS, or having his family killed, of course he’ll go for the first option.” This is just one part of a wider logistics network the group has managed to establish. Unsurprisingly, it has also made extensive use of the internet and social media, trawling Facebook for possible Kurdish recruits among sections of the region’s vulnerable and impressionable youth.

THE KURDS OF ISIS

Kurds’ reasons for joining ISIS are varied and do not necessarily line up with the factors that have influenced their Arab Iraqi counterparts. Many of the latter are joining in protest against the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad that they perceive to be sectarian and that ISIS (and al Qaeda in Iraq before it) presents as anti-Sunni. This type of messaging simply does not resonate among the vast majority of Iraqi Kurds, who are largely disentangled from the Sunni-Shia divides found in the rest of the country. Although our sample of Kurdish ISIS members is admittedly too small for us to make any sweeping conclusions, our conversations with them nonetheless helped to provide a better understanding of how the group operates and whom it recruits.

Our first encounter was with Araz (the names of all prisoners have been changed), a prisoner in his late teens. He had been using Facebook for just two weeks before he was contacted by ISIS recruiters and began to inject himself into their virtual world. A young and impressionable online rookie, he was the perfect target for ISIS recruitment.

When we asked him how ISIS was able to find him, he told us that, due to his interest in Islam, he had posted photos and images of Islamic scriptures and symbols. His profile picture was an image of the Al-Quds mosque in Jerusalem. This caught the attention of ISIS recruiters, who approached him and began a dialogue that would help determine how realistic his prospects of joining the group were.

According to Araz, over a period of three months, his online ISIS contacts convinced him of their utopianist project, and he decided to pack his bags and head to ISIS-controlled Mosul. Although he had a fairly comfortable life and good relations with his family, he was convinced to leave them behind in search of adventure and because of the prospect of being part of what ISIS presents to recruits as one of the most pivotal moments in the entire history of Islam: “They told me that they could offer me a place in their community, status and the chance to fight for a God-given cause.” He became certain that Kurdistan was corrupt and getting tied up in petty nationalist politics, all while the United States continued to humiliate Muslims by occupying their lands and attacking them. It made no difference what his background was in the caliphate, or what his job was: “They said that we were all equal since we all adhere to the same cause.”

How, we asked, could he possibly trust these people whom he had never met? According to what he told us, he had no previous experience with jihadist groups and ostensibly had little reason to find the movement appealing. As a newcomer to Facebook, however, he did not have many other friends to engage with online. Araz told us that, using the social network’s messenger service, he spoke to three different individuals before he signed on. A bond soon began to form, and he warmly described how they began to refer to each other as “brother.” He was not, however, immediately won over by their initial conversations about methods of combat and suicide bombings: “I did not accept what they were telling me, I wasn’t convinced.”

Despite this, the exchanges continued, and he came to feel close to them as the months wore on. They presented him with stories of heroism, martyrdom, and the glorious new life he could have in the caliphate. He was warned of the evils of the Shia and fellow Sunni Muslims who did not follow the ISIS ideology, but theological discussions did not take center stage.

He never felt as if he was being forced to accept their message, and this soft approach appears to have worked: “They did not tell me to accept [Abu Omar] al-Baghdadi [the current leader of ISIS], but did tell me what it was like to be his follower…theology did not come up during our discussion in great detail; they explained to me that the Quran provides guidance for every aspect of our lives and that the laws of the caliphate were from the Quran, were not made by the corrupt, and that the laws were divine and supreme.” Despite only having engaged in basic discussions about Islam, Araz was eventually convinced of the merits of hijrah, or migrating to fight for the cause of Islam. However, as he prepared to leave his home for ISIS-held territory, he was arrested by Kurdish authorities who had been monitoring his online activities.

This process took place entirely in cyberspace and, while the majority of research related to so-called online radicalization has stressed the importance of some level of contact with an offline, physical network, it is also acknowledged that there are a significant number of exceptions to this rule. In some cases, the power of the virtual network has proven to be enough to convince would-be fighters to take action. Other interviewees were also recruited via Facebook and used Whatsapp and Telegram (a messenger application with an encrypted “secret chat” function that makes it popular with ISIS supporters around the world) to communicate with ISIS recruiters and minders.

For ISIS recruiters, online recruitment is almost entirely cost-free. They are able to identify potential fighters who are in close proximity to ISIS territory based on their social media posts, and they cast their net as far and wide as possible. Operating within their own territory means they are running almost no risk of being arrested for their activities. If new recruits are picked up by authorities en route to joining the group, they have little actionable intelligence on the location or true identity of their ISIS online contacts.

Unlike Araz, another prisoner we spoke to, Ali, had long-standing ties to Kurdish jihadist networks, and a number of his friends had become ISIS members. After one of them was killed fighting for ISIS in Iraq in 2015, he was jolted into action. Shortly after, Ali posted a photo of his friend on Facebook along with a message that he was “martyred in defending the caliphate” and was blessed to have been killed during the month of Ramadan. The death of his friend was, according to him, “when I first entertained the idea of joining ISIS.”

His posts piqued the interests of online ISIS recruiters, and he was soon in contact with them via Facebook and Telegram. Although he had no formal Islamic training, throughout his adult life he too considered himself a religious practicing Muslim. ISIS only became an appealing prospect to him, though, once others he knew had become involved. He told us that conversations with friends and online ISIS recruiters led him to conclude that the group was practicing and implementing Islam in its original and purest form.

When we asked him how he could join a group that represents one of the most potent enemies of the Kurdish people, he explained how he was “misled by people I already knew, Kurds who had gone to the caliphate and contacted me from there, friends I continued to stay in touch with. My friendship with people I knew and the ayats [verses from the Quran] and hadith [accounts of the words and actions of the Muhammad] helped to manipulate me and convinced me to join ISIS.”

Friends of his who had already joined ISIS then arranged for him to meet a contact of theirs in Kurdistan. During the meeting, he was urged to travel with other recruits to Mosul, but he hesitated, not wanting to leave his family behind. Identifying an opportunity to grow their network within KRG territory, the ISIS member told him to stay home and await further instructions. In contrast to the young, childless Araz, who was ready to travel to Mosul, Ali had a commitment to his young family.

When we asked him why he chose his family over making hijrah, he replied, “Because they offered me the chance to be part of the caliphate from where I was; it was not necessary for me to go to Mosul and I did not want to leave my family.” The recruiters provided him with money, “but this was not the main motivation for me,” he said. Now claiming to have disavowed his extremist views, he revealed that “I used to believe in the Islam that they told me and believed in the caliphate and Baghdadi, but not anymore. And even then I had my doubts.

As a Kurdish intelligence official explained to us, ISIS plants couriers and messengers within the Kurdistan region as part of its logistics network. “They wanted me to pick things up,” he told us; “collect bags and assist drivers coming into Kurdistan from Mosul and other cities.” On at least three separate occasions, he met lorry drivers acting as couriers for ISIS. They gave him bags full of weapons and ammunition which, using a dead-drop method, he would leave in specified locations for someone else to pick up, watching from a distance to ensure their safe retrieval.

However, the final delivery he took contained something different: it was a large IED which he was to place in his local Shia mosque in the city of Sulaymaniyah during the Shia holy festival of Ashura. According to Ali, it was an obvious choice: “The Shia mosque was always crowded and they are apostates and legitimate targets.” He was also keen to show remorse, pointing out that “I was not thinking straight at the time and was manipulated”; though it was impossible to know whether this sentiment was real or feigned given the circumstances of our meeting. That he eventually decided against carrying out the attack certainly suggests some level of regret, however. Leaving the device at his home, he visited the site of the intended target carrying the same bag he was given, fearing that he was being watched by ISIS minders. His hope was that he could convince them that he decided against planting the bomb due to a high security presence. He too had by this time caught the attentions of Kurdish intelligence, and was arrested as he approached the mosque.

Ali’s story fits more closely to current orthodoxy on how people become involved with terrorist groups. He was influenced by a combination of his own religious devotion along with involvement in a friendship network with connections to ISIS that helped to encourage him to join. Although his online activities certainly played a role, it is unlikely that he would have become interested in ISIS were it not for his friend’s membership in the group and his eventual death.

The last prisoner we met was the most difficult to understand and obtain a clear story from. He appeared more interested in offering a version of events that exonerated him, and was regularly interrupted by Kurdish security officials who questioned the facts he was presenting. Unlike the others, Juma displayed little knowledge or interest in ISIS and its ideology, claiming to have acted out of a mixture of ignorance and the promise of financial incentives.

An out-of-work laborer at the time, Juma was put in contact by his brother-in-law with a man who apparently wanted to help him find a job. Only later, Juma claimed, did he discover that this man was an ISIS operator. He was offered a new car, which he could use as a taxi, something he told us he could not afford to turn down. In return, he was asked to provide ISIS with information. Taxi drivers can offer the group various benefits, including the ability to scout locations for possible kidnappings and attacks without arousing suspicion. Although he denied taking part in any of this, Kurdish officials told us that he had given ISIS information related to the locations of key prisons and other sensitive sites in Kurdish cities.

According to Juma, he only realized he was dealing with ISIS two months after his initial contact was made, when he was asked to pick up a new car. “We went to a location to collect a car with three other men. When we got there they told me ‘We are ISIS and we want to use this car for a bombing operation.’” This, he claimed, was when “I washed my hands of them and told them to go away, that I want nothing to do with them. I feared for my life and my family’s life and told them I will not tell anyone else if they let me go.” He presented himself to us as a vulnerable victim of ISIS duplicity, and insisted that “I am illiterate and wanted to make a living with the car and was manipulated with money. As soon as I found out they were ISIS I told them to leave me alone. I left them but was then arrested.”Again, this was refuted by the Kurdish authorities, who had evidence that his sister and a number of other family members were ISIS members based in Iraq, arguing that this explained how his brother-in-law was able to connect him with the ISIS network in Kurdistan.

Both versions of the story were full of holes, and it was impossible to get anything resembling a clear picture of how Juma came to be involved with ISIS. Nonetheless, Juma’s story (however murky), and those of the others we spoke to, helped us to begin understanding how ISIS operates in the region, and the motivations among Kurds for joining the group.

STATEHOOD STRUGGLE

The stories of Kurdistan’s ISIS members should serve as a reminder of the complexities of the region’s problems. There is no holy grail, and one should be wary of those who promise it. No single reason, or theory, can explain how radicalization happens, and each individual’s path is unique and influenced by personal as well as external factors.

Indeed, it could be argued that too much time is spent trying to figure out why people become terrorists when perhaps we should also be asking another very obvious question: why not? If we are able to better understand the reasons behind an individual’s resisting the call to jihadist violence, this will vastly increase our knowledge about the phenomenon of ISIS.

Given the close proximity of Kurdistan to ISIS-held territory, and the fact that the majority of Iraqi Kurds are Sunni Muslim, the number of Kurds who have joined ISIS is strikingly low. It is difficult to say with any certainly why, unlike their Arab neighbors, Kurds have proven to be more resistant to the allure of global jihadism. Among the possible explanations is that the Kurdish struggle for survival and statehood has ensured a culture and identity defined by nationalism, not religion. However, as our research shows, even here ISIS has succeeded in making itself attractive to a significant number of people. The search for answers will go on for some time yet.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-08-08/kurds-isis


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"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Jordanien Antworten mit Zitat
Islamismus in Jordanien:

Zitat:
Mosques are no longer the hotbed of recruitment they once were. Instead, university students are quietly sharing Islamic State propaganda in dormitories, sports clubs or other youth venues, according to Western officials working on programs to counter violent extremism in Amman.

Most at-risk are “bored youth,” the officials say. Unemployment for those under the age of 30—more than 70% of the population—was 30%, more than twice the global average, according to a 2015 report by the International Labor Organization.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/jordan-struggles-with-islamic-extremism-at-home-1471225840


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"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Buchrezension Antworten mit Zitat
Eine Buchrezension:

Zitat:
Why did Prohibition in America fail? The Pakistani Islamic scholar Abul Ala Mawdudi argued that it was because the law “required people to accept human rather divine reasoning.” What was needed was a harsh and absolute divine mandate to root out evils like alcohol. As the Ottoman empire was being swept away and national-independence movements were about to overrun the Muslim world, men like Mawdudi began articulating a new ideology that would meld medieval and modern concepts. That ideology, Salafi-jihadism, now represents one of the West’s greatest security challenges.

Al Qaeda and the Islamic State may be today’s two most infamous outgrowths of the Salafi-jihadist movement, but they both arose from a wider intellectual history, Shiraz Maher writes in his new book, “Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea.” Mr. Maher, a senior research fellow at King’s College London’s International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, sets out to provide “an explanatory backstory accounting for how we got to where we are” and presents it in a highly readable and incisive overview.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-intellectual-roots-of-isis-1471260593


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
15. August 2016, 14:51 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Bei der Gründung dabei Antworten mit Zitat
Ein detaillierter Bericht über die Gründung des IS basierend auf Interviews mit einem Kämpfer:

Zitat:
Since its creation, we have learned about the Islamic State from its enemies. Its story has largely been told by those fighting the group in Iraq and Syria, traumatized civilians who have escaped its brutal rule, and the occasional defector. That is about to change. This is the story of Abu Ahmad, a Syrian operative for the Islamic State who witnessed the group’s lightning expansion firsthand and spent months among its most notorious foreign fighters.

In this series of three articles, he provides unique insight into how Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s political scheming paved the way for the Islamic State’s expansion into Syria, al Qaeda’s efforts to stem the group’s rise, and the terrifying weapons in the arsenal of the self-proclaimed “caliphate.” Some names and details have been omitted to protect Abu Ahmad.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/16/present-at-the-creation/?utm_content=buffer8e88b&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Chemische Waffen Antworten mit Zitat
2. Teil: Der IS besitzt chemische Waffen:

Zitat:
Roughly four months before the split between the Nusra Front and ISIS, in December 2012, dozens of Syrian jihadi fighters climbed a hill toward Regiment 111 — a large army base near the town of Darat Izza, in northern Syria. That town had been taken roughly five months earlier by a coalition of rebel groups. But while they had besieged Regiment 111 since the summer of 2012, they still had not succeeded in capturing the base from the troops loyal to President Assad.

The weather had turned bad in winter, however, making it more difficult for the Syrian Air Force to hold off the rebels with airstrikes. Moreover, the base was huge, sprawling over almost 500 acres, and difficult to protect from all approaches.

Syrian Army soldiers inside Regiment 111 successfully defended their base during the first rebel attack in early November 2012, killing 18 Nusra fighters in the process. But the cold December wind only fortified the rebels’ resolve. The base was a goldmine: home to guns, artillery, ammunition, and vehicles. And deep inside Regiment 111’s bunkers lay something even more valuable — a cache of chemical weapons.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/17/how-the-islamic-state-seized-a-chemical-weapons-stockpile/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Doc Sportello



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Beitrag Teil 3 Antworten mit Zitat
Dritter Teil zur Spaltung zwischen dem IS und AQ:

Zitat:
It was May 2013, and the newly formed Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant was intent on cementing its status as the world’s most fearsome jihadi force. But before it could do so — or use the new cache of chemical weapons it had obtained — it would have to contend with a new challenge from senior al Qaeda figures.

Al Qaeda’s senior leadership was not about to accept Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s claim to authority — particularly in light of his brazen lie that he had been instructed to do so by al Qaeda leader Ayman-al Zawahiri. One month after the historic meeting between the ISIS chief and other jihadi leaders in Kafr Hamra, a small group of men, including a few armed guards, secretly traveled in a couple of vehicles through Syria. Fearing that they might be discovered by Baghdadi’s loyalists or targeted by the Syrian regime, they moved quietly and carefully.

This group was called Lajnat Khorasan, or the “Khorasan Committee.” Its members had emerged from their underground lairs in Afghanistan and Pakistan and come to Syria on behalf of Zawahiri, who remained in hiding.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/18/the-greatest-divorce-in-the-jihadi-world/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Doc Sportello



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Beitrag IS in Europa Antworten mit Zitat
Dieser Artikel gibt einige interessante Einblicke, auch über die Funktionsweise der Repressionsorgane:

Zitat:
“It was going great until they switched from French to Arabic,” said the cop. “At that stage we lost everything. Do you know how long it takes us to get a translation [of a tape] into French from Arabic?”

In this case: three days, but by then they were gone.

“And that was pretty good because officials were motivated. It could be as little as 24 hours if we thought they were literally on the verge of an attack, but three days, one day, whatever — it’s too long.”

By the time translators had prepared a transcript, the men had fled Brussels by train for another European city — the officer refused to say which one — and eventually flew to Istanbul, where they easily made their way to southern Turkey and across the border into parts of Syria then controlled by ISIS.

https://www.buzzfeed.com/mitchprothero/why-europe-cant-find-the-jihadis-in-its-midst?utm_term=.ejVN9AKV5#.ktgxvk2r4


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Maoistische Guerillastrategie und Jihad:

Zitat:
The Islamic State, despite its longevity, prolific media enterprise, and high profile, escapes easy definition by policymakers, academics, and the media. An examination of the movement using Mao’s revolutionary warfare framework, particularly his three stages of conflict, provides a more holistic view of the organization for both understanding and action. As part of an exploration, Islamic State captured documents and press releases were examined to establish the innovations and breadth of its adaptation of Maoist principles of guerilla warfare and the evolution of the theoretical influences on the doctrine from previous Salafi-militant experiences and publications. This research provides valuable insight into the return of a powerful method of insurgency as well as a glimpse into the vast pseudo-clandestine insurgency that is the Islamic State movement.

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/523/html


Einige biographische Einblicke:

Zitat:
That the Islamic State (IS) in da’wa (religious outreach) is well-known and much of it is publicized online through IS propaganda, but there are still many IS works that remain unpublished on the Internet and distributed on the ground only. One such da’wa series is called qisas al-mujahideen (‘Stories of the Mujahideen’). This series has been distributed under the heading of Akhbar al-Khilafa (‘News of the Caliphate’), which also includes IS news announcements published online, and more formally with the mark of the Diwan al-Da’wa wa al-Masajid (‘Da’wa and Mosques Department’), one of the series of formal diwans created following the announcement of the Caliphate.

http://jihadology.net/2016/08/24/the-archivist-stories-of-the-mujahideen-unseen-islamic-state-biographies-of-outstanding-members/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag IS vs. AQ Antworten mit Zitat
Eine gute Zusammenfassung des Konflikts zwischen IS und AQ:

Zitat:
But rather than withering away, al-Qaeda has turned IS’s emergence into a strategic opportunity, pivoting off of IS’s brutality and doubling down on a more low-profile and sustainable approach to growth. Al-Qaeda has quietly, and yet relatively rapidly, gained ground in conflict zones across the Middle East and North Africa, including Syria and Yemen, where the group has seized territory and embedded itself within local communities.

Al-Qaeda’s decision to become more covert and discrete in response to IS’s ostentatious successes may seem counterintuitive at first. Indeed, it is the opposite of what most analysts expected. But it worked. Al-Qaeda weathered the IS storm. This article tells the story of how al-Qaeda survived and thrived despite the IS challenge. It focuses on al-Qaeda’s response to three key developments over the past decade: al-Qaeda in Iraq’s defeat in 2007-09, the 2011 Arab uprisings, and IS’s rise. The group’s approaches to all three developments are inherently interlinked. The course al-Qaeda charted as these challenges and opportunities arose explains why al-Qaeda is stronger now than it was in 2014, and why it is far better positioned than IS to succeed in the long term.

http://www.hudson.org/research/12788-how-al-qaeda-survived-the-islamic-state-challenge


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Muoit



Anmeldedatum: 31.10.2006
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Beitrag Antworten mit Zitat
Reportage über den Quaasim Illi und den IZRS, die einer Konkurrenzströmung zum IS angehören:

http://www.woz.ch/1634/qaasim-illi-und-der-islamische-zentralrat/die-dschihadisten-von-buempliz

_________________
Power to the Pöbel!
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Beitrag Boko Haram Antworten mit Zitat
@Muoit: Sehr interessant, thx!

Derweil scheint sich Boko Haram in eine autonome und eine IS-Fraktion gespalten zu haben:

Zitat:
Reprenant ces fatwas, Abu Bakr Shekau estime ainsi que ceux qui n'ont pas émigré vers les territoires tenus par le GSPJ doivent être considérés comme des «infidèles» à moins de les voir exprimer leur volonté de combattre les autorités du Nigéria. Néanmoins, il est difficile de croire que le leader du GSPJ puisse rassembler une majorité des combattants à ses côtés. En effet, l'EI ayant atteint un tel niveau de radicalisme il est peu vraisemblable qu'il puisse exister un espace militant plus radical, en tout cas pour un groupe ayant vocation à devenir un mouvement de masse et non pas un simple groupuscule extrémiste. Ainsi, il est peu probable qu'Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi adresse une réponse précise aux questions doctrinales posées par le GSPJ, d'autant qu'une exportation de ce débat en Syrie et en Irak pourrait raviver des conflits théologiques ayant failli déstabiliser l'EI dans le passé.

http://religion.info/french/articles/article_689.shtml#.V8pa_NFb88q


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
03. September 2016, 06:57 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Moderner Jihadismus Antworten mit Zitat
Sehr ausführlicher Essay zur Entwicklung des modernen Islamismus und Jihadismus:

Zitat:
Political Islam has generated two ideological strands that use religious ideology to advance their goals, namely, Islamism and jihadism. On the one hand, Islamists have formulated a political paradigm premised on Islamic teachings that are adaptable to the secular framework of the modern state and have, therefore, endured both as domestic and global political actors. On the other hand, jihadis have rejected positive law outright and advanced a global revolutionary paradigm against today’s secular world order. Key to jihadism’s appropriation of Islamic teachings is a quest for a legal code that provides jihadis with both an anti-establishment justification for their violence and a claim to legitimacy in the minds of Muslims whom they wish to enlist as their followers.

http://religion.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-68?result=4&rskey=ysOG1P&mediaType=Article#ref_acrefore-9780199340378-e-68-note-57


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
04. September 2016, 14:57 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
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Beitrag Was passiert, wenn der IS fällt? Antworten mit Zitat
Ein Interview mit einem Kämpfer:

Zitat:
Speaking of the Turkish military intervention in Syria which began on 24 August, Faraj helps explain a mysterious development which took place at the time. As Turkish tanks and anti-Isis rebel Syrian units moved into the border town of Jarabulus on the Euphrates River, Isis appeared to know they were coming and made no attempt to resist them. This was in sharp contrast to the ferocious resistance put up by Isis fighters to defend the Isis-held town of Manbij a little further south from attack by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) whose fighting muscle comes from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Isis may have lost as many as 1,000 dead in ground fighting and US bombardment from the air.

It was reported at the time that Isis fighters had fallen back from Jarabulus towards their other stronghold in the area at al-Bab, but Faraj has another explanation. He says: “When the Turkish army entered Jarabulus, I talked to my friends who were there. Actually, Isis didn’t leave Jarabulus; they just shaved off their beards.”

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-to-rebuild-in-africa-if-defeated-in-syria-and-iraq-a7234456.html


WSJ glaubt, dass nichts so schnell vorbei sein wird:

Zitat:
“Simply having ISIS go away doesn’t mean that the jihadist problem goes away,” said Daniel Benjamin of Dartmouth College, who served as the State Department’s counterterrorism coordinator during the Obama administration. “Eliminating the caliphate will be an achievement—but more likely, it will be just the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end.”

What made Islamic State unique—and, until recently, so appealing to many young, disaffected Muslims—is that it managed to create an actual state in Syria and Iraq. In Mosul last year, food prices were lower than in Baghdad and the streets were kept clean, even as the group drove out the city’s Christians and Shiites, banned women’s beauty salons, forbade men from shaving their beards and threw gay men from rooftops. Unlike Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s, it was also a place in the heart of the Middle East to which adepts from around the world could migrate relatively easily, by way of Turkey’s porous borders.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-happens-after-isis-falls-1473435007


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Doc Sportello



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Beitrag Türkei & IS Antworten mit Zitat
Ein ehemaliger Verantwortlicher der Anti-Terror-Behörde zeichnet ein düsteres Panorama der Rolle der Türkei:

Zitat:
Ahmet Sait Yayla was Chief of the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Division of Turkish National Police between 2010 and 2012, before becoming Chief of the Public Order and Crime Prevention Division until 2014. Previously, he had worked in the Counter-Terrorism and Operations Division as a mid-level manager for his entire 20-year police tenure, before becoming Chief of Police in Ankara and Sanliurfa.

In interviews with INSURGE intelligence, Yayla exclusively revealed that he had personally witnessed evidence of high-level Turkish state sponsorship of ISIS during his police career, which eventually led him to resign. He decided to become a whistleblower after Erdogan’s authoritarian crackdown following the failed military coup in July. This is the first time that the former counter-terrorism chief has spoken on the record to reveal what he knows about Turkish government aid to Islamist terror groups.

https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/former-turkish-counter-terror-chief-exposes-governments-support-for-isis-d12238698f52#.hzp5102kf


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Boko Haram Antworten mit Zitat
Ein weiterer Artikel zu den verschiedenen Fraktionen von Boko Haram:

Zitat:
The clearest rift is between Abubakar Shekau and Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Shekau became Boko Haram’s leader back at the time of the launch of the insurgency in 2009 and is still its most recognisable figure both within and outside Nigeria. However, on 3 August this year, Islamic State (IS) – to which Boko Haram pledged allegiance in 2015, becoming its “West Africa Province” – announced the insurgency had a new leader in al-Barnawi.

Just hours after this announcement, Shekau issued an audio claiming he was still in charge, but was reverting to his former title as “imam”. A few days later on 7 August, Shekau then accused al-Barnawi of “manipulating” IS into replacing him. In the video, he also claimed IS leader Abubakar al-Baghdadi had yet to respond to his accusation that al-Barnawi was guilty of “great polytheism” and of not being “authentically salafist”.

http://africanarguments.org/2016/09/20/making-sense-of-boko-harams-different-factions/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Boko Haram Antworten mit Zitat
Boko Haram sei im Niedergang:

Zitat:
After being declared the world’s deadliest terrorist organization in 2015, Boko Haram is a menace in retreat. As a whole, the conflict is on pace to claim about 3,500 lives in 2016, a third the number of lives lost in 2015 and the conflict’s lowest total since 2012. As illustrated in Figure 1, during the second quarter of 2016, the group was responsible for 244 killings, the lowest in close to five years.

A close look at the data, drawn from Johns Hopkins University’s Nigeria Social Violence Research Project, reveals four key factors behind Boko Haram’s decline: a failure to spread much beyond Nigeria’s extreme northeast, a loss of popular support, poor strategic thinking by the insurgents, and improved counterinsurgency operations. Though these factors have led to a decisive shift in momentum against the group, the conflict is far from over. Winning the war will require better regional coordination, the re-integration of former militants, and a systematic plan to re-build the northeast, where thousands are currently on the brink of starvation.

http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/charting-boko-harams-rapid-decline/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Doc Sportello



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Beitrag AQ vs. IS Antworten mit Zitat
Wie das Rebranding von JaN vom IS wahrgenommen wurde:

Zitat:
The first question is perhaps best left to governments and journalists, but there is at least one reason to see the rebranding as more than superficial. This is that Jawlani’s maneuver alienated a number of prominent Jabhat al-Nusra hardliners who have yet to join JFS. (One rumor puts the number of these “defectors” at well over a hundred.) Presumably these men felt that joining JFS would amount to endorsing an excessively moderate and inclusive political vision.

The second question, whether Zawahiri blessed this rebranding, also remains open. To be sure, Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaida portrayed the move as having al-Qaida’s support—as an amicable separation. But the Islamic State has begged to differ. The true story, in its view, is that the “traitor” Jawlani struck again: having betrayed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State back in 2013, he turned on Zawahiri and al-Qaida in 2016. Such a view should perhaps be viewed with skepticism, but it also deserves consideration. Understanding both sides of the story requires first revisiting some of the words of Zawahiri that are key to both narratives.

http://www.jihadica.com/jabhat-al-nusras-rebranding/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Sirte scheint langsam aber sicher zu fallen:

Zitat:
The Islamic State’s safe haven in Sirte, Libya has been “reduced to a single square kilometer,” Secretary of Defense Ash Carter told the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier today.

Carter’s testimony was echoed by Al Bunyan Al Marsoos (“Solid Structure”) operations room, which draws fighters from militias based in Misrata and is allied with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA). Al Bunyan Al Marsoos launched an offensive against the Islamic State’s stronghold in May. Earlier today, it posted a map (seen above) showing the jihadists’ shrinking territory.

Al Bunyan Al Marsoos has repeatedly posted versions of this map. The group indicated in mid-August that the jihadists were operating in only a few neighborhoods. That assessment was generally consistent with an infographic produced by the Islamic State’s own Amaq News Agency. The Islamic State has lost even more ground since then.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/islamic-states-safe-haven-in-sirte-libya-shrinks-to-a-single-neighborhood.php


Derweil breiten sich jihadistische Netzwerke in Russland aus:

Zitat:
Often without work permits, marginalized, subjected to abuse and extortion as well as not infrequently racist violence, many of these guest workers understandably turn to their faith as a means to sustain dignity. A Tajik, Kyrgyz, or Uzbek who would not have known the way to the nearest mosque in Dushanbe, Bishkek, or Tashkent becomes a practicing Muslim in Moscow, with at least some falling under the influence of hardline clerics. There are only four mosques in Moscow, and the shortage of space forces thousands of believers to gather in private apartments, where radical preachers feel more secure than in public.

The result: With an estimated 300 to 500 ISIL recruiters in the Russian capital, Moscow has become a key hub and a way station to Syria for fighters from Russia and the former Soviet Union. Between 80 to 90 percent of ISIL fighters from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan have been radicalized and recruited while in Russia as migrant workers. According to Russian sources, all of the 300 ethnic Uzbeks who are members of ISIL were recruited during work stints in Russia — as were 80 percent of the ethnic Tajik fighters, including their leader, Nusrat Nazarov. In response, in January of this year, Russia’s Migration Service issued a list of 333,391 Tajiks barred from entering the country. According to the National Security Council of Tajikistan, 700 Tajiks have left for Syria and 300 have been killed there. Nazarov has claimed that there were 2,000 Tajiks with ISIL.

http://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-coming-of-the-russian-jihad-part-i/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
2. Teil zum ISKP:

Zitat:
ISKP in Nangarhar emerged publicly in May 2015, but had its first clash with the Taleban in December 2014. Within a month of its public emergence, it had captured most of the territory of eight districts, becoming the dominant insurgent group there. After being fought back by the Taleban and pounded by US air strikes, ISKP’s territory had shrunk mainly to four districts. These four districts remain heavily contested. Unlike in other provinces where ISKP was eliminated quickly, ISKP managed to hold onto territory and has proved reasonably resilient in Nangarhar for the last one and a half years.

The group’s tactics have been beyond the pale, even by the standards of the current Afghan conflict, which can be very brutal. Beheadings and public executions have become ISKP’s trademark, with victims including elderly civilian men. It has also forced tens of thousands of families from their homes which its fighters chose to settle in, and forcibly closed schools and even clinics. ISKP has turned Nangarhar into its national headquarters. This year, it has remained confined there, and on defensive. For more details, see the previous part of this series.

https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/descent-into-chaos-why-did-nangarhar-turn-into-an-is-hub/


IS schliesst Schule im Flüchtlingslager Yarmuk:

Zitat:
That relatively hands-off approach drastically shifted this July, when IS members informed local teachers that the camp’s only non-IS school would not be permitted to open in September unless they adopted a new IS curriculum.

“IS considers Yarmouk to be caliphate territory,” said activist al-Qaysar. “In turn, they refuse to allow outside actors—anyone who hasn’t formally pledged allegiance—to conduct independent work inside the camp.”

The camp’s teachers refused to acquiesce at the start of the new academic year despite IS’s offers to pay school salaries for the first time in years.

“We won’t be bought off to teach this IS curriculum,” one local teacher said under the condition of anonymity. “Forget about our salaries; money has never been what’s motivated us. We’re here to teach.”

In response, IS shuttered the 1,300-student Jarmaq School.

The Islamic State controls roughly two thirds of Yarmouk camp—with Jabhat Fatah a-Sham (formerly Jabhat a-Nusra) managing the remaining portion—following multiple bloody turf wars earlier this year.

http://syriadirect.org/news/islamic-state-shuts-down-palestinian-refugee-school-after-teachers-take-a-stand/


Zur Landwirtschaft im Gebiet des IS:

Zitat:
The Islamic State has repeatedly made headlines for commandeering and profiting from the region’s oil. Less attention has been paid to its use of another resource vital to the functioning of any would-be state: agriculture. The Islamic State does not publish agricultural statistics. So how can we measure its agricultural production and potential revenue streams? How has the international campaign against the Islamic State impacted that vital economic sector?

In a recent article, we use an innovative method of interpreting satellite imagery to gauge agricultural production in Islamic State-controlled territory. We derive remotely sensed vegetation indices and correlate them with production in pre-conflict years based on government statistics. To isolate the impact of conflict from drought effects, we statistically control for rainfall. The results are striking: The Islamic State may be using and profiting from agriculture far more than previously estimated.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/27/its-not-just-funded-by-oil-and-looting-how-the-islamic-state-uses-agriculture/?postshare=3621474983311743&tid=ss_tw


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
27. September 2016, 16:02 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
Beiträge: 1574
Wohnort: Stadt

Beitrag Französische Islamwissenschafter Antworten mit Zitat
Zu Kontroversen zwischen französischen "Islamologen":

Zitat:
Die „Islamologie“, von deren Repräsentanten wir nach den Anschlägen im Januar und November 2015 viel gehört und gelesen haben, ist ein Teil der Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften, die sich mit Phänomenen beschäftigen, die mit dem Islam in Verbindung stehen. Es handelt sich um eine quasi autonome – und sehr französische – Disziplin, die sich in den 1980er Jahren mit den Werken von Bruno Étienne „L’Islamisme radical“ (1987), von Gilles Kepels „Le Prophète et le Pharaon“ (1984) und von Rémy Leveau „Les Musulmans dans la Societé Française“ (1987 im Verlag der Sciences Po und in Zusammenarbeit mit Gilles Kepel erschienen) herausbildete. Von diesen Autoren lebt heute nur noch Gilles Kepel, allerdings gehören auch Veröffentlichungen anderer, mittlerweile in Vergessenheit geratener Politikwissenschaftler zu dieser Disziplin. Zu ihnen zählen: Olivier Carré, dem Übersetzer des Korankommentars des ägyptischen Islamisten Sayyid Qutb, Michel Seurat, der zum syrischen Autoritarismus und zur Geschichte der Muslimbrüder forschte, bevor er als Geisel im Libanon starb, sowie Alain Roussillon, Spezialist zeitgenössischer muslimischer Denkströmungen und ehemaliger Leiter des Centre d’Etudes et de Documentation Economiques, Juridiques et Sociales (CEDEJ), der wichtigsten französischen Forschungseinrichtung in Kairo.

http://www.ufuq.de/islamwissenschaften-als-kampfsport/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
30. September 2016, 18:42 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
Beiträge: 1574
Wohnort: Stadt

Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Ein deutscher IS-Deserteur, Geheimdienste, Medien und überraschende whistleblower:

Zitat:
That recording shows two Islamic State operatives executing hostages who were forced to kneel among the columns in the ancient Syrian city of Palmyra, which came under Islamic State control last year. Sarfo appears only briefly in that video, striding across the screen in combat fatigues with the group’s iconic black flag.

But the Islamic State camera crew in Palmyra captured other video in the city that was left out of the propaganda release. Portions of this additional footage were provided to The Washington Post by an individual inside the Islamic State, which is eager to discredit Sarfo because of his repeated denunciations of the group.

In an April interview with the British newspaper the Independent, Sarfo said that he had “witnessed stonings, beheadings, shootings, hands chopped off and many other things.” The Islamic State, also referred to as ISIS or ISIL, is “not just un-Islamic, it is inhuman,” he said.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-a-former-isis-recruit-and-media-darling-edited-his-own-story/2016/10/04/5740ff50-8582-11e6-a3ef-f35afb41797f_story.html


Naht die Apokalypse? Von der Türkei unterstützte Söldner künden einen Angriff auf Dabiq an:

Zitat:
Syrian rebels backed by Turkey have launched an offensive against the Islamic State held town of Dabiq, which holds religious and symbolic meaning for the terror group.

Fighting on the outskirts of the town in northern Syria intensified Sunday night, when some 15 rebels were killed and 35 wounded during heavy clashes, the Turkish military said. The rebel advance was aided by heavy air and artillery support from the U.S.-led coalition fighting Islamic State, the Turkish military said. Airstrikes killed 13 Islamic State militants, it said.

“We are very close to Dabiq…. We have planned for this,” said Ahmad Othman, commander of the Sultan Murad group, one of the Turkish-backed rebel factions advancing on the town.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrian-rebels-advance-on-islamic-state-held-town-of-dabiq-1475512007


Teilweise etwas sehr kulturalistisch, aber nicht uninteressanter Essay über Mosul (ganz, da Paywall nach 1 Artikel):

Zitat:
Iraq and Ruin
The Once and Future Mosul Rasha Al Aqeedi

The city may soon be freed from the Islamic State, but it won’t be easy to govern afterward. Foreigners—and even Iraqis—had better study its complexities.

On August 30, General Joe Votel of the U.S. Central Command told Middle Eastern reporters via a video call from CENTCOM Tampa that coalition-backed Iraqi forces could take Mosul back from the Islamic State before the end of the year. “[A]s the Prime Minister has said, it’s his intention to try to get through Mosul by the end of the year. My assessment over the course of my visits is that they are on track to achieve that objective…. We are at the point here where we are now really into the heart of the caliphate,” Votel said. Coalition forces have already begun “shaping operations” in the outskirts of Mosul.
The liberation of the town where I was born and raised seems to be at hand. So why do I have such mixed feelings, looking on from Dubai these days, about what is likely to happen by year’s end? Because I fear that the effort to retake the town will destroy much of it, and because I am skeptical that a post-combat governance arrangement will be easy to put together. Most of all, I fear that other Iraqis and some select group of non-Iraqis who may have a hand in trying to control Mosul in 2017 may not understand what makes the place tick. Mosul is not just any city. It has its own character, wonders, and distempers. To govern it requires first that one really know it. The details matter, but, alas, details are often ignored.

The aftershocks of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq included not least an overthrowing of the balance—or rather imbalance—of sectarian power that had characterized the country since the onset of its modern history. A minority of Sunnis governed a plurality if not an outright majority of Shi‘a. The invasion shifted that status quo almost immediately. In late April 2003, barely a month after the statue of Saddam Hussein was famously pulled from its pedestal in Baghdad, Iraqi Shi‘a marked the pilgrimage to Karbala. More than one million devotees marched toward their spiritual sanctuary in a ritual that had been suppressed by the Ba‘ath regime for decades. They carried colorful banners that bore names sacred to all Muslims: Fatima, Ali, and Hussein. My hometown of Mosul, like most Sunni-majority cities, observed the event with a mix of confusion and apprehension: Was the new Iraq a place that celebrated and implicitly acknowledged the ascent of a set of customs and beliefs foreign to Sunnis?

Mosul’s alienation from post-2003 Iraq can be partially understood within the context of a general Sunni distaste for Shi‘a ascendency in a nominally secular country. That ascendency ran against the grain of reality, according to those subject to education in Ba‘athi Iraq. The Ba‘athi approach to essentializing its ideology required the marginalization of the Shi‘a practice of Islam and the denial of its relevance. History texts made no reference to the Shi‘a interpretation of history. The Imams, revered by all Muslims, were hardly mentioned. The end of the “Righteously Guided Caliphates” era—the Rashidun—was portrayed as a smooth transition to the “companion” Mu‘awiya, the first of the identifiably Sunni caliphs of the Ummayyad rule.

Authoritarian regimes often rewrite history to serve their political agendas and maintain power, but completely neglecting events that shaped an entire sect of Islam—one that formed the majority of the nation—was an extreme case. Shi‘a rituals and festivals were severely suppressed and frequently banned during periods of sectarian troubles. While Iraqis often proclaim that “we did not know the difference between Shi‘a and Sunni before 2003,” this is mostly a product of the Ba‘athi regime’s policies. One unfortunate byproduct of this philosophy after 2003 was the Sunnis’ shock at realizing that Shi‘a Islam not only existed, but was ready to energetically express itself. The boisterous celebration of its unique rituals during Ashura and other festivals produced consternation among the Sunnis of Mosul, who had thought themselves to be completely in synch with the Iraqi nation as a whole.

Indeed, the ethnically and religiously diverse city of Mosul was perhaps the most oblivious of all Iraqi cities to the Shi‘a. Unlike Baghdad or Basra, Mosul had a Sunni Arab majority and a significant Christian population (Syriac, Assyrian, Chaldean) that formed its core. Though many “Arabs” came from Turkish, Circassia, Chechen, and Georgian roots, their IDs read “Arab,” and they assimilated willingly into their imposed ethnic group. Other non-Arabs, like the Kurdish, Turkmen, Shabak, and Yazidi populations, faced periods of oppression by a succession of leaders, but held on to their identities proudly, integrating only gradually over the years. The few Shi‘a families in Mosul went unnoticed. Those born into mixed families usually omitted mention of the fact that that their mothers or fathers were Shi‘a, not out of any sense of shame but simply because within the Ba‘athi mental space it was too hard to explain what that meant. Humans by nature fear what they do not know, and Shi‘i Islam was mysterious, opaque, and alien to the ways of the Sunnah. Hence, this group’s overnight ascendance to power had to be a conspiracy of some kind targeting Sunnis. In a city dominated by Sunnis and far from the power base in Baghdad, it was easy to believe that the new regime was illegitimate and, as far as Moslawis were concerned, an historical oddity that would fade soon like all the others who had tried to intrude upon the governance of Mosul.

In addition to its distinctive dialect of Arabic, used also by Iraqi Christians and Jews and drastically different from those of Baghdad and the south, Mosul has certain unique characteristics that set it apart from other Iraqi cities: a resilience in the face of temporary intrusions and a pessimistic temperament that has its citizens always prepared for tough times. These characteristics are expressed in, for example, the common habit of stockpiling supplies for emergencies and a careful ethic of austerity, which has in turn led to the humorous stereotype of Moslawi “stinginess,” the basis of hundreds of jokes about the city. These attitudes emerged, however, from one of the darkest periods in Mosul’s history: the great famine of 1917. As the Ottomans hauled food from Mosul to supply their army during several seasons of drought, the local population was left to suffer. Stories of starvation, loss, and humiliation were passed on from one generation to the next, creating a collective memory that has outlived any witnesses to the famine. The fear of a recurring tragedy of this sort is embedded in Moslawi culture.

Another event that lingered for decades in the city’s popular memory was the bloody suppression of the 1959 revolt, which broke out in the young republic just a year after the July 1958 overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy. This event, highly underrated and under-examined, shaped Mosul’s psyche for decades.

Arab nationalism runs in Moslawi blood. It expressed itself during the first two decades of the 20th century in the secret societies of Al-Alam (The Flag) and Al-‘Ahd (The Covenant) that sought to align with the British forces against the nascent Turkish Republic, which staked a claim on Mosul Vilayat, as it was called under the Ottomans. Mosul’s proximity to Aleppo and Deir Al Zor in Syria also led to the downplaying of Iraqi nationalism in favor of the pan-Arab variety, as did the region’s emotional investment in the Palestinian struggle. Religion too runs in the city’s bloodstream, as evidenced by the many shrines, decorated mosques, and madrassas that taught the Quran and Sunnah during Ottoman times and beyond. When the Communist-leaning and avowedly secular President Abdul Kareem Qasim announced the establishment of a Communist-based forum in the heart of Mosul in 1959, he was almost asking for trouble—Communism does not sit well with conservative Sunni nationalist tendencies.

The city’s Arab nationalists had tolerated Qasim’s overthrow of the monarchy, but now a clique within Iraq’s military—many of whom hailed from Mosul—formed to oppose him. Thousands of armed participants from Baghdad and the southern provinces entered Mosul, and within weeks the confrontations escalated to what is today referred to as “Al Shawaf Revolt.” Qasim put down the revolt through his communist surrogates and affiliates: Hundreds of Moslawis were lynched, their bodies left hanging for days. (Hafez al-Assad’s approach to rebellion in Hama in April 1982 bore an uncanny resemblance to Qasim’s techniques in Mosul 23 years earlier.) Among the victims were women—an unprecedented atrocity in Mosul’s modern history.

The tragedy created Mosul’s very own “Never Again” moment, which entailed “never confronting authority despite grievances.” The civil conflict left scars of distrust and suspicion of central and southern Iraqis. Kurds, too, were seen as collaborators with Baghdad.

Within this context, it becomes easier to understand why many citizens opted to remain in the city after the Islamic State surge in June 2014. Refuge in Kurdistan was not an option for most families, who were prevented from entering by a suspicious Kurdish Peshmerga already dealing with a massive influx of displaced Iraqis. People without contacts, relatives, or public-sector jobs with continuing salaries feared what their families would face in the already economically burdened Kurdish towns, or even worse, the refugee camps. Breadwinners chose to stay in Mosul to take on simple manual jobs to support their families instead of facing uncertainty and deprivation elsewhere. Today, as plans for the military campaign to retake Mosul are being made, the city’s civilians recall the recent refugee crisis during Fallujah’s liberation and find themselves on the horns of an insoluble dilemma. They might want to leave to avoid unknown but not improbable ISIS depredations during the battle, but they now realize too that the Iraqi government’s effective concern for the safety of Sunni residents and refugees is close to nil.

Indeed, in a recent conversation, an elderly relative of mine who was an eyewitness to the carnage of 1959 expressed her fear of another “Shawaf” happening if Shi‘a militias were to enter Mosul. Her comparison startled me. Was the Islamic State in her imagination equivalent to a pan-Arab movement? Would she defend the Islamic State against other Iraqis, just because the former is Sunni and the latter mainly Shi‘a? Her answer was “IS will go, just like Saddam did. No injustice sustains. Allah will exert his wrath on Daesh, but the revenge of humans is always crueler.” Her faith in Allah’s proximate reaction is not mine, but as far as her warning of human revenge goes, I had to admit that the implications of certain pro-Iranian elements participating in the liberation of Mosul with the Iraqi Army regulars are quite ominous.

I also argued that the Communist era—a shorthand in Mosul for any secularist regime—was over, and that Mosul’s religiosity was no longer an issue. She insisted in return that, “they all hate Mosul equally.” Again her words arrested my attention. After all, President Qasim is still hailed in Baghdad and elsewhere as a hero who “placed Iraq first, and ended the injustices of social hierarchy,” language that elides fairly nicely with the Shi‘a-centric slogans on the PMF banners. If Qasim’s 1959 barbarities do not stand condemned, is similar conduct in late 2016 liable to be condoned? Indeed, some Popular Mobilization Unit apologists have wasted no time in justifying, or dismissing, the documented abuses in Tikrit and Fallujah. Old ladies are not to be dismissed easily.

After 1959, Mosul raised a white flag that can be described as “indifference” or, perhaps, fatalism. Inscribed on the symbolic banner are words more or less to this effect: Whatever grievances occur shall pass, and the most reasonable method of confrontation is patience; the status quo will run its course, but human life sacrificed against the current of superior power cannot be restored. The logic behind not confronting ISIS, and not evacuating the city when it was possible, lies in a kind if hermetic, steely indifference—not contentedness. Indifference explains why Mosul initially remained calm for more than a year after the Americans toppled Saddam, and why the population avoided tensions with the Kurdish Regional Government’s Peshmerga forces that had gradually expanded their presence in the region. Moslawi culture prefers post hoc lamentation to active insubordination.

On the social side, the shock of 1959 translated to a state of “disconnection” with the rest of Iraq. The populace began to abstain from the company of strangers, with the strangers being other Iraqis. They associated the south of the country with anarchy, paramilitaries, and vengeance, a perception strengthened by the Saddamist narrative of the Sha‘abaniya Uprising. It was uncommon for families from other provinces to choose to relocate to Mosul despite its pleasant weather, fresh water, and abundance of greenery. Students who attended the University of Mosul from other areas often reported feeling alienated or unwelcome. Even during Iraqi Sunnis’ hardships, Mosul was regrettably unwelcoming to Sunnis who relocated from Basra and Baghdad.

Some argue that Mosul “fought” the Iraqi Army after 2011, then caved in to ISIS and, as some video footage shows, welcomed the militants with open arms. This is not so. The citizens of Mosul never confronted the Army. One video showed children from “Al-Zanjili” area throwing stones at an Army vehicle. Anyone familiar with Al-Zanjili would know the children there hurl stones at any moving target. Other footage is in fact from Sadr City in 2013. Terrorists, whether jihadists or rural folk seeking an uncharacteristic domination over Mosul’s urban elite, ran riot in and around Mosul for years. The Army, police, and civilians were all targets. The thousands of people extorted and threatened by these groups would not celebrate an overt surge and the collapse of the state. Resentment existed, true, as it did in all the aforementioned situations, but it hardly translated into violence. With the exception of a fringe driven by radical thoughts and opportunists who found brokering with the extremists to be financially rewarding, Mosul’s Arab-centric culture and conservative Sunni Islam beliefs did not lead it to join the caliphate. Moslawis are among the most eager to repeat the phrase “ISIS does not represent Islam,” and refuse to equate religious-based intolerance—and Allah knows there has been plenty of that in the city—with the endemic violence and mass graves of the Islamic State.

A common error portrays Mosul as a staunch enclave of Saddam’s supporters, and therefore susceptible to also supporting IS. One recent article claimed that the “City of One Million Officers” is literally home to one million loyal Saddamist military veterans, although Mosul had earned that title long before Saddam hijacked state authority in the 1970s. In truth, Mosul’s strong middle class had been an attractive source for educated prospective officers since the Ottoman era, and it was this rather than ideology that produced Mosul’s historical sobriquet.

Another mistake is failing to distinguish between “Nineveh,” the province that includes eight other districts in addition to Mosul, which is the provincial center, and the city itself. Most Iraqis pointed to Mosul as the culprit in the Yazidi genocide. Again, not so. The rest of Iraq seemed oblivious not only to the geographic reality of Nineveh, but also to the political dynamics of the province following 2003. Many thought Sinjar was a rural village on the outskirts of Mosul, and that Moslawis themselves had taken part in purging Yazidi men and enslaving the women and children. But Sinjar is a Nineveh district nearly 100 kilometers west of Mosul. As the U.S. Army secured its grip on Iraq, Kurdish Peshmerga forces partially annexed Sinjar under the banner of the KRG in 2003. Nineveh’s local government, located in Mosul, has had little to no influence on Sinjar ever since. Moslawis could not have been complicit in the tragedy of the Yazidis, nor could they have prevented it.

The social dilemma between Mosul and its rural sub-districts is another subject unfamiliar to most Iraqis, despite similar phenomena observable in Baghdad and in southern Iraq as well. For decades, governments have failed to address the discontent of the tribal societies living in Nineveh’s under-urbanized and underserved districts. The majority of the Iraqi Islamic State militants in Mosul today hail from Tel Afer, Sheikhan, Rabe‘a, and other rural areas, according to several investigations.

Tribal elements and families who moved in the 1960s and 1970s to central Mosul from the town of Qayyarah, for example, faced social discrimination in employment, education, and real estate in certain areas, among other struggles. Rejected by society, they allied with the “authority” then opposing the local elite; the Ba‘ath Party. It was clear by the mid-1970s that the majority of Ba‘athis in Mosul were lower- to middle-class rural immigrants who used this path to achieve upward mobility. One can see the same dynamic taking place today, with many of the IS fighters occupying Mosul revealing rural accents, and much hostility, to the citizens of Mosul. Such social divisions are not exclusive to the Arab Muslim population of Mosul. The city’s Christians also maintained a social hierarchy: The rural Assyrian or Chaldean sub-districts of Alqosh, Qaraqosh, Tel Kef, Bartalla, Hamdania, and others were also seen as “different” from the Christian families who inhabited Mosul’s suburbs. Families of Turkish roots in Mosul saw themselves as distinct from other Turkic groups in Tel Afer.

Tel Afer, a name that stands out in any discourse on the Islamic State, suffered from systemic marginalization in both social and sectarian terms. After decades of disenfranchisement, ridicule, and rejection by Mosul’s urban population, the post-2003 order gave prominence to the 35-40 percent Sh‘ia population of the district. In one anecdote, a Sunni family from Tel Afer was evicted from their home, stripped of the small piece of land they owned, and forced out of the district in an almost “Ba’athist” act of demographic change under the patronage, or disregard, of the Iraqi government. The family relocated to Mosul to live with more urbanized relatives, but held onto a grudge against the new Iraq. Al-Qaeda knew which doors to knock on. Indeed, salafi thought spread in Iraq as it did elsewhere, but the fertile ground in the complicated Tel Afer made jihadi recruiting almost too easy.

The overwhelming majority of Muslims worldwide object to the Islamic State’s brutality and refuse to believe that their faith condones the ideology behind the caliphate. The Sunnis of Mosul are no exception. The fraction of citizens who fled the city have been vocal in denouncing the “deviation” of IS from true Islam; those who remain dare not even try.

There is, in the Mosul context, another dimension worthy of further investigation. Violent Islamist ideology is, to the vast majority of Moslawis, an imported belief system alien to the city and its Islamic roots. Mosul has long taken pride in its Islam. The many dynamic trends of Islam that flourished in the city throughout its history range from Sufism to quietest salafism. The more political and social Islamists are embraced and accepted because they are seen to represent the intellectual, social, and religious grassroots activism of Mosul’s most respected families. Saddam’s religious initiative of the early 1990s—the “Faith Campaign”—offered Islamists a unique platform for exerting social influence over citizens. Values perceived as liberal or Western were frowned upon. Women as young as 16 were encourage to marry and raise families. Men and teenaged boys were judged on their attendance to Friday’s prayers. The U.S. invasion only strengthened the Islamists’ influence as activism transformed into the “Islamic Party,” and they were well prepared to hijack Sunni politics in the absence of other competitors.

The Islamic State’s brand of sharia is seen as an “intrusion” by the religious circles of Mosul, and one that will quickly die out as soon as the city is liberated. However, “grassroots Islam” in Mosul—social-activism Islam—has fallen into the predicament that many devoted Muslims elsewhere avoid: Political Islam, however mainstream it may be, sets the intolerant foundation for the likes of the Islamic State to flourish.

For example, during Saddam’s Faith Campaign, we were told by influential individuals never to initiate a greeting with a Christian, as Mohamed himself ordered according to one hadith, with the intent of pressuring them to convert. We were told non-Muslim were unclean, impure, and doomed to hell regardless of how good they were as human beings. It remains debatable whether such intolerance was the intended goal of the campaign, but it was certainly an outcome. Alas, many Muslims will dismiss the connection between the deliberate second-class treatment of Christians and demanding jizya (a tax on non-Muslims) or dispossessing and dispelling Christians all together—but the latter will follow the former unless efforts are made to prevent it. The same bunch will claim that Islamic State militants are “apostates,” yet continue to call secular and liberal Muslims apostates, too.

There is some relief in knowing, from personal experience, that the vast majority of Mosul’s homegrown Islamists would not resort to violence to impose what they believe is the righteous path, but it remains problematic that many yearn for some form of hisba (religious police) to safeguard the implementation of sharia in society. Alas, not all sharia-law enthusiasts are created equal. Several former Islamists from Mosul have crossed the line that separates “moderate” political Islam from revolutionary Islam. Their numbers remain just a fraction of Mosul’s population, but their motivations for supporting the Islamic State are purely ideological. This serves as a reminder that political Islam is in many cases the incubator of, and not an alternative to, violent extremism.

In short, Mosul’s Sunni Islamic identity is a complex one. There are traditional pious people, grassroots social activists, and political types up to and on occasion including IS supporters. They agree on much and disagree on much as well. Withal, visiting shrines and tombs was a part of the city’s heritage before the Islamic State occupation. Seeking help from gifted sheikhs who claimed to be able to heal illnesses or exorcise demons was a social norm. Celebrations of Al-Mawled (Mohamed’s day of birth) were festive in nature. These customs, all considered signs of polytheism by extremists and salafists alike, remain part of Mosul’s grassroots Islam and will certainly return once the Islamic State is gone.

Despite the ongoing campaign against the city’s Christians, too, all Moslawis grew up with churches a common sight in most neighborhoods, another feature that distinguishes Mosul from other Sunni strongholds like Fallujah. The historic monasteries of “Der Mar Matti” and “Der Al Sayyida” were attractions for students and young people during much happier times. The multiculturalism of Mosul can be revived to set a new foundation for a more tolerant and accepting grassroots Islam, emerging from the young people within the city who watched as the monasteries, churches, and shrines were destroyed by the epitome of intolerance.

The practical point of all this: God help any American or other foreigner who may come to have a hand in trying to govern Mosul after its liberation, if they think that there is only one kind of resident in Mosul, one kind of Muslim, or one kind of anything else. The place is just not that simple, and missing the details is bound to end in tears for everyone.

Other Iraqis also need to understand Mosul a bit better than they have demonstrated in recent years. In Mosul, thousands of civilians have been killed by the Islamic States for reasons that hardly constitute the slightest misdemeanor. Children have spent the past two years witnessing beheadings instead of attending schools. If Moslawis felt isolated before 2014, they feel close to despair today. There are, however, a few silver linings from the Islamic State experience. A new and tangible “Never Again” moment has been formed. Ultraconservative doctrines are being questioned and debated. Feelings of alienation from “Iraq” are rapidly diminishing, in particular after the recent liberation of Fallujah, and some degree of faith in the Iraqi Army and Special Forces units has been restored. Civil society figures have reached out to their counterparts in Baghdad and the south in rapprochement efforts to help Mosul’s image after two years of defamation. If social media is an indication of public sentiments, the anti-Mosul rhetoric has subsided dramatically as well.

Sensitivities still exist, however. Sectarian misunderstandings often prevail, and it is within everyone’s best interest to steer clear of provocation. A friend recently asked why Sunnis felt offended by Shi‘a reciting a hymn near Fallujah. The answer lies in the fact that Iraq has yet to hold an honest conversation on religion and sectarian identities. Community leaders have failed to promote concepts of “coexistence,” whereby groups can choose to not subscribe to others’ beliefs, but still respect their right to celebrate those beliefs.

In 2004, a Sh‘ia friend who lived in Mosul expressed her utter disgust at a wedding that took place a day before Ashura. Her comments sounded illogical to me because Sunnis do not adopt a culture of mourning the dead via rituals. The wearing of black garments in grief for a loved one rarely exceeds forty days, let alone 1400 years. But less than ten years later, sentiments like my friend’s were politicized and exploited. In one incident, Iraqi Army convoys halted a decorated vehicle carrying newlyweds. The groom was savagely beaten in front of his terrified bride. In other incidents, the army ordered shops be closed and streets blocked. Black flags signifying the martyrdom of Al Hussein were forcefully raised at public attractions and schools as military convoys blasted Shi‘a hymns and songs—an unnecessary provocation in an overwhelmingly Sunni city at a critically dangerous time. The “mainstream” Iraqi response to such incidents would be: “Would Mosul then prefer the black flags of ISIS?” I answer that Mosul should not have to choose between either.

Mosul’s Sunnis will not embrace the rituals of Ashura, and Shi‘a from Karbala will not accept “Ta-ra-weeh” prayers during Ramadan. Mosul does not await the Hidden Imam, and Najaf does not consider “Mu‘awiyah” a reverent companion of the prophet. These communal convictions will not change, and need not change. Until Iraqis realize that such differences are manageable, it would be wise not to raise banners that tout Al-Hussein’s vengeance in the center of Mosul. “Liberation” might then be confused for “subjugation.” Instead of injecting sectarian triumphalism into a dynamic situation, it would be much better to keep the focus on the Islamic State’s failure to win over Moslawis, and so let “the Caliphate” be Mosul’s final “Never Again.”

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/09/26/the-once-and-future-mosul/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
05. Oktober 2016, 23:40 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
Beiträge: 1574
Wohnort: Stadt

Beitrag Schweden Antworten mit Zitat
Zur schwedischen Islamistenszene:

Zitat:
One softly spoken young man - who I will call Imran - told me hardline recruiters were manipulating young people who had lost their way, and encouraging them to join IS.

"Like a big brother will say to you, like a father will say to you, 'Stop doing drugs, stop hitting people. Come with us instead. Fight for God. Fight for Allah. Fight for your freedom of the Muslims. The Muslim people are being killed and raped. You are wasting your life. You don't get nothing from the Swedish people.'

"This guy has been a criminal just like me and done a lot of bad stuff. And now he is coming to me and telling me, 'You have to change.'"

http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-37578919


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Im Kalifat wird geblieben Antworten mit Zitat
Wenn man das Kalifat verlassen möchte, kann man beträchtliche Probleme kriegen:

Zitat:
The interview is heralded on the front page in large font that says, “We shall help whoever comes to us as a muhajir for the cause of Allah…But we shall prevent whoever wants [to leave] to dar al-kafirin [the land of infidels]” (emphasis added). In the interview itself, after distinguishing between the land of Islam and the land of infidels, the official reiterates an invitation to all Muslims to come to the caliphate, noting that the Islamic State “has spent huge amounts of money and still does” in an effort to remove travel barriers.

Then comes the kicker: “We also would never allow Muslims to leave towards the land of infidels to live there permanently because it is completely haram (forbidden).” His next statement is even more limiting: “Temporary travel is only permissible under necessary circumstances.” Realizing this might not be the welcome mat that will attract people to the caliphate, the official tries to reassure potential travelers with two specific examples of such circumstances: “a sick person whose sickness could result in death or damage of organs, and no treatment is available in the land of Islam” or if the person is a “merchant who is permitted to travel to bring products needed for Muslims.”

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/ctc-perspectives-welcome-to-the-hotel-caliphate-you-can-check-out-any-time-you-like-but-you-can-never-leave


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Sirte Antworten mit Zitat
Zu den liegen gelassenen Dokumenten des IS in Sirte:

Zitat:
The first page of Abu Bakr’s notebook contains Arabic translations of basic English words. It ends with a safety guide for handling explosives: “Be careful.” “Don’t be afraid.” “Keep the triggers away from children.”

As Islamic State tightened its grip on this Mediterranean city last year, closing schools and restricting social life, it trained hundreds of recruits, many of them foreigners, in the Arabic language, Islam and warfare to help extend its self-declared caliphate to Europe’s doorstep, according to documents recently discovered in the group’s offices here.

The notebook of the fighter who took the name Abu Bakr was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal along with some 150 other documents left behind by militants who fled or were killed or captured in battle as Libyan militias backed by U.S. airstrikes moved in recent months to reclaim the city. The Islamic State militants were under threat on Monday of being routed in the last neighborhood they still control in the coastal city, the group’s last major bastion in the Mediterranean country.

http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-coastal-libya-islamic-state-prepared-to-build-a-nation-1476118460?mod=e2tw


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag jihadi dreams Antworten mit Zitat
Irgendwelche Psychoanalytiker werden sicher mal ein Buch darüber schreiben, dass Jihadisten Träume ziemlich cool finden:

Zitat:
In jihadi culture, dreams are not only a valid topic of conversation, they are a guide to the future and a tool in decision-making, for lone wolves as well as leaders. Ordinary fighters look to dreams to justify violent actions and preview the rewards they hope to enjoy after death, and leaders use dreams to imbue their authority with an air of otherworldly legitimacy; they may interpret dreams about a successful attack as divine endorsement of their plans. In 2015, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi said that he would withdraw from Mosul because Muhammad ordered him out of the city in a dream. As ISIS’s grip on Iraq and Syria deteriorates, according to British anthropologist Iain Edgar, the group seems to be putting even greater stock in dreams.

Whether the dreams are real or fabricated is of course impossible to know — but the spiritual penalties for lying about a dream, Edgar points out, are severe. And the psychological effects on other ISIS supporters can be powerful either way. Videotapes released after the September 11 attacks show Osama bin Laden describing dreams he interpreted as good omens; he even feared that the secret plot could be exposed if too many people dreamed about airplane crashes.

http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2016/10/one-way-isis-sympathizers-decide-to-join-the-terrorist-group.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Geldprobleme? Antworten mit Zitat
Der IS soll knapp bei Kasse sein:

Zitat:
As the battle gets underway to retake Mosul, the group’s largest stronghold in Iraq, the Islamic State group is being denied access to revenue sources such as oil and gas and cash reserves that once amounted to more than $1 billion in 2014, said Daniel Glaser, the Treasury Department’s assistant secretary for terrorist financing.

With those resources slipping away, the Islamic State group is expected to revert to “traditional methods we see al-Qaida using — whether it’s deep-pocket donors, whether it’s charities, whether it’s NGOs, whether it’s criminal activity,” Glaser said in a recent discussion at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Beyond oil and gas sales, the Islamic State group also generated some $30 million per month in Iraq from taxation and extortion in 2015. Hisham al-Hashimi, an expert on IS who advises the Iraqi government, said the militant group currently makes about $4 million per month from taxes in Mosul alone. Al-Hashimi said the group charges a 4 percent income tax on salaries less than $600 per month, and 5 percent on monthly salaries between $600 and $1,000.

http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/as-territory-shrinks-is-group-looks-for-new-money-sources/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ISKP in Kabul Antworten mit Zitat
Sektiererische Gewalt ist in Afghanistan nicht ganz so neu, wie es der Autor darstellt, abgesehen davon ist der Artikel ziemlich informativ:

Zitat:
These attacks, especially the ones more certainly looking to be the act of ISKP, indicate that the group has an operational presence in Kabul that is beyond the ‘nascent’ stage. The group seems to have gained the capability of carrying out fatal attacks on an occasional basis in the capital, although not at a sophisticated level yet. Sending two bombers to blow themselves up in a crowd of civilian demonstrators, or two attackers dressed as police and equipped with hand grenades and guns, plus suicide belts, into a mourning crowd, or carrying out an attack on foreign security contractors in a minibus do not require a high level of complexity. However, the execution of such attacks does need some level of confidence and precision of planning, as well as adequate logistics and surveillance. These attacks are also an indicator that the group has recruited a certain number of dedicated and experienced fighters in the capital. While it is difficult to gauge how large the ISKP membership and support base in Kabul is, there are clues as to the group’s growing appeal among certain quarters of the city’s young population. (More on this in a forthcoming piece.)

https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/with-an-active-cell-in-kabul-iskp-tries-to-bring-sectarianism-to-the-afghan-war/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Mosul Antworten mit Zitat
Interview zur Schlacht von Mosul und dem Verlust von Dabiq:

Zitat:
Territory is arguably both ISIS’s greatest strength and its greatest weakness. The land the group seized in Syria and Iraq, which at its peak was thought to be as large as the kingdom of Jordan, enabled the Islamic State to aspire to its grandiose name by declaring a caliphate, drawing recruits from around the globe, and distinguishing itself from the world’s stateless terrorist and insurgent groups.

But that land has also served as a big, fat target for ISIS’s enemies, who have been pummeling the organization from the air and on the ground. By one estimate, ISIS has lost 16 percent of its territory so far in 2016, after losing 14 percent in 2015. It has recently retreated from the Iraqi cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, the Syrian-Turkish border, and the Syrian town of Dabiq, where ISIS members once prophesied a literally apocalyptic battle with infidel armies. This week, a motley crew of forces launched a massive assault on ISIS’s last Iraqi stronghold of Mosul.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/10/islamic-state-mosul-territory/504665/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Mosul Antworten mit Zitat
Animationsfilm über den Alltag in Mosul basierend auf den Berichten von Mosul Eye:



_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Mosul als Test Antworten mit Zitat
Gemäss IS-Propaganda sind die momentanen Rückschläge nichts anderes als ein Test Allahs:

Zitat:
“Why has the Islamic State lost some of the territories under its control? And why has it lost some of its leaders?” This was the headline of an article published last week by a pro-Islamic State media outlet.

As its leaders are picked off from the sky, as its economic resources run dry, and as its prized “caliphate” slips from its grasp — Mosul likely being the next casualty — the Islamic State’s supporters are looking for explanations for why the tide of war has turned against them. The facts on the ground, after all, no longer support the Islamic State’s triumphalist slogan: Remaining and Expanding (baqiya wa-tatamaddad). How, one may well ask, does a group that projected such unbounded confidence, whose legitimacy seemed to rest on seizing and controlling large territories, adjust its message to less fortunate circumstances?

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/25/allah-wants-isis-to-retreat-iraq-mosul/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag AQ vs. IS Antworten mit Zitat
4. Teil einer Interviewserie mit irgendeinem AQ-Heini, der erklärt, warum der IS schlecht ist:

Zitat:
This is the fourth Q&A of the interview series with Ahmed Al Hamdan (@a7taker), a Jihadi-Salafi analyst and author of “Methodological Difference Between ISIS and Al Qaida“. Al Hamdan was a former friend of Turki bin Ali, and a student of Shaykh Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi under whom he studied and was given Ijazah, becoming one of his official students. Also, Shaykh Abu Qatada al Filistini wrote an introduction for his book when it was published in the Arabic language. The interview series contains contains five themes in total and will all be published on Jihadica.com. You can find the first Q&A here, the second here and the third here.

http://www.jihadica.com/the-role-of-ideologues/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Neue Ausgabe Perspectives on Terrorism Antworten mit Zitat
Auswertung von Polizeidaten über Jihadisten in Holland, sehr psychologisierend, aber gibt einige Einblicke über die Funktionsweise der jihadistischen Szene sowie der Repression:

Zitat:
This article aims to illustrate radicalization towards jihadist terrorism as a non-sequential process. It focuses on both continued as well as unsuccessful trajectories of involvement, by studying how jihadists deal with social stimuli from their environment. The material objects of investigation were 28 voluminous police dossiers from the Netherlands; these yielding rich information on 209 subjects. In addition, 28 semi-structured interviews with police investigators, public prosecutors, and defense lawyers were conducted. By studying the factors that enhance, discourage, and sustain possible affiliation with a terrorist network, this investigation found two transformation processes. The first process shows how intended encouragements to internalize the radical ideology can be carried too far, having a counterproductive effect. The second process shows how seemingly discouraging factors are perceived as positive and therefore encourage further jihadist involvement. All subjects studied appear to have been confronted with mechanisms from transformation processes, indicating that even the involvement of experienced subjects is unstable and can fluctuate over time.

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/539/html


IS und Apokalypse, historisch ein wirres Durcheinander, aber der Schluss über AQ und IS ist interessant:

Zitat:
Islamic State uses an age old apocalyptic narrative to attract followers and legitimatize its existence. This research note show which narrative elements were used during previous violence-inciting apocalyptic manifestation in Christianity and Western ideology and how they can be retraced in the communications and enactments of Islamic State. The use of such narratives explains why the movement has been so much more powerful in attracting followers than al-Qaeda. Based on historical experience the prospects of fighting such a movement without annihilating it are gloomy, the more so as apocalyptic movements have a tendency to provoke a confrontation with their opponents as a manifestation of the promised final battle between the forces of Good and Evil which will produce the salutary end state, both of which are central elements in their narrative.

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/544/html


Zu guter Letzt der linksradikale Flügel der Terrorismusforschung: eine marxistische Analyse der Klassenbasis von Boko Haram:

Zitat:
Street children, many of whom are ‘almajirai’, are part of a vast underclass that populates the cities of Northern Nigeria. Many of these children and young adults have no means of support other than begging for their daily food, petty crime or providing casual labor. For the most part illiterate, they have few educational skills that would allow them to function in a modern economy. This article argues that the appalling economic conditions experienced by these young people makes them prime targets for recruitment into fanatical religious groups such as Boko Haram, or into one or another of the political/criminal gangs – generically called the ‘Yan Daba’–that proliferate in northern Nigerian cities. It further argues that the underclass from which these young people emerge is the direct consequence of the failed governance of the parasitic predator class that dominates the post-colonial Nigerian state. This, in turn, makes attempts at de-radicalization and bolstering the security forces doomed to failure – unless there are far-reaching social reforms that would undermine the very class that dominates the post-colonial state.

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/543/html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Dissens Antworten mit Zitat
Über Dissens innerhalb des IS:

Zitat:
No one can reasonably expect any jihadist organization to be a total monolith in outlook among members, and the Islamic State is no exception. The idea of dissent in the Islamic State is foremost associated with the issue of takfir (declaring people to be non-Muslims, even those who self-identify as Muslim). Indeed, the group’s application of this idea has been publicized both in propaganda as well as in leaked material. However, the Islamic State’s championing of takfir is not without its criticisms. Some critics are extreme, even going so far as to proclaim takfir on Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Others are less virulent in their response and are reluctant to fight people they see as fellow Sunni Muslims, especially other jihadis in groups like Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (previously known as Jabhat al-Nusra). This reluctance to fight flows in part from their hesitancy to accept the doctrine of takfir as espoused by the Islamic State.

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/dissent-in-the-islamic-state-abu-al-faruq-al-masris-message-on-the-manhaj%e2%80%a8


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Mosul Antworten mit Zitat
Irakische Truppen sollen im Stadtgebiet von Mosul angekommen sein:

Zitat:
Iraqi forces have for the first time entered the eastern outskirts of Mosul, as they attempt to drive Islamic State (IS) militants from the northern city.

Elite Counter-Terrorism Service troops seized control of the state television building in Kukjali hours after launching an assault on the area.

But a BBC journalist embedded with them says they are facing fierce resistance.

Units of the army's ninth division are meanwhile said to be bearing down on south-eastern districts of the city.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37832819


Nicht alle Baathisten haben sich dem IS angeschlossen:

Zitat:
On October 17, just before dawn in Iraq, the country’s Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared that the battle to push the Islamic State group out of Mosul had begun. The extremist group had been in control of the city since June 2014. But two days before this announcement, another group was also declaring war on the Islamic State, or IS, group.

This was the militia known as the Jaysh al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia – or the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order. This movement – which has strong links to Saddam Hussein’s outlawed Baath political party - is classified as a terrorist organization by many. The Naqshbandi Army is led by former members of the Baath party and senior officers of the former Iraqi army and is under the command of Saddam Hussein’s deputy, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, who is described by the New York Times as “a top military commander and a vice president in the Hussein government and one of the few prominent Baathists to evade capture by the Americans”.

In a statement issued last week, the Naqshbandi Army called upon the people of Mosul to rise up against the IS group and they warned the Shiite Muslim volunteer militias, who are poised to enter the fray in towns around Mosul, not to enter the city.

https://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/5395/Militias-Betrayed-By-Mosul%E2%80%99s-Extremists-Say-They-Too-Will-Have-Revenge.htm


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Mali Antworten mit Zitat
IS-Ableger in Mali erst mehr als ein Jahr später durch Amaq bestätigt:

Zitat:
Amaq’s statement reads like Sahrawi’s pledge of fealty is recent, but it is actually old news. “Katibat Murabitoon, under the leadership of Abu Walid al Sahrawi in northern Mali, pledges allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and the Islamic State organization,” Amaq’s statement reads.

Separately, Amaq also released a video of Sahrawi reading his loyalty pledge. Sahrawi refers to Baghdadi as “Emir ul-Mu’minin” (or the “Emir of the Faithful”), a title that is usually reserved for the Caliph. A small number of fighters are shown standing and sitting behind him as he reads the announcement. These same fighters join hands at the end of the video to emphasize their own unity with the “caliphate.” (Screen shots from the video can be seen below.)

In May 2015, Sahrawi issued an audio statement in which he announced his oath to the Islamic State and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. He claimed to do so on behalf of the entire Al Murabitoon group. Sahrawi repeats this claim in the new video.

However, only some of Al Murabitoon’s fighters joined Sahrawi in defecting to the Islamic State. Belmokhtar, an al Qaeda loyalist, quickly released a statement saying that Al Murabitoon remained in al Qaeda’s camp. Local media reported clashes between Sahrawi’s men and fighters loyal to Belmokhtar in the weeks that followed.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/10/islamic-state-recognizes-oath-of-allegiance-from-jihadists-in-west-africa.php


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Rede al-Baghdadis Antworten mit Zitat
Ein Artikel zur Rede von al-Baghdadi:

Zitat:
Speaking in Manichean terms, Baghdadi advises his men that they should not allow Satan to convince them to “retreat.” Instead, the jihadists should remain at their assigned “outposts” and hope to “persevere” in the fight ahead. It is “one thousand times better” to remain “in your land” than to retreat “in humiliation,” Baghdadi says. But the jihadists’ reward may not come in this life. Baghdadi tells his people that they fight to avoid “hellfire” and can hope to achieve “paradise.” But the caliphate’s foes cannot hope for the same, Baghdadi claims, as hell awaits them.

The Islamic State leader portrays the conflict in Iraq as a sectarian conspiracy against Sunnis. Baghdadi claims that various parties fight under the “pretext of waging war” against his group, but they are really only interested in killing Sunni men and then taking both their women and children prisoner. He alleges that the cities of Iraq are being emptied of Sunnis as part of a Shiite, or Iranian, plan. Still, Baghdadi’s message hints at the frustration he must have for the Sunnis in Iraq who are not rallying the caliphate’s cause. At one point, the Islamic State’s top man even compares Sunni Iraqis to the people of Israel, implying that they have not stayed on the true path.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/11/abu-bakr-al-baghdadis-grand-jihad-against-the-world.php


Und noch einer:

Zitat:
On Wednesday, the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, issued his first audio statement in over ten months. Preceding it was the usual anticipatory self-pleasuring from certain corners of the jihadist internet, as supporters prepared themselves to receive fresh marching orders from their shadowy sovereign. The preparation was more feverish than usual, due to the Islamic State’s series of losses around Mosul and the long interval since Baghdadi’s last statement. In 30 orotund minutes, Baghdadi confirmed that, for him, nothing has changed. Fight the Shia, he said. Fight the Alawites of Syria’s Assad regime, and bring the war to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and beyond. If you can’t come to Syria and Iraq, he said, remember that martyrdom in Libya—where the Islamic State maintains about a block or two of territory in the city of Sirte—is just as glorious.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/caliph-baghdadi-mosul-isis-iraq-syria/506567/?utm_source=twb


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Noch einer:

Zitat:
Baghdadi tried to project confidence that his jihadists would beat back the Iraqi government’s advance. “This total war and the great jihad that the Islamic State is fighting today only increases … our conviction that all of this is a prelude to victory,” he said in a 31-minute audio recording, his first since December.

But despite his bluster and attempt to boost morale for the fight in Mosul, Baghdadi’s message also signaled the latest transformation for Islamic State as it loses the core of its self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Two years ago, Baghdadi reveled in Islamic State’s quick expansion; he declared himself caliph and “leader of Muslims everywhere.” Today, under pressure from advancing ground forces and U.S.-led air strikes, Baghdadi is looking beyond the caliphate.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bazzi-baghdadi-commentary-idUSKBN12Z2FZ


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Qaraqosh Antworten mit Zitat
Reportage aus Qaraqosh, der grössten christlichen Stadt im Irak, zuvor vom IS und nun von einer christlichen Miliz kontrolliert:

Zitat:
"They took my air conditioner!" Karam yells excitedly as he runs towards his house. "Those fuckers!

It's the first time he's seen it in more than two years, ever since ISIS overran his hometown of Qaraqosh and all the residents fled. Two members of a local Christian militia, known as the Nineveh Plains Protection Unit (NPU), are escorting us around the abandoned and mostly destroyed streets.

We've been told the city has been 'cleared', but that's proving to be a very relative term in this war. A soldier will tell you they've cleared a village, only to have an ISIS fighter pop up a few hours later. Or there will be a sniper or a suicide bomber who has been hiding out for hours or days to carry out an attack.

ISIS attempts to hold off the much more heavily armed Kurdish peshmerga forces and Iraqi forces at frontlines, but they also engage in guerrilla insurgent tactics. The tunnels, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs, or car bombs) have been constants. ISIS doesn't mind leaving a guy behind to die fighting, and one well-placed and accurate sniper can hold off dozens of men for days.

http://www.theladbible.com/videos/news-inside-a-town-liberated-from-the-islamic-state-in-the-fight-for-mosul-20161104


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Mosul Antworten mit Zitat
Bericht von einem (ehemaligen) Einwohner über die Machtergreifung des IS in Mosul:

Zitat:
Mohammed* is NIQASH’s Mosul correspondent. He grew up in Mosul and has been covering events in the city since 2007, risking his own life and others to get information to the outside world. After the extremist group known as the Islamic State took Mosul over in June 2014, he was one of the first – and only – journalists in the world to file stories from inside the extremist-held city. He was forced to leave when the group began arresting local journalists but he has continued to write about events in Mosul. His family and many friends remain inside Mosul.

In this sombre accounting of the chain of events that have led to the current fighting around Mosul, he explains why the people in the city did not rise up and resist the Islamic State group – known colloquially as Daesh in Iraq – at first, why his family and others decided to stay in their homes and how the extremist group managed to control a city of around 2 million.

https://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/5400/Mosul-Is-My-Hometown-Here-Is-Why-The-Islamic-State-Was-Able-To-Stay-There.htm


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Mosul Antworten mit Zitat
Man sieht es der Journalistin deutlich an, dass der Dreh dieser Reportage ziemlich anstrengend war:

Zitat:
For more than 28 hours, CNN senior international correspondent Arwa Damon and photojournalist Brice Laine were with Iraqi special forces during their push into ISIS-held Mosul. It was a new phase of the liberation operation -- switching from villages and open terrain to a dense city that a well-equipped ISIS is determined to defend.
Their convoy was leading the operation Friday when it came under attack multiple times.
Vehicles were destroyed, soldiers were hurt. Troops and journalists sought shelter in a succession of houses, calling for backup again and again.
Inside the armored vehicles, hiding with families in houses, Arwa Damon kept notes amid the heat of the battle. Here is her account, with occasional strong language. It has been lightly edited for clarity.

http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/05/middleeast/iraq-inside-mosul-battle/index.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Strategie Antworten mit Zitat
Einige Hypothesen zur künftigen Strategie des IS:

Zitat:
The past couple of years dramatically illustrate how much the world has changed. ISIL’s dying caliphate aside, the United States and its allies stood by helplessly as dictators aligned with the West fell in Tunisia and Egypt. The United States and its NATO allies intervened to topple Muammar Qaddafi, who had been a bulwark against Islamist gains in Libya. Jihadist insurgencies are gaining steam in Mali and Somalia. And al-Qaeda continues to control significant territory in coastal Yemen. The pace of jihadist attacks in Europe is unprecedented, and a confluence of factors have allowed jihadist networks in Europe to emerge that are broader and more deeply interconnected than analysts would have thought possible even five years ago (that is, prior to the boom in end-to-end encryption, such networks would surely have been detected and disrupted). The United States and its allies are simply no longer in a position to crush jihadist forces wherever and whenever they assemble.

As the world changes, so too does jihadist strategy. So as ISIL tries to transition from jihadist state to insurgency or transnational terrorist group and eventually back into a state, a new strategic doctrine will likely be born. An examination of Suri, his ideas, and their application illuminates the likely emergence of this new jihadist doctrine.

http://warontherocks.com/2016/11/how-will-jihadist-strategy-evolve-as-the-islamic-state-declines/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Zur Schlacht von Mosul:

Zitat:
It is a bitter fight: street to street, house to house, with the presence of civilians slowing the advancing forces. Car bombs — the militants’ main weapon — speed out of garages and straight into advancing military convoys.

“If there were no civilians, we’d just burn it all,” said Maj. Gen. Sami al-Aridhi, a counterterrorism commander. He was forced to temporarily pause operations in his sector Monday because too many families were clogging the street. “I couldn’t bomb with artillery or tanks, or heavy weapons. I said, ‘We can’t do anything.’ ”

Mosul is the most populous city held by the militants, with an estimated 1 million people still living there. Iraqi forces have been closing in from the north and south but have broken into the city only on the eastern front, beginning a slow grind through densely populated neighborhoods.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iraq-has-never-seen-this-kind-of-fighting-in-its-battles-with-isis/2016/11/11/96af671e-a524-11e6-ba46-53db57f0e351_story.html


Hunderte Kämpfer von Boko Haram desertieren im Tschad:

Zitat:
Hundreds of Boko Haram fighters and their families have surrendered in Chad in the past month, security and U.N. sources said, in a sign the military campaign against them is making headway.

Boko Haram, which has killed and kidnapped thousands of people, had seized an area approximately the size of Belgium in northeastern Nigeria by last year but has since lost significant ground amid growing regional military pressure.

Analyst and security sources think the fighters are probably recent recruits that Boko Haram has struggled to retain as it has ceded territory. Defections of Boko Haram fighters have been reported in Nigeria but are not known to have previously occurred on such a large scale.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-chad-bokoharam-idUSKBN1370BP


Viel Extremismustheorie-Quatsch, aber trotzdem lesenswerter Essay zur "Radikalisierung" in englischen Gefängnissen:

Zitat:
The Unit, he recalls “was designed to break you down.” Everything is bad. In the morning you are given a small box of cereals, lunch is merely one of those shadows of reality that Plato talks about and dinner need not be discussed. But UK prisons are not the ones experienced by Dostoyevsky nor Solzhenitsyn’s Ivan Denisovich. Ahmed knows very well that Belmarsh is a far cry from Chateaux D’if or Assad’s Tadmor prison. It is twenty two or three hour lock up, with a small square where you can do some exercise. But the twenty yards to the exercise area takes a full twenty minutes to get to, the prisoner is escorted, buzzed through thirteen doors and patted down thirteen doors. Ahmed finds it absurd but then again, considering the company he keeps, it is understandable. The gym is “a shambles designed in a way so that the weights can’t be used as a weapon”. The library consists of a set of shelves on wheels which is called without irony, a mobile library. At the Unit, according to Ahmed, the wardens or ‘screws’ don’t punish you, they just behave vindictively. In the summer they make the water scalding hot so it peals your skin off and in the winter it is ice cold and the wardens always blame the maintenance crews. “We all knew” says Ahmed, “that this was just a game, because the other spurs had nice temperate water to shower in during association.”

Cerie Bullivant who spent 2007-2008 in Belmarsh and Wandsworth on remand seemed to confirm Ahmed’s view:

“I would be praying during Ramadan with another brother in my cell and they would kick off about it. Whilst in the other cell there would be four non-Muslim inmates playing music and it would be absolutely fine. It goes both ways though, during Ramadan Muslim inmates would get special food packs to break their fasts and the non-Muslim inmates would complain. There was a lot of tension between the Muslim and the non-Muslim inmates.”

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/prison-radicalisation-dealing-t-charge-prisoners/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Dokureihe Terror Antworten mit Zitat
Der Vice-Gründer ist an "die Fronten des Krieges gegen den Terror" gereist:

Teil 1: AQAP, Jemen:



Teil 2: Al Shabaab, Somalia:



Teil 3: IS, Irak:



Teil 4: Boko Haram, Nigeria:



Teil 5: TTP, Pakistan:



Die Videos sind in Europa noch nicht verfügbar, das Add-on Hoxx VPN Proxy hat dieses Problem für mich gelöst.

_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Interview Antworten mit Zitat
Interview mit dem französisch-algerischen Jihadisten Rachid Kassim:

Zitat:
“I migrated to Syria one year ago, but now I am sad,” Rachid Kassim, a 29-year-old French jihadist tells me, in his first-ever interview. “A lot of us are jealous of brothers who attack in dar ul-kufr,” he said, using the Arabic term denoting non-Muslim lands. “We believe that even a small attack in dar ul-kufr is better than a big attack in Syria. As the door of hijrah [migration] closes, the door of jihad opens. If I stayed in dar ul-kufr, I would do an attack there.”

Words like these from jihadists like Kassim have heightened the concerns of security agencies across Europe and North America. If supporters of the Islamic State are prohibited from traveling to join their ranks in Syria and Iraq, will they instead turn their gaze inward? Over the last several months, Kassim has been quite vocal on Telegram, a messaging application, which also allows individuals to create channels where they can broadcast their message to the masses. Telegram has increasingly become the platform of choice for jihadist movements, particularly after Twitter became more committed to shutting down pro-jihadist accounts.

http://jihadology.net/2016/11/18/guest-post-an-interview-with-rachid-kassim-jihadist-orchestrating-attacks-in-france/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Libyen Antworten mit Zitat
Artikel zur Lage des IS in Libyen:

Zitat:
The Islamic State is having a hard time in Libya, though. Unlike Syria and Iraq, where the group’s presence is mostly contiguous (albeit with important exceptions), in Libya the Islamic State is a segmented entity. Ideally, it divided the entire country into three administrative divisions (wilayah): Barqah in the East, Tarabulus in the North-West, and Fezzan in the South-West. But in reality, the territorial supremacy of Wilayah Barqah and Wilayah Tarabulus is currently limited to small areas of Benghazi and Sirte, respectively. As to Wilayah Fezzan, it never exercised territorial control. However, roving units and undercover clusters are still active in both Wilayah Fezzan and Tarabulus, and they’re shaping the future of the group.

Early this year, the Islamic State had a firm grip on a coastal strip on either side of Sirte, at a time when Libya represented a realistic fallback option for the Islamic State as a transnational organization. But serious territorial setbacks suffered in Libya in recent months make Baghdadi’s latest call unexpected. Al-Bunyan al-Marsous, forces affiliated with the Libyan Government of National Accord and backed by US air support, have degraded the largest group of Islamic State fighters present in the country and trapped them in a small area of Sirte’s Giza Bahriyya neighborhood. Still, the loss of Sirte is not the end of the Islamic State’s Libyan ambitions.

http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/isis-in-sirte-from-caliphate-to-insurgency?utm_content=buffer59543&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Ideologie Antworten mit Zitat
Ausführlicher Text zu den ideologischen und/oder theologischen Referenzen des IS:

Zitat:
This paper explores the Islamic State’s ideology and sectarianism in context, drawing on primary sources and direct testimonies from Islamic State clerics and members in Syria and Iraq. It discusses broader themes relevant to the group’s ideology to explain the origins of the Islamic State’s violent and exclusivist vision. Until the illusion that the group’s ideology is traceable straight to Salafism is dispelled, the world will not be able to understand the Islamic State’s appeal, or to defeat it.

http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/13/sectarianism-of-islamic-state-ideological-roots-and-political-context-pub-63746


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag AQ u. AQI, damals Antworten mit Zitat
Etwas reisserischer Titel, aber aufschlussreicher Text:

Zitat:
It is not clear how much the local Turkish police knew about Muhammad’s identity, but a different set of authorities, allegedly including the CIA, knew quite a bit. They knew that two Turkish al Qaeda operatives, Mehmet Yilmaz and Mehmed Resit-Isik, had traveled to Iran to help him and his family cross the border into Turkey. They knew that Yilmaz had fought in Afghanistan and may have provided assistance for a series of bombings in 2003 in Istanbul. They knew that another suspected al Qaeda operative, Mehmet Polat, had met Muhammad and his family in Gaziantep, and that he was the second man in the vehicle with the license plate 79 M 0064.

Most importantly, they knew that the man arrested in Gaziantep was neither Muhammet Reza Reanjbar Rezaei nor Abdulrahman bin Yar Muhammad. And he was certainly not a refugee en route to Europe.

In fact, the man in Gaziantep police custody was best known as Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, and he was on a desperate mission to reassert al Qaeda’s authority over its rebellious affiliate in Iraq.

As Abd al-Hadi sat in police custody, he must have known that his mission had failed — but it is unlikely that he knew just how badly. With his arrest, al Qaeda had just lost one of its most creative operatives on a bold mission to establish control over its rebellious Iraqi affiliate — an organization that would eventually evolve into its bitter rival for supremacy of the jihadi movement.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/23/the-man-who-could-have-stopped-the-islamic-state/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Somalia Antworten mit Zitat
Qandala in der autonomen Region Puntland in Somalia soll immer noch von einer Miliz kontrolliert sein, die dem IS die Treue geschworen hat. Auf Wikipedia wird behauptet, die Armee habe die "leere Stadt" zurückerobert. Gemäss dem Journalisten Harun Maruf war die Armee nie dort:

Zitat:
On 26 October, about more than 50 heavily-armed Somali Islamic State (IS) fighters seized Qandala, a sparsely populated town in Somalia’s Puntland federal state on a rugged mountainous coastal strip overlooking the Gulf of Aden. It was a small, but highly symbolic, step forward for the group and demonstrates again how armed extremists exploit state disorder and local tensions to develop safe havens and rebuild after otherwise debilitating defeats. Unless Puntland treats this threat seriously and resolves internal tensions like that in the Qandala area and conflicts with neighbouring federal states, IS in Somalia could grow in strength and destabilise much larger parts of Somalia.

https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/islamic-state-threat-somalias-puntland-state


Zitat:
Yusuf started working at the fish processing factory as a dishwasher in the kitchen in 1950, when he was 10 years old. The plant was then owned by Italian colonists who ruled Somalia. In 1958 he started his first shift in the plant outside the kitchen. From there, he worked his way up until he became the general manager.

The factory continued to operate for two years after the Somali government collapsed in 1991 and the country sank into violence and lawlessness. Yusuf says operations were stopped at that point due to a lack of maintenance and care.

But Yusuf treated the plant — comprising some 30 buildings for offices, residences, and shops for boats and fishing equipment — as his own property, protecting it from looting.

“We have the technique but it lacks maintenance,” he said.

http://www.voanews.com/a/somali-town-qandala-puntland-islamic-state/3611903.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Zur islamistischen Szene in Bangladesch:

Zitat:
Together with attempts by people linked to Islamic State to recruit and fund militancy in the country, the documents show the extremist organization has built deeper connections with Bangladeshi militants than was previously known.

The police official declined to be named due to the sensitivity of the information. Reuters could not independently verify the contents of the communications.

As Islamic State comes under pressure in its home base of Syria and Iraq, its activities in outposts such as Bangladesh could intensify, experts have said.

The extent of Islamic State's influence in Bangladesh will be key to the country's garment sector that employs millions of people and earns $28 billion a year in exports.

Any sign the global jihadi network is making inroads could force Western brands to look elsewhere for cheap clothes.

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-islamicstate-insight-idUSKBN13P2WK?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=Social&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FworldNews+%28Reuters+World+News%29


Propagandisten des IS im Visier des FBI:

Zitat:
Mr. Hussain, a 21-year-old from Birmingham, England, was a leader of a band of English-speaking computer specialists who had given a far-reaching megaphone to Islamic State propaganda and exhorted online followers to carry out attacks in the West. One by one, American and allied forces have killed the most important of roughly a dozen members of the cell, which the F.B.I. calls “the Legion,” as part of a secretive campaign that has largely silenced a powerful voice that led to a surge of counterterrorism activity across the United States in 2015 as young men and women came under the influence of its propaganda.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/world/middleeast/isis-recruiters-social-media.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0


Wie im Irak waren (sind?) auch in Syrien die Gefängnisse Jihad Academies:

Zitat:
He was hanged by his hands for four days. They beat him with clubs and iron bars, and used electric prods on his genitals, he says. Then came the surprise: After a staged trial and a conviction for terrorism, he was sentenced to a lockup where his cellmates were hardcore al Qaeda veterans, newly transferred from Syria’s political prisons.

“It was the first time I saw someone from the al Qaeda movement face to face,” said Hakawati, an actor who’d played the lead role in an anti-regime play that spring and had helped organize demonstrations in Aleppo, Syria’s biggest city. “They threatened to slaughter me because I’m an atheist and I do not pray.”

After weeks in the same cell with the al Qaeda veterans, who were “practically the managers of the prison,” five of Hakawati’s colleagues joined the extremists, many later taking up arms against Assad.

Mixing civic activists with al Qaeda veterans was no accident.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/12/01/assad-henchman-here-s-how-we-built-isis.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Emni Antworten mit Zitat
Ausführlicher Bericht zur Funktionsweise des Emni, Geheimdienst des IS:

Zitat:
Thirty-eight ISIS defectors from Syria, Western Europe, and the Balkans interviewed over the last year in our ISIS Defectors Interviews Project reported about life inside ISIS and their reasons for ultimately risking their lives to escape. The defectors also shared their observations of the ISIS intelligence operation—known in Arabic as the “Emni. ” From the defectors’ detailed stories, supplemented with journalists’ reports, and our own experiences interviewing terrorists over the years, we have been able to piece together a chilling view of the structure, leadership, duties, funding, and patterns of communication of the ISIS Emni. Relying primarily on first person accounts, this article sheds light on the highly organized activities undertaken by the Emni, since the first days of the “Islamic State’s” inception, to become one of the most totalitarian and brutally efficient terrorist organizations to date alongside its aspirations for attacking the West (what the Emni labels as “external operations”).

http://www.icsve.org/research-reports/the-isis-emni-the-inner-workings-and-origins-of-isiss-intelligence-apparatus/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Assad und IS Antworten mit Zitat
Gemäss den liberalen Freunden der arabischen Scheichs soll Assad an allem schuld sein. Die Thesen sind bekannt und wohl nicht alle ganz falsch, doch sie haben klar zum Ziel, die "gemässigten Rebellen" als programmierte Sieger darzustellen, wenn Assad nur nicht so fies gewesen wäre und sie vom Westen etwas besser unterstützt worden wären.

So soll das Regime Selbstmordanschläge inszeniert haben:

Zitat:
According to al Ali, the bombings were timed to coincide with the arrival of one delegation or another—of diplomats, journalists or prominent figures. Each time the regime claimed that terrorists were responsible. And none had been solved because al Ali, whose job it was to investigate them, had been blocked from the crime scene every time.

One reason former regime officials and close observers describe the bombings as inside jobs is that they often came with advance warning, starting with the first blast on Dec. 23, 2011.

“I was in the security sector of the regime army and on Thursday of that week, I got a report,” said the officer, who asked to be identified as Abu Sayf and was interviewed in Deir el Zour, eastern Syria, in July 2013. “I remember the number of the report, it was 3018, and it said: ‘a terrorist will set off an explosion against the regime on Friday or Saturday.’”

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/12/02/how-assad-staged-al-qaeda-bombings.html


Und es soll einen diabolischen Pakt mit dem IS geschlossen haben:

Zitat:
In the spring of 2012, hundreds of militant Islamists crossed into eastern Syria from Iraq under the eyes of the Assad regime’s extensive security apparatus. As they arrived, Syrian intelligence services received two sets of instructions.

One was in writing, and contained the names and details of the jihadists, along with the instruction to “arrest and kill them.”

But that was the cover story. Even as it circulated a “kill” order, the regime sent out official messengers to convey the opposite message.

“They came from command headquarters and held meetings of the intelligence offices,” said Mahmoud al Nasr, a former intelligence official in northern Syria who defected in October 2012. ‘They told us: ‘stay away from them. Don’t touch them.’”

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/12/05/how-isis-returned-to-syria.html?via=desktop&source=twitter


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Dresscode Antworten mit Zitat
Frauen aus Mosul berichten über das Leben unter dem IS:

Zitat:
The dress code imposed on the women of Mosul started soon after the Islamic State overran the city more than two years ago. It was carried out gradually, until every part of the female body was erased, starting with the face, then the rest of the body — including the hands, which had to be covered with gloves, as well as the feet, which had to be hidden by socks. It ended with an announcement blared over loudspeakers, telling women to wear a film of black cloth over their eyes.

Halima Ali Beder, 39, said she had resentfully made each new addition to her wardrobe, starting with the niqab to cover her face, and the abaya, also known as a jilbab, a loosefitting gown. Yet she still ran afoul of the Islamic State’s increasingly harsh enforcement of its codes when she stepped into the lane outside her home, planning to pop over to her neighbor’s house.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/world/middleeast/islamic-state-mosul-women-dress-code-morality.html?_r=0


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Überblick Antworten mit Zitat
Halt eine Bande von Liberalen und lang, aber lesenswert:

Zitat:
This report is a collaboration by 20 experts on the Middle East, Islamic extremism, and jihadism who held a series of conferences between August and November 2016. “The Jihadi Threat” reflects the broad — and often diverse — views of the coauthors. Not every one agreed on all points, but the variety of findings, trend lines, and scenarios for the future covers the best thinking about the evolution of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates.

The United States Institute of Peace was the primary sponsor of this initiative, with the backing of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Fifteen other think tanks and universities were represented in the Working Group on Extremism. The goal was always to reflect the widest expertise and the full spectrum of views.

http://www.usip.org/publications/2016/12/12/the-jihadi-threat-isis-al-qaeda-and-beyond?utm_source=Homepage&utm_medium=Slideshow&utm_campaign=SlideshowClicks


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"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ISKP Antworten mit Zitat
Ausführlicher Bericht über die Propaganda und den Einfluss des IS in Afghanistan:

Zitat:
From a close monitoring of these various media platforms between early 2015 and autumn 2016, a picture of an agile and deft media operation emerges. From a study of the full archive of Khilafat Ghag broadcasts, the group’s social media feed and its multimedia products, it becomes clear that ISKP has put far greater effort into its media activities than would normally be expected from a nascent group of its size.

ISKP is already outmatching the Taleban in terms of the quality and diversity of the media it employs, as well as the activeness of its loyalists in promoting the group’s message – especially taking into account the differing size of the two groups and their level of establishment in Afghanistan. ISKP is most notably ahead of the Taleban in its usage of FM radio and social media. ISKP employs a dedicated team of broadcasters and reporters who produce reporting on military advances and life under the caliphate that is engaging to its audience. The radio reporters interview fighters, talk to local residents and record reportages featuring life under the caliphate. The language used by the broadcasters is brisk, energetic and focused on attracting listeners and new recruits. Similarly, in their use of social media, ISKP loyalists are dedicated and give the appearance of a well-connected community, although it is not clear if this is centrally coordinated. The Taleban’s De Shariat Ghag (Voice of Sharia) Radio, that intermittently broadcasts throughout Paktika and Ghazni provinces, on the other hand, mainly plays tarane (Pashto plural for tarana, chants performed without instrumental accompaniment) and reads out articles that have been posted on its website.

https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/iskps-battle-for-minds-what-are-their-main-messages-and-who-do-they-attract/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Mosul Antworten mit Zitat
Auch in Mosul lassen sich die Kriegsparteien von den Zivilisten nicht wirklich stören:

Zitat:
Hundreds of thousands of people who remain in this northern Iraqi city are struggling to find food and safe drinking water as the protracted offensive against Islamic State militants batters their neighborhoods.

When the battle began seven weeks ago, aid agencies feared that an exodus from the city would overwhelm already crowded camps. Instead, most people heeded government advice to stay in their homes as security forces advanced.

Now many of those residents lack even basic services, with water supplies cut by the fighting, and U.N. and government aid distributions unable to reach all of those in need. Some residents are moving from neighborhood to neighborhood in search of food or to escape the bombardment.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/tragedy-inside-mosul-as-food-runs-out-and-the-battle-against-isis-drags-on/2016/12/18/689198d0-bbe9-11e6-ae79-bec72d34f8c9_story.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Dieser Artikel ist zwar fast interessanter in Bezug auf den BND, als den IS, trotzdem:

Zitat:
Manche sehen schon jetzt in den eingestellten Überwachungsmaßnahmen gegen Amri einen Skandal. Fakt ist jedoch: Gefährder werden nur in absoluten Ausnahmefällen rund um die Uhr beobachtet. Alleine schon aus Kapazitätsgründen. Mehr als 30 speziell geschulte Polizeibeamte sind im Schichtdienst notwendig, um eine Person lückenlos zu überwachen. Die dafür zuständigen Mobilen Einsatzkommandos (MEK) arbeiten schon jetzt am Limit – und vernachlässigen durch die Islamisten-Observationen zunehmend andere Deliktsbereiche, etwa den Drogenhandel oder die Rockerkriminalität.

Die Ermittlungen gegen die Islamisten werden jedoch nicht nur durch den Personalmangel erschwert. Auch das veränderte Kommunikationsverhalten bedeutet eine immense Herausforderung für die Fahnder. Statt Telefonie oder SMS nutzen auch auch Dschihadisten immer häufiger Messengerdienste wie WhatsApp, Telegram oder Signal. Die Chatprogramme sind zwar unterschiedlich stark kryptiert – aber für Sicherheitsbehörden fast nicht zu knacken.

https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article160631828/Im-Fall-Anis-Amri-kein-Grund-zur-Entwarnung.html


Derweil an der Front vor Raqqa:

Zitat:
Whether it is wise to send an overwhelmingly Kurdish force to capture the overwhelmingly Arab city of Raqqa is in question, however. A Kurdish push on Raqqa risks alienating the local population, perhaps encouraging residents who otherwise would not support the Islamic State to fight on its behalf, according to Abu Issa, a commander with the rebel Free Syrian Army’s Liwa Thuwar al-Raqqa, or Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade.

“We saw in Iraq and other places that if the local people are not involved in the liberation, there won’t be any stability,” he said in an interview at his headquarters, in a remote farmhouse in the countryside of Raqqa province. He and his group are from Raqqa, and though they are loosely allied with the SDF, they fly the flag of the Free Syrian Army.

“All the Arabs know that the SDF are YPG, and if things continue as they are, there will be big problems in the future, sectarian clashes and conflict,” Abu Issa said. “People don’t understand why the YPG are going to Raqqa. It’s an entirely Arab area, and the Arabs feel marginalized.”

http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2016/12/28/on-the-front-lines-of-the-fight-for-the-islamic-states-capital-of-raqqa/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Philippinen Antworten mit Zitat
Islamismus im muslimischen Süden der Philippinen unter Duterte:

Zitat:
The political situation in the Philippines has also aided the growth of these groups. The ongoing 'war on drugs' led by the country's populist President Duterte has caused significant instability, and has alienated foreign countries. In recent months, Durterte has openly questioned foreign military support for the Philippines, while alternatively talking tough on extremism, before also offering political concessions.

With the security situation deteriorating across the archipelago, it is likely that the southern Moro region could become one of several new bases for IS as its core territories in Syria and Iraq come under pressure. According to Prof. Gunaratna the country is on-track for a 2017.

“Without US military and Australian intelligence support, the Philippines will fail in the fight against terrorism and IS will declare a wilayat in Mindanao. The scale and magnitude of the threat is evident.”

http://www.conflict-news.com/articles/forgotten-fronts-islamic-state-in-the-philippines


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Rückkehr vom Jihad Antworten mit Zitat
Es wird immer offensichtlicher, dass es eine beträchtliche Schnittmenge unbekannter Grösse zwischen protestierenden Proletariern 2011 und künftigen Jihadtouristen geben dürfte:

Zitat:
“IF BEN GUERDANE had been located next to Falluja, we would have liberated Iraq.” So (reportedly) said Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, before he was killed a decade ago. He was referring reverentially to a town in south-eastern Tunisia that is one of the world’s biggest exporters of jihadists. No place better epitomises the challenges facing Tunisia’s government as it tries to consolidate a wobbly democracy six years after the revolution that toppled the old dictatorship.

Hundreds of Tunisians marked the anniversary of the revolution on January 14th by taking to the streets to demand jobs. The protests began in Ben Guerdane before spreading to other poor places, such as Sidi Bouzid, Meknassi and Gafsa, where locals blocked the route of Beji Caid Essebsi, the president, who was in town to mark the anniversary. “Work is our right,” yelled the protesters, using the slogans of 2011.

http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21714967-unwelcome-homecoming-terrorists-returning-home-tunisia?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Krieg mit Drohnen Antworten mit Zitat
Der IS tüftelt fleissig an waffenfähigen Drohnen:

Zitat:
Both are civilian drones, the first uses a PG-7V and the second an improved PG-7VM warhead. These ones were rocket-propelled grenades originally intended to be fired from the Soviet rocket launcher RPG-7 with multipurpose capability, and they are able to penetrate more than 20 cm of armor (RHA) or to roughly create an explosion like that of a hand grenade but more powerful.

A PG-7 warhead alone would weight around 1 kg but it would also need a dropping mechanism if it is a tactical support drone, or even a phone or a special device to make the SVBIED exploit at the desired moment unleast the plan is launch the drone straight to the target and make the impact fuze exploit, what could be a difficult task.

While we are not sure if those drones were intended to be SVBIEDs or to be support attack drones they were using typical war material from the region adapted to their new purpose, in spite of use especially designed projectiles.

https://misterxanlisis.wordpress.com/2017/01/25/made-on-the-caliphate-attack-drones-brief-analysis-of-the-threat/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Mosul Antworten mit Zitat
Videoreportage an der Front in Mosul:

Zitat:
As Iraqi forces attempt to retake Mosul from Isis, Guardian reporter Ghaith Abdul-Ahad joins their elite Golden Division on the frontline to examine the fight and its toll
Go inside the Iraqi army's battle to take back the city of Mosul from Isis with Iraqi journalist Ghaith Abdul-Ahad.

Ghaith reveals what retaking the city means for the future of his country. He will also discover the harsh realities of what it's like to live and survive under Isis – and under the Iraqi army.

The fight inside the city is brutal and slow, and losses are mounting with countless civilians and over 2,000 security personnel reportedly killed since the offensive began.

Iraqi special forces are leading the charge to liberate the city. We witness their struggle close-up, with the filmmakers even surviving a suicide truck bomb aimed at killing the group's leader Lt Col Muntadher, known to his troops as 'Steel'.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/feb/01/battle-for-mosul-iraq-isis-dirty-war-video


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Falludscha Antworten mit Zitat
Der Wiederaufbau von Falludscha lässt auf sich warten:

Zitat:
Fleeing Islamic State fighters had rigged bombs all through his south Falluja neighborhood, and these had still not been cleared, they told him. Insurgent corpses were said to lay unrecovered.

Mr. Rashid, 30, a determined sort, moved back into his ransacked house anyway — he and his family fled the Islamic State three years ago and did not want to wait. Last week, they were camped out in their sagging house with no heat, electricity or running water. They boiled water on a wood fire. And they waited with mounting frustration for promised government aid.

Nearly eight months after the recapture of Falluja showed that Iraq’s government could wrest one of the Islamic State’s major support bases away from it, the victory now seems at risk.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/middleeast/falluja-iraq-isis.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Jihad Agency Antworten mit Zitat
Blackwater, Version Jihad:

Zitat:
Heavily armed and expertly kitted with body armor and ballistic helmets, the men can be seen defending bunkers, storming buildings, and even posing by whiteboards giving tactical lessons. Though the titles of these YouTube videos are written in Russian Cyrillic, their background music is an acapella Islamic chant known as a nasheed, which is often used by extremist groups in propaganda films. But the men are no ordinary jihadis. They are members of Malhama Tactical, the world’s first jihadi private military contractor (PMC) and consulting firm.

Malhama Tactical isn’t an enormous military conglomerate like the infamous Blackwater (now named Academi). It consists of 10 well-trained fighters from Uzbekistan and the restive Muslim-majority republics of the Russian Caucasus. But size isn’t everything in military consulting, especially in the era of social media. Malhama promotes its battles across online platforms, and the relentless marketing has paid off: The outfit’s fighting prowess and training programs are renowned among jihadis in Syria and their admirers elsewhere. It helps that until now the group has specialized its services, focusing on overthrowing Bashar al-Assad’s regime and replacing it with a strict Islamic government.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/10/the-world-first-jihadi-private-military-contractor-syria-russia-malhama-tactical/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Zurück durch die Hintertür Antworten mit Zitat
Mit genug Geld kann man im Irak auch als IS-Mitglied problemlos an ziemlich alle Papiere kommen:

Zitat:
In his office next to Ramadi’s police station, Col. Ahmed Hussein Mohammed, the leader of a regiment of tribal forces in the city, pointed at one of the small cards.

“The most important document right now is this,” he said, adding that it costs as little as 25,000 dinars on the black market, or about $20. He says many of the people his forces arrest are soon back out on the streets, with witnesses too afraid to give evidence against them.

Col. Yassir Ismail Moussa, a spokesman for the Anbar police, conceded there was “some corruption at checkpoints” and said there are plans to introduce new identity cards to deal with the issue. Some detainees are rumored to be Islamic State members, he said, but without witnesses or evidence, they must be released.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/away-from-iraqs-front-lines-the-islamic-state-is-creeping-back-in/2017/02/22/8abd8b70-d161-11e6-9651-54a0154cf5b3_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_iraq-430pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.85cf7dd4e515


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Banda Vaga Antworten mit Zitat
Die Banda Vaga zum IS:

Zitat:
Die strukturellen Gründe des Konflikts reichen jedoch tiefer. Die »Dschihadisierung« des Bürgerkriegs im Irak beruhte auf einer Ethnisierung und religiösen Aufladung von materiellen Widersprüchen. Der Nährboden, auf dem sich der Bürgerkrieg und der schlussendliche Zerfall des Staates ausbreiteten, ist das Ergebnis eines Scheiterns der sogenannten »nachholenden Entwicklung«, also eines Scheiterns der kapitalistischen Modernisierung.
Schon zu Zeiten Saddam Husseins gelang es trotz der Milliarden durch die reichen Ölreserven des Landes nicht, eine funktionierende heimische Industrie aufzubauen – mit Ausnahme der Petroindustrie selbst. Der Irak besitzt und besaß kein nennenswertes verarbeitendes Gewerbe als Grundlage für eine kapitalistische Modernisierung. Schlüsselindustrien wie beispielsweise Maschinenbau, Stahlerzeugung oder Chemie konnten sich nie etablieren. Im Augenblick verzeichnet einzig die Baubranche größere Wachstumsraten, die allerdings den erlittenen Kriegsschäden zu verdanken sind.

http://labandavaga.org/kehrseite-der-kapitalistischen-moderne-der-islamische-staat-eine-materialistische-analyse


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Tagebücher aus Raqqa Antworten mit Zitat
Bericht über das Leben in Raqqa von einem jungen Aktivisten:

Zitat:
I will never forget the time when Daesh [Isis] first appeared on the streets of our city. At first, opposition forces surrounded the fighters who occupied the government buildings. We were optimistic. But then everything changed. The Free Syrian Army began to weaken. It was busy fighting the regime elsewhere and its forces around Raqqa became thinner and thinner. Its soldiers were hit by repeated government air strikes. Daesh fought back, broke the FSA’s siege and quickly took over our helpless city.

They took advantage of our confusion and ignorance and began persuading people to join their ranks. At first they would charm people with a softly spoken manner, promising them the world. But I didn’t buy any of this. Daesh members come in two basic types. Those who actually believe they have come to save us were among the first to enter the city; the second type are much more violent.

https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/feb/26/the-raqqa-diaries-life-under-isis-rule-samer-mike-thomson-syria


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Zentralasien und Belgien Antworten mit Zitat
Berichte über IS-Kämpfer aus Zentralasien und Belgien:

Zitat:
A great deal of attention has been paid to Europeans who have joined jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. But a significant number of citizens from the former Soviet Union have also traveled to the region. Russian is now the second most commonly spoken language by Islamic State fighters after Arabic. While precise figures do not exist, as many as 4,000 Central Asians have traveled to fight in the Middle East. The available evidence suggests that some of these militants play a crucial role in the organization. In September 2016, news agencies in Iraq reported that the former head of Tajikistan’s paramilitary police, Gulmurod Halimov, had been appointed ISIS’s supreme military commander.

http://impakter.com/varied-roads-central-asia-islamic-state/


Zitat:
From early on in the Syrian–Iraqi conflict, foreign fighters from Belgium have played an important role. To begin with, there have been many of them: on a per capita basis, more fighters have come from Belgium than from any other Western European country. But beyond this, they have often ended up in the right place at the right time. Many of them joined a key militia in the genesis of the Islamic State (IS), and some were even present when IS was founded. Furthermore, many were under the command of later IS heavyweights, and several contributed to the transformation of IS into an international terrorist group. Finally, a few of them took part in the first major attacks by IS on Western soil—both in Paris and in Brussels. Based on exclusive witness accounts, court documents and the screening of social media accounts, we have reconstructed the path of the most important Belgians in the rise of this worldwide terrorist threat. We have even learned about a Belgian who is said to be one of the very first Western fighters in Syria and whose activities suggest that the jihadist movement—then still unified under the al-Qaeda banner—had already intended to hijack the Syrian uprising before it became a real war.

http://europeandemocracy.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Belgian_fighters-DRAFT8-webversion.pdf


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Sinai Antworten mit Zitat
IS-Kämpfer haben auf der Hauptstrasse der Hauptstadt Nordsinais Arish Checkpoints errichtet und nach Kopten gesucht:

Zitat:
One of the eyewitnesses that spoke to Mada Masr on the condition of anonymity says that he and his friends were stopped by masked militants on Assiut Street on March 5. “We tried to step back, but one of them ordered us to continue. After 100 meters, we found another group of masked militants who asked us about our IDs.”

“We showed them our IDs, and we were very scared. We never imagined things would turn out this way in Arish, to the extent that we see checkpoints set up by terrorists on a main downtown street like Assiut, which is surrounded by checkpoints by the police and military.”

The militants at the checkpoint stated that they were “looking for Copts,” according to the eyewitness. “After 50 meters, we found more militants standing next to a cigarette kiosk and smashing it, while another was holding a laptop and checking people’s IDs. At that moment, a security vehicle arrived to the scene and exchanged fire with the terrorists.”

http://www.madamasr.com/en/2017/03/12/feature/politics/islamic-state-affiliate-in-sinai-gaining-ground/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Nord- und Westafrika Antworten mit Zitat
Bestandesaufnahme zur Situation des IS in Nord- und Westafrika:

Zitat:
En décembre 2016, l’Etat islamique (EI) est chassé de Syrte, ville libyenne du bord de la Méditerranée. C’est un coup dur pour l’organisation. L’EI considérait la Libye comme un sanctuaire sur lequel se replier, en cas de défaite en Irak ou en Syrie. Entre 2014 et 2016, l’organisation a encouragé ses sympathisants à se battre sur le front libyen, y envoyant même de force des combattants qui avaient choisi la Syrie. En février 2015, elle s’est emparée de Syrte. L’EI y a déployé certains de ses commandants chevronnés, comme le défunt Omar al-Shishani. Mais en mai 2016, des forces alliées au gouvernement de Tripoli ont déclenché l’opération «Structure solide» (al-Bunyan al-Marsous) qui a abouti en décembre 2016 avec la reconquête de la ville. La perte de Syrte, couplée aux difficultés rencontrées en Irak, devrait être lourde de conséquences pour l’EI, comme l’explique un rapport du chercheur Daveed Gartenstein-Ross pour la Foundation for the Defence of Democracies.

http://www.slate.fr/story/139865/afrique-du-nord-ouest-annees-difficiles-daech-etat-islamique-alqaida


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag AQ Westafrika Antworten mit Zitat
Zur Reorganisation von AQ in Westafrika:

Zitat:
On Mar. 2, a merger of al Qaeda groups in the Sahel was announced. The “Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims” (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) brings together four existing al Qaeda organizations under one banner. Ansar Dine, Al Murabitoon and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Sahara branch are all part of the new entity. The Macina Liberation Front, an arm of Ansar Dine, is as well.

Iyad Ag Ghaly, the longtime leader of Ansar Dine, heads the new joint venture. Ghaly, a Malian Tuareg jihadist, explained why the merger was necessary in a video that is more than seven minutes long. And he emphasized that his group is part of al Qaeda’s international network.

“On this blessed occasion, we renew our pledge of allegiance [bayat] to our honorable emirs and sheikhs: Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, our beloved and wise sheikh Ayman al Zawahiri and…the emir of the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan Mullah Haibatullah, may Allah protect them and support them,” Ghaly said.

Ghaly’s stated allegiance is entirely consistent with how al Qaeda’s global network is structured.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-al-qaeda-groups-reorganize-in-west-africa.php


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Mosul Antworten mit Zitat
Zur Schlacht von Mosul:

Zitat:
A month has passed since Iraqi pro-government forces began to try and push the extremist group known as the Islamic State out of the western side of Mosul. And the Islamic State, or IS, group appears to be becoming increasingly desperate, fighting to the death with no regard for civilian lives or property and no apparent escape routes.

One Mosul local described what the IS fighters were doing as a “scorched earth policy”. They had not launched any successful attacks, they were shelling indiscriminately, bombing areas that were no longer under their control, and were basically trapped, he said.

In a recent press statement Lieutenant General Talib Shaghati, head of the Iraqi counter-terrorism forces who are leading the fight to retake the northern city confirmed this, saying that, we “are not fighting a regular army with clear methods and plans. We are fighting an extremist organization that changes its tactics all the time and does not follow any rules. This is an organization that has no consideration for any humanitarian issues in war.”

http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/security/5545/Mosul-Locals-Explain-Extremists%E2%80%99-Desperate-Tactics.htm


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Belgien Antworten mit Zitat
CNN-Doku zur belgischen Islamistenszene:



_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Black Crows Antworten mit Zitat
Arabische Fernsehserie über das Leben im IS:

Zitat:
A mother travels to Syria to find her son after he ran away to join the Islamic State. A Christian renounces her faith and plots to blow up a church. A black-clad matron tells teenage girls to rest up before they are raped by extremist fighters.

These frighteningly familiar stories of life under the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria will this month become plotlines on prime-time television across the Arab world.

A sprawling, 30-part dramatic series is scheduled to make its debut on MBC 1, the Arab world’s most watched satellite channel, during the holy month of Ramadan, said Ali Jaber, the director of television for the MBC Network.

The network shared with The New York Times video, available below, from three episodes of the show, “Black Crows.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/world/middleeast/isis-ramadan-tv-drama.html?_r=0


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag IS in Libyen Antworten mit Zitat
Liberales Zeug halt, aber lesenswert:

Manchester Attack Highlights Foreign Fighters in Libya

Zitat:
The phenomenon of foreigners traveling to fight in Libya is not new. According to U.S. officials, dozens of such individuals arrived to join the rebellion against Muammar Qadhafi's regime as early as September 2011. Since then, foreign fighter involvement inside Libya has developed in two phases: the first related to al-Qaeda's network (2011-2013), and a second related to the IS network (2014-present). This is not to say that al-Qaeda members are no longer operating in Libya, but the vast majority of foreign fighters present there since 2014 have been more closely associated with IS. And while North Africans have consistently arrived in higher numbers than other nationalities during both phases, IS recruitment efforts in Libya have resulted in a far more diverse group overall.

In the first phase, the key organizations involved in facilitating foreign fighters in Libya were al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Mokhtar Belmokhtar's group al-Murabitun (which has since rejoined AQIM), Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), and Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST). At the time, AQIM mainly used Libya as a base for transferring and storing weapons, which had flooded the market following Qadhafi's fall. These arms were then trafficked to Algeria, Mali, and Tunisia in particular.

Meanwhile, al-Murabitun was using southern Libya as a safe haven following France's early 2013 intervention in northern Mali. Unlike AQIM's focus on weapons trafficking, Belmokhtar's group treated Libya as a launch point for mass-casualty attacks in Algeria and Niger that year.

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/manchester-attack-highlights-foreign-fighters-in-libya


Tip of the Spear? Meet ISIS’ Special Operations Unit, Katibat al-Battar

Zitat:
On a mild November night last year, nine EU citizens roamed the streets of Paris with guns and explosives, murdering and injuring hundreds of civilians. In the days and weeks afterward, France declared emergency laws, Britain voted to expand the bombing of ISIS in Syria and ISIS supporters launched their own social media response on Twitter with #PrayforRaqqah.

But many of the most important questions around Paris remain unanswered. Where did these men come from? Were they part of a group? Who instructed them to commit these acts?

The following investigation reveals that a little-known group of battle-hardened and highly capable Libyans are the common factor behind many of the major terrorist attacks in Europe and North Africa since 2014.

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/02/16/tip-of-the-spear-meet-isis-special-operations-unit-katibat-al-battar/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Zum Jihadismus Antworten mit Zitat
Seine politischen Schlussfolgerungen sind für den Müll, doch die Kritik der Extremismustheorie kann man durchaus teilen:

Zitat:
Conceptually, violent extremism suffers from vagueness. While its promoters were right to place emphasis on ideology, they were reluctant to focus on any particular ideology. As one Obama administration report put it: “Violent extremists have many motivations and are not limited to any single population, region, or ideology.” The concept thus comprises a broad range of unsavory actors, from far-right extremists to eco-terrorists to jihadis — a one-size-fits-all approach to all sorts of unrelated bad guys. It often suggests that those drawn to violent extremism are mentally unstable, socially disconnected, or otherwise troubled or delusional. In a certain context, of course, these are important factors to consider, but by and large jihadism should not be seen as a movement of the rationally impaired. It has a logical and coherent ideology and appeals largely to the sane. It is not mindless, amorphous radicalism.

https://www.scribd.com/document/348081174/Jihadism-on-Its-Own-Terms-Understanding-a-Movement


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Boko Haram Antworten mit Zitat
Rezension zweier Bücher über Boko Haram:

Zitat:
The rise of northern Nigerian Islamic extremist group Boko Haram has garnered a great deal of attention from American policymakers in recent years. That interest compounded after the 2014 kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls in Chibok, an event that galvanized grass-roots anger and demands for an international response around the globe. As attention to the crisis grew, however, misunderstandings about the group’s origins, motives and connections (or lack thereof) to international Islamist extremist organizations have abounded.

Several new books provide important correctives to the many misperceptions about Boko Haram. In the next two installments of our African politics summer reading series, we’ll examine three of these books to try to develop a better understanding of the movement, its supporters and critics, and how ordinary northerners see themselves as Muslims and Nigerian citizens. We’ll start today with two excellent new books by political scientist Brandon Kendhammer and religious studies scholar Alexander Thurston, respectively.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/23/how-to-understand-boko-haram/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Alltagsleben Antworten mit Zitat
Einige Einblicke in den Alltag von IS-Kämpfern:

Zitat:
The soldiers do one final check of the bodies. On the young man in the shadows, they find some cash - a small amount of Syrian pounds, almost worthless. But in his other pocket, there is something small and far more valuable - a memory card from a mobile phone.

The pictures on it will lead us to uncover fragments of the lives of the dead men, the deep camaraderie among them, their brutality, and their journey through the battle for Mosul. And it will cast light on the dead fighter in the shadows. Who was this young man and what secrets of Islamic State did he leave behind?

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/is_fighters


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Philippinen Antworten mit Zitat
Ein Artikel über die Situation in Marawi:

Zitat:
The seizure of Marawi represents the greatest challenge Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has faced since taking office last year, and one of the most significant and concerted attempts by insurgent groups to seize and hold territory in the history of the Philippines.

Over a month later, much of the city remains occupied by militants despite significant operations by the Philippine armed forces. In this time, over 400 people have died, and almost 400,000 have been displaced. Beyond the immediate challenge of removing the insurgent groups from the city, the seizure of Marawi has exposed several key dynamics of militancy in the Philippines, with significant implications for the future of the Islamic State in the country.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/22583/what-the-militant-takeover-of-marawi-reveals-about-isis-in-the-philippines


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Philippinen Antworten mit Zitat
Ein ausführlicher Artikel zur jihadistischen Galaxie auf den Philippinen:

Zitat:
For years a member of ASG, one of the most ruthless militant organizations in a part of the Philippines known for its long history of extremism, and a friend and brother-in-arms of Hapilon, Abu Jihad is now concerned the militant group's recent successes will embolden further attacks.
He tells CNN his former friend's brutality "will not end only in Marawi."
Now a reformed jihadi who denounced militancy while imprisoned, he is desperate to use his life's experience to warn against the excesses of his former comrades. He requests anonymity from CNN -- he is fearful his enemies will find him and kill him for speaking out against violent jihad.
"They might succeed (in holding Marawi)" he tells CNN from an undisclosed location, his face obscured to prevent identification.
"But they also know, in case they might not succeed (in holding Marawi), at least they have been tested. They have tried."

http://edition.cnn.com/2017/07/02/asia/former-abu-sayyaf-militant-abu-jihad/index.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Philippinen Antworten mit Zitat
Noch ein Artikel zur Situation im Süden der Philippinen:

Zitat:
As fighting in the southern Philippine City of Marawi recedes, there is much to take stock of. The six week siege of the city by the Islamic State pledged Maute Group and a faction of the Abu Sayyaf tested the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and it has led to a regional concern that Mindanao is, once again, a black hole in regional security. The toll was high: 70 members of the military and police, 27 civilians, and 290 militants were killed according to recent estimates, and more bodies are being recovered as security forces comb through the rubble. Over 246,000 civilians were displaced. The city is in ruins.

There is much to write about Marawi: the intelligence failure; the fact that the Maute Group had conducted a similar siege in Butig in November 2016; President Rodrigo Duterte’s single-minded attention on the war on drugs rather than the growing threat by terrorist groups. We can question Duterte’s decision and justification for declaring martial law. We can debate whether the decision to drawdown the U.S. Special Forces contingent in 2014 was the right one, or whether, if they had stayed, the AFP would have conducted itself better or more professionally. And we can analyze the rift between the AFP and Duterte over U.S. assistance and provision of intelligence.

But here I want to ask just one question: is another Marawi-style siege likely? And, relatedly, what this mean for the United States?

http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/why-another-philippines-terrorist-attack-is-coming/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Mosul Antworten mit Zitat
Überlebende aus Mosul erzählen:

Zitat:
“When students went to to school, it was step-by-step curriculum to get them to join IS,” says Khalil*, 17, in Khazer camp. “It’s like you grab one end of the rope and pull it then, bit by bit, you get convinced by them.

“Some of my friends were convinced.”

The “rope” of IS indoctrination included physical drills then beheading dolls then, according to one young man, decapitating cats. All was in preparation.

But if school was supposed to be a field of mass indoctrination, here IS largely failed. Parents rebelled en masse and kept their children home.

http://www.theage.com.au/interactive/2017/mosul/hussein/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Philippinen Antworten mit Zitat
Reportage aus Marawi:



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"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Jihad und Business Antworten mit Zitat
Interessanter Artikel über die Verbindungen von Jihadisten mit Schmuggelnetzwerken und lokalen Eliten:

Zitat:
This fragmentation is what gives Islamists their competitive edge. Unlike ethnic or tribal warlords, who only appeal to their own kin, Islamists can tax across those divisions, offering protection to business elites from multiple ethnic and tribal groups. The ethnic warlord and the Islamist are running rival protection rackets, charging the business class “taxes” in exchange for security; but while the ethnic warlord is forced to tax his narrower ethnic kin base, the Islamist can use religious identity to override local divisions and attract business buy-in across ethnic and clan lines. The Islamists are therefore able to offer the business class a simplified, low-cost, single-payer security model that cuts across ethnic and clan lines—a cost-effective alternative to paying taxes to multiple warlord protection rackets. Indeed, by selling security across local divisions, the Islamists can also offer a lower tax rate than rival ethnic or tribal warlord protection rackets; the wider their consumer base, the lower their prices. As the chairman of one of the largest business associations in Mogadishu told me, “For every $100 we were paying to the warlords, we could give the Islamic Courts $35 to remove them.” In war, the Islamists offer a better deal, and this deal has in turn fuels the rise of their power.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2017-10-05/making-jihad-pay?cid=int-fls&pgtype=hpg


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Ölschmuggel Antworten mit Zitat
Wohl einer der Gründe, warum der IS noch nie ein Attentat in Italien verübte:

Zitat:
According to Assopetroli, Italian Association of companies in the oil sector, the illegal oil market in Italy caused a loss as high as 2 billion euros in tax revenues in 2016, with over 10 billion liters of gasoline sold on the black market.

An illegal business of this magnitude can hardly survive without a very wide network of operators. Meanwhile, Italian oil giant Eni has reported cases to Italian authorities in which operators offered prices that were too low to be fair and where payment methods were unusual and possibly resulted from illegal activities. This is how ‘Dirty Oil’ investigation by the Attorney General of Catania, Sicily, began.

Last week, nine people were arrested, while 50 were under investigation as part of this probe. Italian officials and members of the Finance Guard believe that between 2015 and 2016 over 30 vessels loaded with 80,000 tons of illegal gasoline worth 30 million euros managed to reach Sicily from Libya. In fact, this seems to be the tip of the iceberg, as the network is much wider.

https://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2017/10/30/A-million-dollars-per-day-welcome-to-ISIS-s-oil-smuggling-empire-.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Sahel Antworten mit Zitat
Artikel zum IS in der Sahelzone:

Zitat:
The area in Niger, near the border with Mali, is known to host groups loyal to both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State and has long been used as a smuggling route for arms, drugs and people. Just over a week ago, gunmen killed 13 Nigerien soldiers in an attack on their base, not far from where the joint patrol was ambushed, the latest in dozens of assaults unleashed in the past two years.

The chief suspect in the Oct. 4 ambush is a group affiliated with the Islamic State operating in a desolate area that has long suffered from poverty and government inattention.

“They are presenting an alternative to a state that villagers associate with corruption and neglect,” said Corinne Dufka, a regional director for Human Rights Watch who has studied the area for years.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/world/africa/niger-ambush-isis.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag IS vs. MB Antworten mit Zitat
Spannungen zwischen dem IS und den Muslimbrüdern in den ägyptischen Knästen:

Zitat:
The political dynamics inside Arab detention centers have ramifications far beyond the prison walls. Jails in the Middle East have long forged radical extremists, including the Egyptian intellectual godfather of Islamic extremism, Sayyid Qutb, and the founder of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian ex-convict whose al-Qaeda in Iraq later morphed into ISIS. Alleged ISIS supporters find prisons to be fertile soil, especially in brutal Arab regimes like Egypt. There are numerous signs ISIS has begun using prisons that are intended to confine them and limit their activities to expand their influence and even plan operations. Egyptian authorities and activists believe former prisoners recruited by ISIS in jail were behind suicide bombings of churches in Cairo in December and on Palm Sunday this year in Alexandria and Tanta.

https://www.buzzfeed.com/borzoudaragahi/prison-fight-between-isis-and-the-muslim-brotherhood?utm_term=.qpmdODMjZw#.fjOXaqzRAw


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Tagebuch eines Australiers Antworten mit Zitat
Ein australischer Arzt scheint mit seinem Waisenhaus im Kalifat mässig erfolgreich gewesen zu sein:

Zitat:
But the chance discovery of what is believed to be Dr Kamleh's diary in the group's former de facto capital of al-Raqqa has revealed a very different story. The handsome Australian paediatrician wrote that he was in "despair" about the so-called caliphate, according to a British man who has read the document.

Whatever he said for the cameras, in his private moments Dr Kamleh bemoaned that other IS fighters refused to donate to an orphanage he was involved with and even lamented the way they treated animals.

http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/suspected-diary-of-tareq-kamleh-reveals-australian-doctors-despair-with-is-20171110-gzj1gc.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Raqqa Antworten mit Zitat
Ein geheimer Deal erlaubte es etlichen IS-Kämpfern, Raqqa unbeschadet zu verlassen:

Zitat:
The BBC has uncovered details of a secret deal that let hundreds of IS fighters and their families escape from Raqqa under the gaze of the US and British-led coalition and Kurdish-led forces who control the city.

A convoy included some of IS’s most notorious members and – despite reassurances – dozens of foreign fighters. Some of those have spread out across Syria, even making it as far as Turkey.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/raqqas_dirty_secret


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Kommentar von Lower Class Mag zum BBC-Artikel:

Zitat:
Ja, dieser Deal ist auch aus den Erwägungen zum „Schutz der eigenen Leute“ zu befürworten; und zum Schutz der Familien der Daesh-Kämpfer, die eben nicht per Kollektivstrafe alle umgebracht werden sollten, wie sich das deutsche Schreibtischtäter wünschen.

Den „Skandal“ kann hier nur sehen, wer tatsächlich ein Menschenleben in Paris, Washington oder Berlin für maßlos wertvoller hält als eines in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa oder Minbic. Die offen ausgesprochene Forderung ist: Ihr Kurden und Araber, sterbt für unsere „Sicherheit“, auf dass die Weihnachtsmärkte und Bummelmeilen von unbekümmertem Lachen erfüllt werden. Denn gestorben wird in Raqqa, nicht am Kuhdamm.

http://lowerclassmag.com/2017/11/gestorben-wird-in-raqqa-nicht-paris/


Wie die Jihadisten das Elend der Bauern aufgrund der Dürre ausnutzten:

Zitat:
Circling like vultures among the stalls of the town’s fertilizer market in Iraq’s northern Salahaddin governorate, they’d arrow in on the most shabbily dressed farmers, and tempt them with promises of easy riches. “Join us, and you’ll never have to worry about feeding your family,” Saleh Mohammed Al-Jabouri, a local tribal sheikh, remembers one recruiter saying.

With every flood or bout of extreme heat or cold, the jihadists would reappear, often supplementing their sales pitches with gifts. When a particularly vicious drought struck in 2010, the fifth in seven years, they doled out food baskets. When fierce winds eviscerated hundreds of eggplant fields near Kirkuk in the spring of 2012, they distributed cash. As farming communities limped from one debilitating crisis to another, the recruiters—all members of what soon became the Islamic State—began to see a return on their investment.

https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/11/climate-change-drought-drove-isis-terrorist-recruiting-iraq/


Zur IS-Präsenz in Puntland:

Zitat:
The Islamic State group burst into public view in Somalia late last year as dozens of armed men seized the port town of Qandala in the northern Puntland region, calling it the seat of the “Islamic Caliphate in Somalia.” They beheaded a number of civilians, causing more than 20,000 residents to flee, and held the town for weeks until they were forced out by Somali troops, backed by U.S. military advisers.

Since then, ISIS fighters have stormed a hotel popular with government officials in Puntland’s commercial hub of Bossaso and claimed their first suicide attack at a Bossaso security checkpoint.

https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2017/11/13/us-targeted-isis-in-somalia-could-be-a-significant-threat/#.WgrtHMunOqp.twitter


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Sehr ausführlicher Artikel über geflüchtete IS-Mitglieder:

Zitat:
Another man said he had retrieved ISIS members and their families from smuggling hot spots along the Turkish border, some speaking languages he didn’t understand. “I smuggled Iraqis, Syrians, and people who did not speak Arabic,” said the man, a Syrian in his thirties who once worked as an electrician. “They told me that they came to support the Muslims in Syria. We have to help those people who came to support us.”

No one but the jihadis themselves can say what their intentions were in leaving — and whether they remain active members of ISIS or have abandoned it in the wake of its military defeats. ISIS was defined by the physical territory, once larger in size than Texas, that made up its hardline state. Now that state, which the militants had boldly declared a caliphate, is finished — ISIS controls just small pockets of territory and loses more by the day. Yet US intelligence officers say that the kind of escapees the smugglers describe will contribute to ISIS’s long-term survival, and that they will help to define what the terror group becomes next.

https://www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/how-isis-members-fled-the-caliphate-perhaps-to-fight?utm_term=.oaO08ROmZ#.tgYgZR9V4


Kalifat und Barbarei Teil 4:

Zitat:
La prise de Raqqa est hautement symbolique puisque la cité, aux mains de l’EI depuis juin 2013, avait été sa capitale politique (même si son administration avait été transférée plusieurs mois auparavant à Mayadine, à 175 km en aval sur l’Euphrate). Un mois plus tard, à Abou Kamal, une bataille d’une importance stratégique – sur laquelle nous reviendrons – signait véritablement la fin du Califat en tant qu’entité territoriale protoétatique. L’effondrement de l’EI semble refermer une parenthèse, celle de l’affrontement entre le Mal et le reste du monde ; désormais, l’actualité syrienne sera celle du conflit initial, cette guerre civile qui a mis fin et fait suite à la contestation sociale de 20111. En dépit des années d’un processus de libanisation qui a vu s’affronter des centaines de milices et groupes armés plus ou moins soutenus par des puissances étrangères, le conflit touche à sa fin.
Les prolétaires avaient eu le choix entre se faire tout petits, émigrer ou choisir un camp (le métier de soldat, le seul en tension dans la région, ayant l’avantage de fournir un salaire et un repas). Mais, désormais, la normalisation approchant, chacun se prépare à une exploitation plus rationnelle et plus classique de toute cette main-d’œuvre qu’on imagine docilisée par des pluies de bombes et de ruines.

https://ddt21.noblogs.org/?page_id=1906


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Die Geschichte von Emilie König:

Zitat:
Emilie König went from being a barmaid in Brittany to a notorious recruiter for Isis. French sociologist and documentary maker Agnes de Feo, who met König tells The Local how the daughter of a French policeman ended up among the ranks of the terror group.
The story of Emilie König has perplexed France.

Since news of her arrest emerged earlier this month the country has been asking how the 33-year-old former nightclub barmaid from the town of Lorient in Brittany ended up featuring on UN and US blacklists of dangerous Isis jihadists?

https://www.thelocal.fr/20180108/how-a-french-nightclub-barmaid-became-a-notorious-isis-recruiter


In Sirte ist nicht viel wieder aufgebaut worden:

Zitat:
Libyan militias, aided by U.S. Special Forces and airstrikes, drove out Islamic State militants from their stronghold of Sirte in December 2016, ending their brutal rule and aspirations for an alternate capital in North Africa. A year later, this sprawling coastal city remains deeply scarred physically and psychologically.

Whole neighborhoods are flattened. Thousands of families have yet to return. Many who have come back are renting in half-destroyed buildings. Schools and hospitals are partially functioning, as are businesses. Streets are covered in garbage. The smell melds with the stench from sewers that don’t work.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/01/08/feature/a-year-after-isis-left-a-battered-libyan-city-struggles-to-resurrect-itself/?utm_term=.761beef05d79


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag AQ rekrutiert IS-Kämpfer Antworten mit Zitat
In verschiedenen Regionen sollen Kämpfer des IS zur AQ übergelaufen sein:

Zitat:
The recruitment campaign started last summer, even before Isis had lost its final strongholds, underlining the importance al-Qaida attach to winning over fighters and resources from its rivals.

One such effort was launched by al-Qaida militants in Algeria in August. Ten fighters who had been with the small Isis affiliate in the country switched allegiance after debates with Islamic scholars loyal to al-Qaida, local security sources reported. A second was launched in Syria in September.

In the Sahel region of north Africa, senior al-Qaida officials are believed to have reached out to the extremist commander whose men are thought to have ambushed and killed four US special forces in Niger in October.

Around the same time, a pro-al-Qaida news wire in Yemen boasted of the “repentance” of many Isis fighters who had been discouraged by their leaders’ religious approach, behaviour and by “mistreatment”, and who had recently joined its ranks. In Afghanistan a group of Isis fighters in the remote but strategically important central province of Ghor defected to the Taliban.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/19/al-qaida-recruit-from-islamic-state-affiliates-isis


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Verwaltung von Mosul Antworten mit Zitat
Text über die IS-Verwaltung in Mosul, Teil 1:

Zitat:
Indeed, some were already acting as a kind of shadow government – “taxing” businesses and extorting a percentage from every municipal contract. Those who failed to comply were often kidnapped and shot.

“We paid them a percentage of every contract for a decade,” said Azzam, an electrical engineer at the department of energy. “Eight percent. The head of our directorate would get a phone call from them before every bidding process. They chose who would win and who got appointed to what job. A third of all new vacant positions were set them. No one dared to disobey. Those who didn’t pay were kidnapped. Every government institution was infiltrated, even the police.

“When Mosul fell, they appeared on the surface.”

https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jan/29/bureaucracy-evil-isis-run-city-mosul


Teil 2:

Zitat:
Like many other diwans (ministries) that Isis established in Mosul, as part of their broader effort to turn an insurgency into a fully functioning administrative state, the Diwan al-Siha (ministry of health) operated a two-tier system.

There was one set of rules for “brothers” – those who gave allegiance to Isis – and another for the awam, or commoners.

“We had two systems in the hospitals,” Wassan said. “IS members and their families were given the best treatment and complete access to medicine, while the normal people, the awam, were forced to buy their own medicine from the black market.

“We started hating our work. As a doctor, I am supposed to treat all people equally, but they would force us to treat their own patients only. I felt disgusted with myself.”

https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/jan/30/mosul-isis-apartheid?CMP=share_btn_tw


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ISKP Antworten mit Zitat
Russland unterstützt nun offiziell die Taliban:

Zitat:
Administration officials cited a huge concern at United States Central Command, which largely runs the war in Afghanistan, about the return of safe havens. Russia is also worried that an increased Islamic State presence in Afghanistan will further radicalize the Caucasus; as a result, according to Central Command officials, Moscow began supporting the Taliban as a counterweight, sending its fighters weapons and night vision goggles.

At a Senate hearing last week, Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said the Islamic State in Khorasan intended to “expand ISIS’ self-declared caliphate and compete with the Taliban for recognition as the dominant militant group in the region.”

He also said that Al Qaeda had “retained the intent and limited capability to threaten coalition and Afghan forces and interests in the region,” a reference to the American-led NATO coalition that has been fighting in Afghanistan.

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/12/world/middleeast/military-safe-havens-afghanistan.html?smid=tw-share


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Antworten mit Zitat
Untersuchung zur Ökonomie des IS-Kalifats (reisserischer Titel, für einen FAZ-Artikel):

Teuflische Blaupause: So funktionierte der IS-Terrorstaat

Zitat:
Die „New York Times“ hat 15.000 Seiten Dokumente aus dem Reich der Dschihadisten zusammengetragen und ausgewertet. Sie liefern Hinweise darauf, das die Gefahr brutaler Gottesstaaten nicht vorüber ist.


_________________
"We houden er niets van de prietpraat, die in de rest van Nederland gedaan wordt. We zijn er gewoon op de man, een woord is een woord, een hand een hand en een vuist is een vuist." (Hafenarbeiter aus Rotterdam)
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Beitrag Timbuktu Antworten mit Zitat
Schon älterer Bericht über AQ in Timbuktu:

Zitat:
From April 2012 until January 2013, al Qaeda and its local ally, Ansar Dine, attempted to establish an Islamist theocracy in the northern Mali city of Timbuktu. Hundreds of documents found in the hastily abandoned offices of the Islamic police and the sharia court show how the radicals meticulously created institutions meant to implement their harsh version of Islamic law, which included destroying historic shrines and ancient manuscripts in the ancient city. The Islamists only fled after a French military intervention helped the Malian army wrest Timbuktu from their grasp.

The extremists commandeered a local establishment named La Maison — a fancy, French-owned hotel designed to resemble a traditional Malian home, made of brown clay — as the headquarters for their Islamic court. In one of the upper rooms of the hotel, stacks of papers detailed the punishments to be meted out. In the same room, a rope lay on the floor. According to a local man, who did not want to be identified, the rope was used for floggings — a common sentence delivered by the Islamic court.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/14/inside-the-islamic-emirate-of-timbuktu/amp/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Interview mit Shekaus Mutter Antworten mit Zitat
Interview mit der Mutter von Abubakar Shekau, dem Anführer der dissidenten Fraktion von Boko Haram:

Zitat:
Shekau was an almajiri. In the generations-old tradition, almajirai are sent off by their parents to study the Quran in schools locally known as a tsangaya, where a teacher coaches the dozens, sometimes hundreds of male students, to memorize the entire Quran.

Almajirai beg on the streets for food, and it is believed that Shekau did the same. At some point in his studies, Shekau, according to his mother, met Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, who condemned Western education as sinful. Falmata says her son was brainwashed.

https://www.voanews.com/a/voa-interview-mother-of-boko-haram-leader/4438375.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag ... Antworten mit Zitat
Welt kündigt Tod des ranghöchsten Deutschen beim IS an:

Zitat:
Seyam galt als einer der bekanntesten Islamisten der Bundesrepublik mit langjährigen Verstrickungen in der dschihadistischen Szene. In den 90er-Jahren lebte er zeitweise mit seiner deutschen Frau auf dem Balkan und produzierte Propagandavideos über islamistische Kämpfer im Bosnienkrieg.

Nach dem Al-Qaida-Anschlag auf Bali im Oktober 2002, bei dem mehr als 200 Menschen getötet wurden, wurde Reda Seyam zudem verdächtigt, ein Drahtzieher und möglicher Finanzier des Attentats gewesen zu sein. Die indonesischen Behörden nahmen den Islamisten fest, ließen ihn nach einigen Monaten allerdings wieder frei.

Bei der Rückkehr nach Deutschland wurde Seyam von BKA-Beamten begleitet, um eine Verschleppung durch US-Geheimdienste zu verhindern.

https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article180026322/Terrorismus-Der-ranghoechste-Deutsche-beim-IS-Reda-Seyam-soll-tot-sein.html


Ausführlicher Bericht über die Massaker gegen die Drusen in der Provinz Suweida:

Zitat:
The militants knocked on doors – sometimes calling out locals by name – and slaughtered families. Meanwhile, they deployed snipers outside the town limits, and took up entrenched positions in the towns.

In most homes the militants left a single survivor as a witness to their brutality, said Monther. Some of the Isis fighters had tied their legs together in what appeared to be a symbolic statement that they would fight to the death without fleeing.

As news of the attack spread, local youth and militiamen took up arms. At the same time, at least four suicide bombers entered Sweida city. One bomber blew himself up at the vegetable market, another two in the city centre and the fourth detonated his vest in a building after being cornered by locals in the southern part of the city. About 30 people were killed by those attackers.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/27/isis-knocked-on-doors-calling-out-locals-by-name-and-slaughtered-families


Jihadismus im Gefängnis und "Deradikalisierung" in Belgien und Deutschland:

Zitat:
Europe has seen fewer deaths from terrorist attacks since the policies went into effect. But now European officials are grappling with a new problem: how to prevent prisons from becoming training and recruitment centers for future terrorists. From Belgium and the Netherlands to Germany and France, law enforcement officials are experimenting with markedly different approaches to the problem, including reeducation programs and the near-total isolation of the most radicalized inmates. The efforts are a race against time, as many of the jailed returnees will regain their freedom in less than two years.

“They come to the end of their sentence, and we have no choice but to release them,” said a Belgian official who helps supervise the treatment of Islamist inmates in that country’s largest prisons. The official, like several others interviewed, spoke on the condition of anonymity out of concern that former inmates might target them.

“Some of them,” the official said, “could be human bombs.”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/europe-isis-prisons/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.88f554bdd393


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Marawi ein Jahr danach Antworten mit Zitat
Von Marawi ist nicht viel übrig geblieben:

Zitat:
In the months before the Marawi standoff, two of the extremist groups had joined forces. One was the group led by Isnilon Hapilon that was based in the Sulu Peninsula of Mindanao. He had broken from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1994 and helped form a more militant movement, Abu Sayyaf. This movement — as much a criminal gang as a political organisation — became wealthy through kidnapping and holding hostages for ransom. They gained international notoriety by kidnapping foreigners and beheading those for whom ransom was not secured. In 2016, Hapilon was said to have pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph of the Islamic State, affiliating his group with the international ISIS movement.

Another group, led by two brothers, Omar and Abdullah Maute, had a history similar to Abu Sayyaf but in a different part of Mindanao. They were based in Lanao del Sur, the region surrounding Marawi, and they had broken off from the mainstream Moro movement that that was dominant in that area of central Mindanao, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Like Abu Sayyaf, the Maute Brothers Group gained their income through extortion and threats. Sometime in 2015 or 2016, the brothers joined forces with ISIS, proclaiming their movement to be a branch of this international jihadi organisation, and began working closely with Hapilon and his formerly Abu Sayyaf branch of ISIS.

https://thewire.in/world/in-eliminating-isis-philippines-broke-the-hearts-of-a-city-and-its-people


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag IS Khorasan Antworten mit Zitat
Ausführlicher Bericht über die IS-Provinz Khorasan (Afghanista/Pakistan):

Zitat:
Since the beginning of 2018, Afghanistan has been shaken by multiple political crises, from provincial officials refusing to step down, Taliban attempts to endanger major provincial cities and expand from rural areas in the never ending war, and a crisis of legitimacy coming from former warlords like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Vice President General Abdul Rashid Dostum, who has now returned to Afghanistan after spending 14 months in self-imposed exile in Turkey. However, it is still the most dangerous terrorist group in the region that frequently occupies headlines and demands the attention of major political players in the region – the Islamic State Khorasan Province.

Islamic State first appeared in Afghanistan in 2014, when the first militant network pledged bayat, or allegiance to the group originally from Iraq. The appearance of these groups was a direct consequence of the proclamation of the so-called Caliphate on June 29, 2014, first by its spokesperson Mohammad al-Adnani in his “This Is The Promise of Allah” speech, released by al-Hayat Media Center, and confirmed a few days later on July 5, with ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi giving his first sermon as the supposed “Caliph” in the Iraqi city of Mosul.

https://thedefensepost.com/2018/07/31/afghanistan-isis-khorasan-province/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Spion im IS Antworten mit Zitat
Geschichte eines irakischen Spions im IS:

Zitat:
The driver was sweating as his white Kia pickup truck sped along a rain-slicked Baghdad highway toward a neighborhood bustling with open-air markets.

With every jolt and turn, his pulse quickened. Hidden in the truck’s chassis was 1,100 pounds of military-grade explosives that the Islamic State planned to use in an audacious attack on New Year’s Eve shoppers in the Iraqi capital.

A reckless driver on Iraq’s notoriously chaotic roads might clip him, accidentally setting off the bomb. A clash at one of Baghdad’s frequent checkpoints could escalate into gunfire, potentially igniting one hellish fireball.

But there was another reason he was afraid. The driver, Capt. Harith al-Sudani, was a spy.

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/world/middleeast/iraqi-spy-isis.html


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Irak Antworten mit Zitat
Der IS ist nicht wirklich "besiegt" im Irak:

Zitat:
On that fall night near Hawija, Imad, a father of five who asked that his real name not be used because he fears reprisals from both ISIS and the Iraqi security forces, told his brother to get a gun, while he himself slowly stepped into the dark. These days, almost no one dared venture outside after dusk. Everyone knew that the night belonged to ISIS.

“Who is it?” Imad called out.

“Come closer,” a male voice replied from the shadows.

“What do you want?”

When there was no answer, the brothers opened fire, repelling the intruders. But the militants would soon return, pressuring the family to give them food and water and spreading fear across the village.

Incidents like this one have become daily occurrences in this remote patch of northern Iraq, an area spanning thousands of square miles across the provinces of Kirkuk, Salahuddin, Diyala, and Sulaimaniyah. Just seven months after Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared victory over ISIS in Iraq, the jihadists have regrouped and are stepping up guerrilla-style attacks.

https://theintercept.com/2018/09/16/isis-has-not-vanished-it-is-fighting-a-guerrilla-war-against-the-iraqi-state/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Banda Vaga Antworten mit Zitat
"Thesen zum Islamismus" von Banda Vaga:

Zitat:
Seit den Terroranschlägen von Al-Qaida am 11. September 2001 und der Schreckensherrschaft des Islamischen Staats (IS) im Irak und in Syrien ist der Islamismus auch im Westen zu einem Dauerthema der politischen Auseinandersetzung geworden. Längst hat der bärtige Islamist den bösen Russen als zentrales Feindbild im Hollywood-Kino abgelöst, und kaum ein Abend vergeht, an dem nicht in einer Talkshow über die weltpolitische Bedrohung durch den islamistischen Terror diskutiert wird. Die journalistische und wissenschaftliche Flut an Interpretationen und Theorien ist kaum noch zu überschauen, lediglich brauchbare materialistische Analysen tauchen wenn überhaupt nur vereinzelt auf. Darum erscheint es uns dringend notwendig eine linke Debatte über das Wesen des Islamismus und den Umgang damit in Gang zu setzen.

https://www.kosmoprolet.org/de/thesen-zum-islamismus


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Kriegskasse des IS Antworten mit Zitat
Trotz Gebietsverlust kommt immer noch ziemlich viel Kohle rein:

Zitat:
The Islamic State has also buttressed financial holdings with a diversified funding portfolio. It has developed a knack for raising money through a range of new criminal activities, including but not limited to extortion, kidnapping for ransom, robbery and theft, drug smuggling, and trafficking in antiquities. These activities do not require holding territory, but there are risks involved for individual insurgents, who could, at least in theory, be caught. However, the chances of being arrested are minimal, as even at this late date, there are still no security services or police forces in Iraq or Syria capable of conducting the type of policing activities that would deter widespread criminality. In the near future, the group can also reinvigorate revenue streams that have become dormant by extorting populations living on the periphery of where government control extends. During the years they were in control, Islamic State members meticulously collected personal data from the population that includes detailed information on assets and income, as well as the addresses of extended family members. This critical intelligence on the population provides the group with more leverage in intimidating and extorting civilians, allowing it to replenish cash reserves in the process.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/10/isiss-new-plans-to-get-rich-and-wreak-havoc/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Ausländische Kämpfer in den Händen der YPG Antworten mit Zitat
Keine Lösung in Sicht:

Zitat:
Rund 120 Deutsche warten hier auf ihren Prozess oder ihre Rückkehr nach Deutschland, Mitläufer, Frauen und Kinder, aber auch etwa ein Dutzend hartgesottener mutmaßlicher Terroristen. Der wohl brisanteste Fall ist der von Marcia M., 29, und ihrem Ehemann Oğuz G., 39. Sie stehen im Zentrum eines bislang unbekannten Terrorplots, der ein Blutbad in Deutschland anrichten sollte. Anhand von Ermittlungsakten und Gesprächen hat die ZEIT rekonstruiert, was der IS in Deutschland geplant hatte und wer der mutmaßliche Drahtzieher im Hintergrund war. Marcia M. und Oğuz G. haben in diversen Vernehmungen eine Art Lebensbeichte abgelegt, zuerst gegenüber der amerikanischen CIA, später auch gegenüber dem deutschen Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).

https://www.zeit.de/2018/43/islamischer-staat-syrien-rueckkehr-verhandlung


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
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Beitrag Boko Haram Antworten mit Zitat
Sehr eindrücklicher Dokumentarfilm über Frauen, die Boko Haram entfliehen konnten:

Zitat:
Quel che resta di me

Un eccezionale documento sul gruppo di Boko Haram, che in Nigeria, soprattutto nel Nord, semina paura e terrore in nome della Jihad.

https://www.raiplay.it/video/2018/09/Doc-3-d03a380b-423e-46df-aa20-0a3d9202132f.html


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"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
18. Oktober 2018, 17:10 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
Beiträge: 1574
Wohnort: Stadt

Beitrag ISWA Antworten mit Zitat
Zum IS in Westafrika:

Zitat:
Originally ISWA and Boko Haram were one group working under the same banner. In March of 2015 then leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, pledged allegiance to ISIS and within days this pledge was accepted by the IS spokesperson. For approximately a year Boko Haram operated as the IS West Africa affiliate. However, by August of 2016 the cracks had begun to show as ISIS central had become increasingly frustrated with Shekau after his continued attacks against muslims in Nigeria. An attempt was made by IS to remove him as head of the group and replace him with Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the son of Boko Haram’s original founder, Muhammed Yusuf. This coup-like attempt was prevented by Shekau leading to a major split between the groups; Shekau led a smaller faction of terrorists under the original name of Boko Haram, while the larger group established IS West Africa province, led by al-Barnawi.

https://elintnews.net/2018/11/15/brief-overview-of-the-expansion-of-isis-in-west-africa-iswa/


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
15. November 2018, 15:57 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
Doc Sportello



Anmeldedatum: 10.09.2012
Beiträge: 1574
Wohnort: Stadt

Beitrag Buchrezension Antworten mit Zitat
Eine kritische Buchrezension zum IS:

Zitat:
Même si ce n’est évidemment pas une loi mécaniciste, force est de constater que l’État islamique compte bien plus de leaders issus du prolétariat pauvre ou des classes moyennes salariées qu’al-Qaida. Al-Qaida a tendance à vouloir attendre « le bon moment » pour fonder le califat, leurs stratèges de guerre lisent Mao et Che Guevara, tandis que ceux de l’État islamique ont plutôt tendance à lire Marighella et à vouloir le califat « ici et maintenant ». Pas de califat sans capital, évidemment, mais celui de l’État islamique provient bien davantage d’une économie du pillage que des bourgeois dans ses rangs. Et malgré la perte d’une bonne partie de son territoire, le groupe n’a de toute évidence pas perdu son trésor de guerre.

http://dndf.org/?p=17435


_________________
"Die kommunistische Theorie kann nichts anderes sein als gebunden an die gesellschaftliche Praxis der proletarischen Bewegung, sie ist weder 'marxistisch' noch 'anarchistisch'." Jean-Yves Bériou, 1975.
15. Dezember 2018, 14:33 Benutzer-Profile anzeigen Private Nachricht senden
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